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

Winter 1979

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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FOREWORD

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Volume XXXI, Number 3/Sequence 270 Winter 1979

Cover: President's House (Quarters AA), Naval War College

TAKING STOCK

Practical men tell us it's a good idea from time to time to check our assets against our liabilities. Today we are long on technical knowledge, short on courage. For light on hard topics like courage I like to start with a ray of ancient wisdom.

Aristotle was a practical hardnosed scholar and no-nonsense teacher. He wrote the first textbooks for a dozen academic disciplines including physics, biology, logic, psychology and political science. Although time has passed him by in some fields, a recent winner of a Nobel prize for genetic research said that the award should rightly go to the old master from whose treatise on embryology he lifted some of his prize-winning ideas on sperm chemistry. Skeptics may chuckle about that, but in the area of moral philosophy, Aristotle's preeminence endures. In the field of military ethics, Aristotle is one of the few writers who actually spells out the qualities that one rightly expects to find in the heart of a warrior, whether a fighting man of the 5th century B.C. or of World War III.

The exemplary moral virtue of a military man, says Aristotle, is courage. Because it is a moral virtue, involving feeling and well as reason, one achieves it by avoiding the pitfalls of excess (rashness) or defect (cowardice). In this way Aristotle introduces his concept of moral excellence—the mean. The mean doesn't signify "moderate" or fence-sitting, but rather the center of a target,

avoiding on the one hand gutlessness and on the other show-off irresponsibility. Endurance is a major component of the classical Greek concept of courage. Aristotle's teacher, Plato, defined courage as "endurance of the soul." Although the Greeks acknowledge the value of the single brave thrust or audacious dash, their hero was more often the man who "hung in there" when the going got tough. Both Plato and Aristotle specified that courage had to be exercised in the presence of fear. Aristotle described courage as the measure of a man's ability to handle fear.

A correlative of courage is the ability to deal with failure. Just as a military leader is expected to handle fear with courage, so also should we expect him to handle failure with emotional stability—another way of saying endurance of soul. I'm not talking about the leader being a "good loser"; I mean his ability to meet personal defeat with neither the defect of emotional paralysis and withdrawal nor the excess of lashing out at scapegoats or inventing escapist solutions. (Faced with monstrous ingratitude from his children, King Lear found solace in insanity. The German people, swamped with merciless economic hardships, sought solace in Adolf Hitler.)

Humans seem to have an inborn need to believe that in this universe a natural moral economy prevails by which evil is punished and virtue is rewarded. When it dawns on trusting souls that no such moral economy is operative in this life some of them come unglued. Aristotle had a name for the Greek drama about "good men with a flaw who come to unjustified bad ends"—tragedy. The control of tragedy in this sense is the job of education. The only way I know how to handle failure is to gain historical perspective, to think about men who have successfully lived with failure in our religious and classical past. When we were in prison we remembered the Book of Ecclesiastes: "I returned and saw that the race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise nor riches to men of understanding, nor favors to men of skill, but time and chance happeneth to them all."

Today the statement that life is not fair has drawn ridicule. But it's true nevertheless. For that interpretation of a good man's defeat I prefer the original poem of the Book of Job—the way it was before some ancient revisionist historian spliced on a happy ending. The story of Job goes a long way in explaining the "Why me?" of failure. That God can allow evil to be visited upon upright and honest men is something we must be prepared to deal with.

How does one handle failure? One can develop or learn that special kind of courage that can prepare us for the occurrence of failure and diminish its worst effects. Historical perspective allows us to assess within the framework of the past the relative importance of injury and disappointment—even a misfortune that may seem cataclysmic and the end of the world. Measured historical perspective will allow an optimism of hard work to grow. That's my definition for a studied outlook born of knowing that failure is not the end of everything, that a man can always pick himself up off the canvas and fight one more round.



J.B. STOCKDALE
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

On 16 August 1978 the Under Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable R. James Woolsey, delivered the principal address at the Convocation of the 95th Class of the Naval War College. Much of his address will be of interest and value to Review readers and the following is adapted from it.

DIFFERENT VALUES – COMMON GOAL

by

The Honorable R. James Woolsey

The military promotion system tends to value highly and to promote those individuals who are competent operators. You [military officers] are thus products of a system that rewards you for becoming skilled in organizing for combat, for readily subordinating your own will to that of a superior, and for being able to obtain the loyalty and dedicated service of your own subordinates. Your training is focused on learning how to apply force against an enemy's weak point, on analyzing problems from a conservative, some would say a worst case, perspective in order to ensure that you always have enough to do the job. You stress the need to prepare solidly for any contingency and not to engage in rash or emotional action–as Teddy Roosevelt put it, to speak softly but carry a big stick. This is a largely coherent and useful set of values.

But it will come as no great surprise to you that much of civilian society and a number of those in the civilian government hierarchy with whom you must work do not share many of these values and characteristics. Those that can potentially get the most from their War College experience are those who are not merely defensive or scornful about that, but those who try to puzzle it out, those who can get outside themselves enough to wonder about, explore, and understand these differences. It's a perplexing business.

But this is an important and necessary effort for several reasons. In the years following World War II there was in Congress, in the executive branch, and in positions of authority in civilian society as a whole, a vast reservoir of Americans who had served with honor and pride in World War II. Although they had known the exasperating and bureaucratic side of military life–they had served under their Captain Queegs and many had viewed the world from the perspective of Willie and Joe–they also had known hours of greatness and glory in uniform. They knew that they had been engaged in a vast cooperative enterprise with comrades in arms that in a very real sense had saved the world from barbarism.

That generation is passing. One now needs to be able to work with a generation of civilian leaders, both in Washington and in communities around America, who are from the generation of the student deferment.

I don't need to tell you that the last war, the war for which we did not mobilize, was the most unpopular in our history. Increasingly in future years when you deal with a civilian counterpart, an Assistant Secretary, a Member of Congress, or whomever, you will not be dealing with someone who served prominently on Eisenhower's staff, or who helped run the OSS. You will not even be dealing with a Willie Keith, the central figure in the *Caine Mutiny*, who entered the war as a young dithering confused brat and emerged from it as the competent, even courageous, last skipper of *Caine*. You will be dealing with many men and women who came into adulthood looking upon you and many of your values as part of the problem, not as part of the solution: veterans not of the Battle of the Bulge, but of the demonstrations in 1970 against the invasion of Cambodia.

Ernest May of Harvard, in his fascinating book *"Lessons" of the Past* describes some of the misuses of history in making foreign policy over the last several generations. One central problem is that people seem to have a difficult time learning from events further back than those that shaped their own youth. This is partly because of the decline in the study of history in our schools and colleges, a development about which I may wring my hands with you another time. In any case, the generation of civilian leaders of the 1920s and the 1930s had learned the lesson of how Europe stumbled into World War I, of how the "merchants of death" and entangling alliances created wars, and they vowed that it would not happen again. Much of that generation concluded, for example, that international agreements alone would suffice to restrain the military appetites of potential aggressors, and that the notion of "America First" was compatible with the appeasement of Hitler. Because of their mistakes the next generation learned a different lesson, and made different mistakes. Having seen what appeasement had brought in the 1930s, the next generation spent much of the late 1960s and early 1970s avoiding another Munich, in the jungles of Southeast Asia.

The point is clear. The generation that is now coming into positions of authority and prominence in the civilian community is a generation that will require some effort for you to understand and work with. Many of their assumptions are not yours. They are products of a recent history that has far more in common with the agony and ambivalence of the World War I era than with the triumphant victory of World War II. What can you do about that? How can you work with them? How can you communicate with them? What can you read to understand their assumptions better? When is the last time you read a thoughtful history of Europe or the United States that deals with the 1920s and 1930s? What about the series of naval treaties that occurred during the 1920s and 1930s? Did they work or not? How did Carl Vinson and others get the two-ocean-Navy built during the 1930s? And so on.

Apart from problems of generation and experience, what about the differences between you and those in civilian society with whom you must deal that stem from the different heritages of your professions? The list is long but let's take two of the largest civilian species in the Washington Zoo--the economists and the lawyers. What makes them tick? How are their professional assumptions different from yours? How did the economist become such an important advisor to government? What was the course of

Lord Keynes' career in Britain and why did he become a model for many other economists? Have you ever read a biography of him? Why is everything from the overall size of the federal budget to the flight characteristics of the next generation of Marine close support aircraft heavily determined by models constructed by economists or by those who approach decisionmaking with a similar set of tools? From what intellectual tradition do our current economists spring? Does economic man provide a reasonable basis for predicting human behavior, especially in war? Are there other competing intellectual traditions and visions of society and the role of government? Would the British philosopher Edmund Burke have designed a military compensation system the same way a group of modern economists does?

And lawyers, my God, the lawyers. Like the all-pervasive thick fog that permeates London in the opening pages of Dickens' *Bleak House*, his classic dismemberment of the Victorian legal system, you can't go anywhere—Congress, the executive branch, or your local city council—without plowing into them. Why are they always haggling over jurisdiction? Why do they always seem to first stake out a strong position and then compromise? What is the root of their emphasis on the procedural aspects of decisionmaking? How can they defend a guilty man or honorably turn from careers in the private sector to government and back again? Why did Brandeis and Frankfurter become their models? What have you read by or about either of these men?

I can only answer a few of these many questions myself, but I will draw one conclusion: it is only the sort of officer who asks these kinds of questions and ponders them who will be capable of being more than an executor of civilian decisions. It is only the officer who worries these sorts of problems, who restlessly turns to history or philosophy or novels or other sources for admittedly partial and imperfect answers, who will be the sort of thoughtful colleague, advisor, and teacher, that many in the civilian world, particularly in Washington, will need in the years to come.

For War College students: this year you have a chance to explore such matters—to step back and do some reading and listening and talking that can help you look into the recent history of our country—the judgments that we've made, and what we're becoming. The questions I've asked and the areas I've suggested are not the ones you need explore. But I know now that if by next July you've become captured by any such chain of inquiry—if you've got caught in any one sequence of reading and discussion that gets under your skin and leads you to examine how you and your profession fit into our country's government and society, and into our world, if you apply yourself to any such inquiry with the same sort of dedication with which you would plan a military operation, then the year will have been a pearl of great price. You will then not only have learned some things about the world outside your profession, you will have learned something about yourself. And that's the highest and most important course of study the Naval War College or any college has to offer.

Ψ

SALT I and the Vladivostok Agreement are fact. SALT II is at hand. Some possible, if vague, points and problems of SALT III may be discerned. An "outsider" here presents a survey and offers suggestions.

SALT UNDER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

by

J.I. Coffey

Introduction. President Carter (and key members of his administration) seemingly have an approach to arms control different from that of the Ford and Nixon administrations, which generally ranked strategic arms limitations below improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations. While they sought limitations that could curb the arms race and, they hoped, achieve strategic stability, they did not push their proposals to the breaking point; instead, they relied more on U.S. defense programs to achieve U.S. objectives–including that of the ability to "win" a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.[1] This emphasis on the potential contributions of strategic arms limitations to détente made it possible for these Administrations to regard as "successes" outcomes such as SALT I and the Vladivostok Agreement, even though these affected strategic nuclear forces only marginally.

Mr. Carter has seemingly been less concerned than his predecessors with détente (which he attacked during his Presidential campaign) and even more concerned than they about Soviet weapons buildups. Conversely, he has displayed more empathy for arms control, calling at various times for progress on mutual force reductions, for curbs on arms sales, for limits on force deployments, for an end to nuclear testing and even for the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons.[2] He has therefore sought to head off threats from the Soviet Union by seeking cuts in and curbs on strategic nuclear forces, in preference to countering these threats by unilateral weapons programs. This paper will discuss the approach to SALT taken under the Carter administration, to include not only the philosophical and the pragmatic differences between this approach and that taken by the

Nixon-Ford administrations but also the effect on U.S.-Soviet relations, the implications for strategic stability and some of the problems in and with SALT.

The Carter Proposals. When the Carter administration took office, it inherited both an agreement reached by President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok in November 1974 and a set of negotiations designed to flesh out that agreement in treaty form. The Vladivostok Agreement provided for:

1. Identical U.S./Soviet ceilings of 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers), with freedom to "mix" these, i.e., to alter existing numbers and ratios of SNDVs;

2. Identical U.S./Soviet ceilings of 1,320 launchers for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs);

3. A ban on the construction of new ICBM silos or other fixed ICBM launchers, and on the conversion of "light" ICBMs to "heavies," a restriction that had been part of the SALT I Agreement;

4. An understanding that intercontinental bombers carrying air-launched ballistic missiles (and, according to Soviet sources, air-launched cruise missiles with ranges in excess of 2,500 kilometers) should be counted against the number of MIRVed launch vehicles allowed.[3]

The Vladivostok Agreement, as might be expected from any short document resulting from a brief meeting, left open or obscure a number of issues that necessarily preoccupied the teams negotiating SALT II. One of these was whether the President and the General Secretary had agreed to limitations on air-launched cruise missiles, as Moscow contended and Washington disagreed.[4] Whether this was or was not the case, the conferees began to talk as though such limitations were part of the agreement and to discuss how cruise missiles should be limited, in terms of range, and whether the bombers carrying them should also be counted against MIRVed SNDVs. Another issue that arose, as it had after SALT I, was how to define "light" and "heavy" missiles, as the unilateral definition given by the United States in 1972 (that a "heavy" ICBM was any missile larger than a "light" ICBM) was neither determinable nor acceptable; moreover, the Soviets could argue, with perfect truth, that their newer ICBMs, although very much larger than earlier models, did not violate the explicit proviso that "the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased"—that is to say, by more than "10-15%."[5] A similar problem plaguing the negotiators was that of how to count "heavy" bombers. One issue was whether to charge entire inventories against the 2,400 total or only those aircraft in operational squadrons, which would make U.S. force figures significantly lower. Another and more controversial issue was whether to count the Soviet Backfire B, a new bomber that is larger than old U.S. and Soviet "medium" bombers, though smaller than "heavy" ones. And then there were the problems of counting mobile ICBMs and of verifying the limitation on numbers of MIRVed missiles, as some Soviet types come in a number of modes, some MIRVed and some not. In brief, the Vladivostok Agreement, though it established "equality" in numbers of SNDVs and in MIRVed launchers, and set these limits for a period of 10 years, by no means resolved all the problems attendant on implementing that agreement—much less those deriving from issues that were not tackled, such as that of banning new weapons or precluding significant qualitative improvements in existing ones.

Although he made no public statements to this effect, it may be that

President Carter, like many others, felt that the Vladivostok Agreement simply registered existing or proposed weapon systems, rather than imposing curbs on them. Moreover, it is certain that Mr. Carter disapproved of the negotiating tactics of the previous Administration, specifically of those of former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. He may also have been motivated by a desire to reach decisions concerning strategic nuclear forces that could affect the defense budget that he had inherited from the Ford administration and could help him carry out his campaign commitment to trim some billions of dollars from that budget. Whatever the reason, or combination of reasons, Mr. Carter and his advisors put an effective halt to ongoing negotiations on the implementation of the Vladivostok Agreement while they prepared several new proposals which were conveyed to General Secretary Brezhnev by U.S. Secretary of State Vance in March 1977.

The "Comprehensive Option." The first and most far-reaching proposal submitted by Mr. Vance called for:

1. Reducing the overall force ceiling on ICBMs, SLBMs and intercontinental bombers from 2,400 to 1,800-2,000;

2. Reducing the 308 modern large ballistic missiles ("Heavy" ICBMs) authorized the U.S.S.R. under SALT I to 150 SS-9s and/or SS-18s;

3. Reducing MIRVed launchers from 1,320 to 1,100-1,200, with a subceiling of 550 on land-based missiles;

4. Freezing the deployment of all ICBMs, banning modification of existing ones, and banning the development, testing and deployment of new ones;

5. Eliminating mobile ICBMs;

6. Limiting flight tests for ICBMs and SLBMs to 6 each per year;

7. Precluding all cruise missiles with ranges over 2,500 kilometers (1,350 nautical miles) and requiring that airborne cruise missiles with ranges over 600 kilometers (324 nautical miles) be launched from no aircraft other than "heavy" bombers.[6]

The "Comprehensive Option," if accepted, would have gone far beyond the Vladivostok Agreement. For one thing, it would have reduced markedly the number of SNDVs allowed and, to a lesser degree, the number of MIRVs authorized. For another, it would have placed comparatively low subceilings on MIRVed ICBMs and on "heavy" Soviet ICBMs. For a third, it would have imposed qualitative constraints on missiles (notably on ICBMs) through limits on flight tests, through constraints on the modification of existing ICBMs, and through a ban on new ones. Finally, it would have resolved the cruise missile-Backfire controversy by putting limits on the range (though not the number) of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and by excluding the Backfire from the proposed agreement. The net result would have been deep cuts in Soviet strategic nuclear forces (and lesser ones in American SNDVs), the capping of ongoing Soviet weapons system programs and the cessation of U.S. plans for new ICBMs, delays in the time when current missile systems would attain high accuracies, and some minor limitations on ALCMs—though not GLCMs (ground-launched cruise missiles) or SLCMs (submarine-launched cruise missiles). In sum, the "Comprehensive Option" was, as its name implies, both more extensive and more far-reaching than the Vladivostok Agreement.[7]

Vladivostok With Cruise Missiles. The U.S. fallback position was to settle temporarily for the basic agreements reached at Vladivostok, deferring disputed points such as the question whether to count the Soviet Backfire bomber and whether to put constraints on cruise missiles until later. Although the Backfire is in production, and long-range cruise missiles are not, the latter

would add significantly to American strategic nuclear capabilities, and particularly to its hard target kill potential. Moreover, the lack of any constraints on cruise missiles meant that the United States would, in the absence of any new agreement, be free not only to develop sea-launched and ground-launched versions, as well as air-launched ones, but to deploy the former types in areas close to the Soviet Union and to disseminate them to the NATO allies. Thus it is understandable that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko should not only denounce this proposal but also resurrect previously buried issues, such as the deployment of forward-based systems in Europe and the question of not transferring strategic weapons to third countries.[8]

The Current Draft Agreement. Following Soviet rejection of its March proposals, the Carter administration reconsidered its positions and engaged in extensive negotiations with the Soviet Union at various levels. Although these have not been concluded, it looks as though any new agreement will take the following form:

1. Ceilings of 2,250 on SNDVs, with a subceiling of 308 on modern large ballistic missiles (this being the number the Soviets already have) and a precise definition of what constitutes a "modern large ballistic missile."

2. Continuation of the 1,320 limit on MIRVed vehicles, but with new subceilings of 820 on ICBMs and of 1,200 on all missiles;

3. Heavy bombers carrying air-launched cruise missiles would be counted as MIRVed vehicles, as would any wide-bodied commercial aircraft adapted to this mission;

4. Range limitations of 2,500-3,500 kilometers would be placed on all cruise missiles;

5. Cruise missiles up to this range could be developed and tested during the next 3 years, but none with ranges over 600 kilometers (324 nautical miles) could be deployed, except for ALCMs;

6. The Backfire bomber will not be counted but the Soviet Union will give separate assurances concerning the rate of production, the bases to which it will be deployed and its potential for in-flight refueling.[9]

7. Some constraints will be placed on the development and testing of new missiles—though there is still disagreement as to the form these should take and the weapons to which they should apply.[10]

An agreement along these lines, whether or not it was the version favored by the United States, would still allow the Soviets to achieve, by 1985, a significant hard-target kill capability, based on large numbers of sizable warheads for current and future ICBMs. The totals reached would, however, be less than under the Vladivostok Agreement and the capabilities for knocking out U.S. ICBMs reduced—or at least delayed. Moreover, the United States would gain considerable freedom to develop cruise missiles of all types and would have the ability to deploy sizable numbers of ALCMs—though not as many as if its variant of the Vladivostok Agreement had been accepted. Perhaps most importantly, the potential agreement would place some limitations on the development of new weapons and would facilitate verification, as both sides have apparently agreed to count all missiles of a given type as MIRVed once one such missile has been tested in a MIRVed mode. Thus this "Current Draft Agreement" should achieve more than did the Vladivostok Agreement, if less than the "Comprehensive Option," and it should, in the "Statement of Principles" that will accompany it, set objectives for future arms limitations.

Supporters of the Carter administration may argue that these achievements result from the President's initiative in "throwing down markers," an argument that suggests that the "Comprehensive

Option" should be viewed more as a goal than as a proposal. Opponents may, as one already has, describe Mr. Carter's policies as a "rooster's quadrille: a great puffing out and then a gradual drawing in." Both would probably agree that it will be more difficult to obtain assent within the United States now, because of Mr. Carter's apparent fallback, than would have been the case earlier. Whether or not this latter judgment turns out to be true depends, in part, on the attitudes and images of U.S. political elites which, as the debate on the Panama Canal showed, are unlikely to be affected by facts. It may in part, however, depend on assessments of the progress made by the Carter administration toward its announced goals and the desirability of these goals.

SALT and U.S.-Soviet Relations. One factor to consider in the approaches to SALT of the Carter administration is their effect on U.S.-Soviet relations, as in a circular fashion the status of these relations will affect the prospects for agreement on strategic arms limitations and proposals for arms limitations can, as will be seen, affect these relations. Obviously, such proposals are only one among many factors, ranging from the intensity of the U.S.-Soviet competition for influence through differing concepts of détente to the character and scope of economic interactions; hence their effect may be only marginal. Nor should the effect of SALT proposals on U.S.-Soviet relations be the prime consideration in drawing up those proposals, as other objectives (such as strategic stability) and other interests (such as the maintenance of alliance cohesion) also affect proposals—as they should. Nonetheless, because it takes two to agree, anyone evaluating SALT under the Carter administration must look (as that Administration should have) at potential Soviet responses to various proposals.

One must begin by noting that the Soviet interest in strategic arms limitations, like that of the United States, is both mixed and contradictory. On the one hand, the U.S.S.R. evidently desires to push "military détente" as a complement to "political détente" in order "to accomplish one of the most important tasks of our time—the task of limiting and ending the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race."[11] While it is impossible to appreciate fully all the motives for this Soviet interest, a number are obvious. One is to preclude the development by the United States of new weapons, such as the B-1 bomber or its successor, the Trident SLBM, and the cruise missile, which could at least complicate, if not threaten, the task of maintaining adequate Soviet strategic nuclear forces. Another is to reduce the cost of maintaining those forces, which will require extensive upgrading and modernization if they are to meet the dual requirements of survivability and combat capability; even under the current Draft Agreement the U.S.S.R. will have to replace over 1,000 ICBMs to complete this process.[12] A third motive may well be concern lest failure to reach agreement on strategic arms limitations not only poison U.S.-Soviet relations but strengthen the "right-wing elements in the United States" who, in the Soviet view, are seeking to promote "American imperialism."[13]

This does not mean that the U.S.S.R. is prepared to accept any and all agreements that may be proposed—as the history of SALT shows. One reason for this is that the Soviets have a different view of the strategic balance, which does not seem nearly as advantageous to them as many Western analysts argue that it is.[14] Another is that Soviet concepts of deterrence, and of the ways in which strategic nuclear forces should be employed in the event deterrence fails, differ markedly from those of many Americans, in that they call for forces potentially capable of "winning" a nuclear war.[15] A third (and somewhat contradictory) factor is Soviet insistence

on strict equality and the avoidance of unilateral advantages, or, to put it in the words of a *Pravda* editorial, any new agreement "should consistently embody the principle of equality and equal security for both sides . . . while giving no one a one-sided advantage."[16] A final point, at least for here, is that the U.S.S.R. tends to negotiate slowly, cautiously, and from agreed points of departure and hence is likely to be upset by sudden and drastic changes in negotiating positions—particularly where these seem to reverse understandings previously reached.

The Nixon and Ford administrations had catered to these predispositions by negotiating agreements that ostensibly were based on the principle of equality and that left largely untrammeled Soviet (and American) programs for the modernization of strategic nuclear forces; indeed, this was one of the criticisms of the Vladivostok Agreement. Moreover, both of these Administrations had moved slowly in negotiations with the Soviet Union, save for flurries in May 1972 at the time of SALT I and in October 1974, when the Vladivostok Agreement was reached, thereby giving time for incremental progress as well as, some critics maintain, for the initiation of programs that might vitiate that progress. Whatever the stated objectives of strategic arms limitations, in terms of maintaining strategic stability and enhancing the survivability of land-based systems,[17] these in practice took second place to political gains—and, some would say, to political careers—with more reliance placed on U.S. technological advantages than on arms control to secure strategic objectives.

Whether the Carter administration was moved by a strong desire to "stake out a position" in arms control (as its defenders suggest) or by the need to disassociate itself from the practices of the previous Administration (as some critics charge) it may well have proceeded without a full understanding of Soviet attitudes and practices; at any rate, the "Comprehensive Option" flew in the face of virtually all cherished Soviet interests. For one thing, while ostensibly preserving "equality" in number of launchers and MIRVs, it called for disproportionate reductions by the U.S.S.R., which would have had to eliminate some 400-600 newer SNDVs, as against 0-100 for the United States. For another, it would have required the Soviet Union to eliminate the SS-16 mobile ICBM, to curtail production of the SS-17, 18 and 19 fixed ICBMs and to forego the deployment of 400-500 MIRVed missiles, while the United States would have given up no MIRVed ICBMs and abandoned only the Minuteman X, still on the drawing board. Moreover, the U.S. proposals were not only markedly disruptive of ongoing Soviet programs but also would have handicapped the Soviet Union in achieving a capability comparable to that of the United States to strike at military targets by:

1. Placing severe limitations on the number of ICBMs (and especially MLBMs—modern large ballistic missiles);

2. Constraining flight testing of missiles, a measure which would, under present circumstances, have more of an adverse effect on the Soviet Union than on the United States;

3. Removing all limits on the number of cruise missiles the United States could deploy (or give to its allies to deploy), a factor of particular importance as these missiles, while slower in response time, are supposed to be more accurate than ICBMs.

And while these measures might help achieve U.S. aims of delaying the time when its ICBMs would become vulnerable, thus enhancing strategic stability by our definition, it is scarcely likely to do so from the Soviet perspective.

Moreover, the "Comprehensive Option" represented, in Soviet eyes, a retreat from the Vladivostok Agreement

in that it called for much deeper cuts in Soviet missiles than had been set by that Agreement, for new constraints on the modernization of strategic nuclear forces, and for a ban on new weapons. Thus it is understandable that the Soviet Union reacted angrily to the "Comprehensive Option" that, it charged, was aimed at "achieving unilateral advantages for the U.S."[18]

Nor did the alternative suggestion that the Soviet Union accept the Vladivostok Agreement without constraints on either cruise missiles or Backfire bombers receive a warm welcome, partly because, in Gromyko's words, the Americans "called a non-strategic plane a strategic plane" but largely because this proposal would "give a green light to the production and deployment of American cruise missiles."[19] And cruise missiles make a considerable difference in strategic nuclear capabilities, especially with respect to attacks on hard targets.

All this is not to say that the Soviets are on the side of the angels; they have their own (sometimes antithetical) goals to achieve and maintain a pronounced silence with respect to areas in which they have advantages, as in the size and throw weight of ICBMs. Nor would the "Comprehensive Option" have been without advantages to the U.S.S.R. in that it would have left it with a greater advantage in counterforce capabilities than if the United States had deployed the M-X.[20] Nevertheless, the net effect of the Carter administration's proposals was to further chill U.S.-Soviet relations, already affected by such developments as that Administration's emphasis on human rights, and to delay for some months the prospect of agreement on strategic arms limitations.

If and when these come, they may well (as defenders of the Administration maintain) go beyond the Vladivostok Agreement; whether they go beyond what might have been obtained had the Carter administration accepted the results of Vladivostok (as interpreted and applied in the negotiations conducted by the Ford administration) is perhaps another matter. And whether any agreement ultimately reached will achieve U.S. arms control objectives with respect to the maintenance of the strategic balance is open to question.

Arms Control and the Strategic Balance. There is general agreement among U.S. officials, past and present, that the strategic balance has shifted over the last 10 years more in favor of the Soviet Union, i.e., that both its absolute and its relative capabilities to wage strategic nuclear war are greater now than they were then. There is equally general agreement that further shifts in the strategic balance may be dangerous, for a variety of reasons:

1. They may give the Soviet Union the capacity to initiate a disarming strike that, even if it is effective only against bombers and ICBMs, could significantly degrade U.S. retaliatory capabilities—especially against such hard targets as submarine pens, ICBM silos, etc.;

2. They may give the Soviet Union an absolute or a relative advantage in the ability to inflict damage on political and economic targets, thereby making the choice of war a more reasonable decision than if the reverse were true. (It is in this context that the scope and the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense programs have aroused so much concern);

3. Further shifts in the strategic balance may, even if they do not result in such dire outcomes, create a situation in which the Soviet Union could believe that striking first could be preferable to striking second, a situation that could induce instability in time of crisis;

4. In these and other ways, such shifts may not only weaken the credibility of the U.S. deterrent but may also affect perceptions of power, thereby giving the Soviet Union an advantage in

negotiations, an enhanced ability to exert pressure on the United States and its allies, or even greater assurance that it can take risky actions without undue fear of consequences.

There is also widespread agreement among officials that the United States, in order to obviate these undesired ends, must maintain "essential equivalence" with the Soviet Union,[21] lest the outcomes described above materialize, and that the attainment of this and other U.S. objectives require a highly survivable TRIAD, capable both of inflicting "unacceptable damage," whatever that may be, and of responding flexibly to direct and indirect aggression by various kinds and levels of attacks on both military and nonmilitary targets, in and out of the Soviet Union. Where differences arise these are, as former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said, with respect to the kinds of capabilities required to deter[22] and in opinions concerning the contribution SALT can and should make to deterrence.

Deterrence and SALT. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, when Secretary of Defense McNamara dominated defense decisionmaking, it was decided that the destruction of one-fifth to one-fourth of the Soviet population and 50 percent of Soviet industrial capacity would constitute unacceptable damage.[23] This in turn would have required the devastation of some 100 Soviet cities, in the course of which as many as 50 to 60 million people might have been killed. When Mr. Nixon came to power, he and his associates decided that this did not constitute "essential equivalence," which required that the United States possess the ability to inflict a level of damage not significantly less than the level of damage the U.S.S.R. could inflict on the United States[24]—a decision that would (because of the denser concentration of population and industry in American cities) have required attacks on some 1,000 Soviet cities, with the probable deaths of over 100 million people. So far as is known, Mr. Schlesinger did not alter this requirement but he did add to it one for "flexible options," i.e., for the delivery of less than all-out attacks against a variety of targets, including Soviet weapons sites, and *his* successor, Mr. Rumsfeld, went still further, declaring that assured destruction should be measured

> —by the size and composition of the enemy's military capability surviving for postwar use;
>
> —by his ability to recover politically and economically from such an exchange.
>
> If the Soviet Union could emerge from such an exchange with superior military power, and could recuperate from the effects more rapidly than the United States, the U.S. capability for assured retaliation would be considered inadequate.[25]

It is obvious that each successive change increased the requirements for strategic nuclear forces, especially as Schlesinger and Rumsfeld envisioned large-scale second strikes against such hardened point targets as missile silos, communications centers and command posts. It is equally obvious that such requirements could be met by strategic arms limitations only if:

1. SALT could drastically reduce Soviet first strike counterforce capabilities, while those of the United States remained high, an approach that led one ex-U.S. official to say that the task of arms control was to reduce Soviet attack capabilities while retaining our own;

2. SALT imposed only minimal controls, which would allow the United States (as well as the Soviet Union) to multiply hard target kill capabilities.

Because the Soviets are neither philanthropists nor fools, this latter approach became the only feasible one.

Although President Carter has endorsed the concept of "essential equivalence" and has pledged that he will "protect the strategic balance,"[26] he has left it to his Secretary of Defense to spell out the implications of these policies. In his first Annual Report to the Congress, Mr. Brown defined essential equivalence as

> the maintenance of conditions such that:
> —Soviet strategic nuclear forces do not become useable instruments of political leverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage;
> —Nuclear stability, especially in a crisis, is maintained;
> —Any advantages in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by U.S. advantages in other characteristics; and
> —The U.S. posture is not in fact, and is not seen as, inferior in performance to the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union.[27]

In a return to the lower levels established by McNamara (under whom Brown once served) the Secretary of Defense defined assured destruction as "the capability at all times to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on the Soviet Union, including destruction of a minimum of 200 major Soviet cities."[28] However, he went on to say that

> Assured destruction cannot be the only response available to the President . . . we must have the flexibility to respond at a level appropriate to the type and scale of his [the enemy's] attack.
>
> As part of that flexibility, we must be able to launch controlled counter-attacks against a wide range of targets—including theater nuclear and conventional forces, lines of communication, war-supporting industry, and targets of increasing hardness: from aircraft runways and nuclear storage sites to command bunkers and ICBM silos. It should be added that a great many of these facilities—including air fields and ICBM silos—could remain priority targets for a second-strike.[29]

If Brown's statements reflect the views of the President, as presumably they do, an outsider can conclude only that the Carter administration has made relatively little change in the requirements for deterrence—and consequently in the requirements for strategic nuclear forces. True, the levels of damage to Soviet society have been reduced below those set by Brown's predecessors; and with them, presumably, the number of secure SNDVs allocated to that component of "assured destruction." However, the continued support for "essential equivalence," and particularly for that part of this concept requiring that the U.S. force posture "is not seen as inferior in performance to the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union," means that post-SALT forces must be higher than purely military tasks may require.[30] And the insistence that these tasks must include the ability, in a second strike, to target "a great many of these Soviet [military] facilities—including air fields and ICBM silos . . . ."[31] means that any SALT agreement must both preserve certain kinds of U.S. capabilities and insure that large numbers of SNDVs are retained.

SALT and War-Fighting Capabilities. Although Brown discusses only retaliatory strikes against the U.S.S.R., this is not the only mission assigned to U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Their assigned tasks seemingly include:

1. Strikes against targets in the theater of operations, either as a complement to or as a substitute for tactical nuclear forces, or as an indication of U.S. intent.

2. Attacks on targets that these tactical nuclear forces cannot reach, such as Soviet MR/IRBMs and

medium bombers deployed in the homeland.

3. Employment against other military targets inside the Soviet Union, including, as Secretary of Defense Brown suggests, "lines of communication, war-supporting industry and targets of increasing hardness: from aircraft runways and nuclear storage sites to command bunkers and ICBM silos . . . ."[32]

And they certainly include second-strike counterforce attacks against residual Soviet SNDVs, in order to insure an American advantage in relative force size, following a Soviet attack.[33]

Granted, these missions do not include that of developing the capacity for a first-strike disarming attack, a capability which Brown, like his predecessors, eschews. If, however, the number of silos and other hard targets to be attacked in a second strike require even a fraction of the 2,000 plus warheads needed for such a disarming strike,[34] the total number of SNDVs that the United States must maintain will remain high indeed--especially since not only fixed ICBMs but some percentage of the aircraft carrying the 3,000 plus ALCMs the United States is planning to procure may be vulnerable to Soviet attack.

Whether the United States should seek to maintain the capability for large-scale second-strike counterforce attacks is open to debate; following attacks of the magnitude of those that the Soviet Union can launch, and the range of targets at which it presumably would strike, it is questionable whether U.S. success in knocking out airfields on which a few laggard bombers might be based, or in destroying silos from which additional missile might be launched, perhaps after several days devoted to reloading, would be all that meaningful. What is not debatable, however, are the implications for SALT of continued adherence to a doctrine calling for extensive combat capabilities, by either side. Such adherence would mean:

1. A reluctance to make substantial cuts, especially in MIRVed ICBMs, on which the United States relies heavily (and the U.S.S.R. even more heavily) for accurate attacks against time-urgent hardened targets;

2. Difficulty in imposing constraints on the modernization of existing weapons, especially where such modernization would increase the number of warheads, improve their accuracy, or otherwise contribute to hard target kill capabilities;

3. Problems in heading off new weapons that would promise to enhance these capabilities, as would cruise missiles and such highly accurate SLBMs as Trident II;[35]

4. Continued threats to strategic stability.

SALT and Strategic Stability. Strategic stability may be said to exist when neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. has such an edge in nuclear delivery capabilities as to make the initiation of strategic nuclear war an acceptable option and when neither country has any incentive to preempt in time of crisis. The first condition is usually related to the capacity for inflicting assured destruction, already discussed, and involves such questions as the overall effectiveness of damage-limiting strikes (on all components of strategic nuclear forces), the efficiency of air defenses, capabilities for conducting antisubmarine warfare operations, the value of civil defense programs, *et cetera*. The second consideration relates more directly to the possibility of degrading the land-based component of strategic nuclear forces, thereby:

1. Reducing a country's ability to launch counterattacks against certain kinds of targets deemed important, such as weapons sites;

2. Conceivably putting that country at a disadvantage in subsequent negotiations, wherein that adversary

would have residual capabilities unavailable to the country which was on the receiving end of a first strike.

Previous Administrations attached considerable importance to maintaining strategic stability under both of these definitions, through SALT as well as through unilateral measures. Thus Ambassador Smith, at the conclusion of the negotiations for SALT I, stated that "an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces"[36]—a view repeated by President Nixon the following year.[37] As is known, Schlesinger was particularly concerned about the vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs to increasing Soviet counterforce capabilities, a situation that he feared could make a partial disarming strike a valid choice for the Soviet Union, whether or not the United States was threatening attack. And Rumsfeld, though less explicit, referred frequently to growing Soviet capabilities to launch a disarming strike and noted the necessity for precluding the Soviet Union from attaining a position in which it could (or could seem to) have "a meaningful advantage."[38]

Despite these concerns, the successive proposals advanced in SALT by the Nixon and Ford administrations were not likely to preclude the Soviet Union from acquiring either the capability to launch a partial disarming strike or that of inflicting disproportionate damage on the United States, the former being a function of the number, the size, and (in the long run) the accuracy of SNDVs, the latter a combination of these factors and the vulnerability of the United States to nuclear attack. The Carter administration, whether from zeal or from ignorance, rushed in where its predecessors had feared to tread, with the "Comprehensive Option" already described.

It is hard to tell whether this approach reflected the same concern with threats to strategic stability manifested by its predecessors; at any rate, references to strategic stability in the Secretary of Defense's posture statement were few and muted.[39] Because Brown did indicate a desire to achieve that stability "through a combination of specific, equitable and verifiable arms control agreement and unilateral force modernization," it is fair to infer that this objective motivated not only him but other members of the Carter administration.[40]

Granting that stability is not the sole objective of strategic arms limitations, which may have other ends ranging from that of maintaining certain kinds of attack capabilities to that of assuaging particular interest groups, it may be worth looking at the extent to which the proposals of the Carter administration might achieve it. Chart 1 shows U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, now and in 1985, under four separate assumptions: no arms control, the Comprehensive Option, Vladivostok with cruise missiles, and the Current Draft Agreement and lists such static indicators as the number of SNDVs, their throw weight, the number of reentry vehicles, etc. It also lists the capacity to destroy hard targets, which is a function of the yield of the warheads, their accuracy and the hardness of the target(s).[41]

1. Under any indicator, Soviet ICBMs contribute much more to Soviet capabilities than do U.S. ICBMs to those of the United States—which may help explain why the Soviet Union has resisted deep cuts in its land-based missile forces;

2. When bomber payloads are counted in, even on a conservative basis (i.e., more than Mr. Nitze would credit but less than Mr. Trofimenko would ask) throw weight favors the United States rather than the U.S.S.R., as is commonly assumed;

3. Under any proposal, the United States is ahead in the number of war-

heads and probably (though it cannot be shown here) in the accuracy with which these can be delivered but behind in the size of warheads—and hence in megatonnage and megaton equivalents.

If one calculates the results of a nuclear exchange or looks at the numerous (and differing) calculations of others,[42] three further points can be made:

1. In any of the five cases described, both sides retain the ability to destroy upwards of 200 cities in retaliatory strikes;[43] thus if one believes that the prospect of 80 to 120 million dead, and the loss of two-thirds to four-fifths of industrial floor space, suffices for deterrence, we have strategic stability—by one definition;

2. These levels of damage in a second strike are inflicted largely by submarine-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles; thus either side can, by striking first, reduce drastically the capabilities of land-based strategic nuclear forces. By that definition, strategic stability does not exist;

3. The United States is better off now than it will be in the future, even under 1985, Case 2: the "Comprehensive Option."

This last point should come as no surprise to anyone following the trends and projections in Soviet ICBM forces that will, over time, further multiply the number of RVs and increase their accuracy, while maintaining fairly sizable warhead yields. As Secretary of Defense Brown said, "the 'Comprehensive Option' of March 30 would delay substantially the time when fixed ICBMs become vulnerable"[44] but neither he nor anyone else has argued that invulnerability can be extended indefinitely. Thus, so far as one type of strategic stability is concerned, the United States either must accept the fact of instability (which, as Brown says, "would not be synonymous with the vulnerability of the United States, or even of the strategic deterrent")[45] or attempt the difficult task of insuring strategic stability through future arms limitations or build other weapons which are not so vulnerable—a move that may inhibit, if it does not rule out, meaningful progress in SALT.[46]

Problems in SALT. Negotiating SALT II. Both sides have made concessions since last March, the United States with respect to the depth of cuts to be made in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the limitations to be placed on modernization, the U.S.S.R. with respect to the ranges of ALCMs, the testing of GLCMs and SLCMs at ranges greater than 600 kilometers and the ceilings to be imposed on MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs. Reportedly, the United States and the U.S.S.R. have come close to agreement on four documents:

1. A treaty of 8 years duration that would embody understanding reached covering ceilings on SNDVs, restrictions on MIRVs, etc.;

2. A 3-year protocol covering temporary limitations that are not ready for longer term resolution, such as new types of ICBMs, mobile ICBMs and cruise missiles;

3. A Joint Statement of Principles setting guidelines for continuing negotiations on strategic arms limitations;

4. A separate set of assurances covering restrictions on the Backfire bomber.

Still at issue are a number of points that could affect the likelihood and timing of an agreement, if not its substance. These include:

1. Disagreement (within the United States Government as well as with the Soviet negotiators) whether the allowable range of ALCMs should exceed 2,500 kilometers, to allow for zigzags while en route to targets, and if so, by how much;

2. Differences over whether the agreed restrictions on the Backfire bomber should be issued in the form of a unilateral Soviet declaration or incorporated in a signed agreement;

3. Questions whether the new ICBMs allowed each side should be limited to one without MIRVs (as the Soviets propose) or one with MIRVs (as the United States suggests) and whether the new SLBM allowed each party should, for the United States, be the Trident 1 (as the Soviet Union wishes) or the Trident 2;

4. Whether there should be a ban on the development of depressed trajectory weapons, that could, because of their shorter flight (and warning) time, threaten the survivability of land-based aircraft.[47]

None of these differences appears insoluble but equally, none is certain of resolution. At the moment these differences are more likely to delay than to halt progress on SALT, especially as the Soviet Union is reportedly eager to conclude an agreement.[48]

Ratifying SALT II. Another problem that may have contributed to the slow rate of progress on the negotiations is potential opposition to the terms of the "intermediate Agreement" as it is now developing. To some extent this opposition arises from the fears of the NATO allies that they will be denied cruise missiles and/or access to the technology required to build them on their own.[49] They have not been wholly persuaded by U.S. arguments that the deployment of GLCMs and SLCMs is precluded only for 3 years (during which time these can be fully developed and their deployment studied) because they fear that the United States may, at the end of 3 years, trade off continued restraint for further Soviet concessions on strategic nuclear forces. And the allies are further perturbed by the seeming U.S. willingness to accept a proviso in SALT II that they will not circumvent the intent of the agreement with respect to cruise missiles by transfers of technology to other powers.[50]

The concerns of the Western Allies are important not only in themselves, in that they can cause hesitancy on the part of U.S. officials, but also in that they reinforce the opposition of important political elements in the United States. Although a poll taken last year showed 77 percent of the people want a SALT agreement, and that only 8 percent are opposed to one,[51] their answers were based on its general desirability, not on specific terms of agreement—and some were skeptical about the probable nature of those terms. Among key members of Congress, some of whom have been briefed on the terms of the "Current Draft Agreement," reaction has purportedly been much more adverse. Senator Jackson, for one, has argued that the proposed agreement would "result in an ever-increasing arms spiral"—largely because it would not end threats to Minuteman ICBMs—and has, along with others, expressed concern lest the 3-year protocol precluding the deployment of M-X be extended, with the result that the United States would be unable to utilize mobile ICBMs. Senator Baker, the Republican leader of the Senate, indicated that "there's a malaise, a sense of concern about it in the Senate" and expressed doubt whether Carter could get a two-thirds vote in approval of the forthcoming agreement; subsequently he indicated that he personally might oppose it.[52] Other critics, such as Mr. Nitze, have expressed alarm over the residual Soviet advantage in ICBM throw weight, and have expressed doubt whether the United States will, at the end of the 3 years covered by the protocol, be able to obtain further concessions from the Russians without trading off the cruise missile.[53] Administration officials reportedly acknowledge that Carter may have trouble getting congressional approval—in part because of the issue of ICBM vulnerability, in part because of his apparent retreat from the "Comprehensive Option" proposed in March.[54] And though these officials have put forward counterarguments, notably to

the effect that while no conceivable agreement could insure Minuteman survivability, the duration of that survivability—and the position of the United States in general—would be better off with an agreement than without it, they acknowledge the difficulty of making further concessions to the U.S.S.R., that twice has charged that the opposition of "Congress, the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex" is responsible for lack of progress in completing an agreement.[55]

Other Problems. Even if one assumes that something close to the "Current Draft Agreement" as portrayed here is signed and ratified, this will not end all problems with SALT as many issues may be deferred until the end of the 3-year protocol and the beginning of negotiations to implement the anticipated "Statement of Principles." Though the number of these problems might be legion, this paper will focus on only two related problems: inhibitions to modernization and reductions in force levels. As noted earlier, the "Comprehensive Option" put forward by the United States called for a number of inhibitions to the modernization of weapons, such as barring the modification of existing ICBMs; precluding the development, testing and deployment of new ones; barring mobile ICBMs; limiting flight tests of SLBMs and ICBMs, and establishing range limitations on cruise missiles. Although one of these (limiting flight tests) has been dropped, and another (barring mobile ICBMs) is now opposed by the United States, the "Intermediate Agreement" will probably provide for a 3-year freeze on the deployment of such ICBMs, will limit the number of new (untested) ballistic missiles that can be developed and will restrict both the ranges and the modes of deployment of cruise missiles. These provisions may, however, create as many problems for the United States as they solve—at least if present strategic doctrine is continued unchanged into the future.

These problems arise from the fact that even with current accuracies and probable yields the Soviet ICBM force will, once the deployment of SS-17s, 18s and 19s is completed, be capable of launching a disarming strike;[56] indeed, the SS-19 alone could probably provide the means to this end. Thus, the specter of "Minuteman vulnerability" will continue to haunt our decisionmakers—as, indeed, it would have even if the restrictions proposed in the "Comprehensive Option" had been adopted. In the absence of SALT, the United States could markedly reduce that vulnerability by building mobile ICBMs, could substitute longer-range (or forward-based) GLCMs for ICBMs, or could deploy Trident II. At the moment, however, all three of these options are likely to be ruled out temporarily by the protocol to the projected treaty, and the subsequent choice of any one could have a major effect on SALT III.

The great advantage of a mobile ICBM, such as the M-X, is that it would insure the maintenance of a survivable, communicable, controllable force capable of rapid employment against time-urgent hard targets. Moreover, the programmed M-X is twice the size of MN-3, has more than twice the thrust (enabling it to carry 7-14 RVs, each more powerful than the 170 KT warhead now carried by MN-3) and is potentially capable of being delivered within 100 yards of the target, compared to the 300-yard CEP of Minuteman III.[57] Thus, the deployment of M-X as presently conceived would give the United States a greatly enhanced counterforce capability, in either a first or a second strike.

This indeed is one of the criticisms of it, namely that this capability may appear so threatening to the Soviet Union that the latter country would preempt in time of crisis. Moreover, its deployment would probably induce the

U.S.S.R. to proceed with parallel developments, such as the deployment of a MIRVed version of the SS-16 mobile ICBM—and perhaps of a larger, more powerful successor. In one sense, this would only restore the "balance" and could even be construed as "stabilizing"; however, it would markedly intensify the arms race. Additionally, it would make verification of the numbers of missiles on either side almost impossible—at least unless the United States and the U.S.S.R. agreed to very intrusive inspection systems. Thus, entirely aside from its costs (which are formidable) U.S. decisionmakers must consider the potential consequences for SALT of choosing, when the 3-year protocol expires, to proceed with M-X.

The second alternative, that of developing long-range GLCMs[58] that would depend for security on dispersal and concealment as well as on mobility, might seem less threatening in that the time required for each missile to reach its target makes it potentially less useful in a first strike counterforce attack. Nor would GLCMs, as presently designed, be able to carry multiple warheads so that even larger numbers would be less effective than the M-X ICBM. However, its relative cheapness would make possible the production of these large numbers at much lower cost than Minuteman X, and the disadvantage of time could be compensated in part by deploying GLCMs overseas—a move that might please the NATO allies, especially if these were given some degree of control over the targets and the launching of GLCMs. This latter choice would, however, undoubtedly increase the virtual Soviet paranoia over "forward based systems," on that account alone prejudicing SALT. So, moreover, would the problem of verification. Thus this option also poses problems for the Carter administration—among them being the additional one that technology may extend with weaponry, and enable new countries to pose potential threats to the United States.

The third choice, SLBMs, is less advantageous, in that these are less responsive (because of the difficulty in maintaining continuous communication) and less rapid, because they may not be in range of the chosen target area. They may also be less survivable than mobile ICBMs or GLCMs, though the breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare that would make missile submarines vulnerable has been projected for 15 years and would, according to one estimate, take at least 15 years to materialize if it did develop.[59] Since, however, a missile like the Trident II could, according to Secretary of Defense Brown, "provide the potential for a capability against the entire Soviet target spectrum, in a highly survivable system . . . ,"[60] it cannot be ignored.

The difficulty here is that the decision to go ahead with a more capable SLBM, on the ground that it is necessary to enhance U.S. counterforce capabilities, may reopen the quest of the Soviet Union for a similar expansion of its capabilities—thereby jeopardizing efforts to ban depressed trajectory missiles, which could threaten the survivability of U.S. bombers. And while one cannot say that the choice of an advanced SLBM would be as prejudicial to strategic arms limitations as would the other two, it would have an effect.

At some stage, moreover, the U.S. program to improve its hard-target kill capabilities is bound to run counter not only to attempts to inhibit qualitative improvements but also to efforts further to reduce force levels. This is true in part because assured survivability may require a multiplication of aiming points—and hence large numbers of launch vehicles. It is more largely true, however, because these launch vehicles must strike at numerous and varied targets, in either a first strike or a second, and this requirement increases the number of SNDVs that must be

maintained—even though some of these, like wide-bodied transports, could carry 50-100 RVs. As long, therefore, as the United States tries to maintain significant combat capabilities, it will find it hard to reduce its delivery vehicles by the 50 percent to which President Carter aspires,[61] and even harder to cut the number of MIRVed launchers by that percentage; in fact, even the "Comprehensive Option" would not have reduced MIRVed launchers by more than 18 percent—and would have reached this lower level only by not counting bombers armed with ALCMs.

However, an even greater obstacle to major reductions in SNDVs is the policy of "essential equivalence" that aims at insuring that "political perceptions [of the strategic balance] are in accord with the military realities . . . ."[62] This policy seems reasonable until one looks both at its bases and its consequences. First of all, there is little hard evidence to support the view that superiority in strategic nuclear forces is translatable into political advantages; in fact experts disagree on this issue, with former Secretary of State Kissinger saying "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?"[63] A second point is that there is even less evidence that perceptions of the strategic balance weigh as heavily on our allies as do other factors, ranging from U.S. economic policy to the attempt of the United States to enhance détente; for example, one senior West German military officer termed the June 1973 agreement between Brezhnev and Nixon on the renunciation of nuclear war "a worse betrayal than Munich."[64] A third point to note is that the problem of persuading people of the existence of "essential equivalence" is very difficult, partly because of the difficulty of applying static indicators,[65] partly because of the fact that preconceptions and biases affect judgments. (For example, Mr. Nitze, no tyro in defense matters, is apparently unpersuaded that bomber payloads, even when increased by some thousands of ALCMs, offset the Soviet advantage in ICBM throw weight.)

A fourth point, and perhaps the most relevant, is that attempts to maintain "essential equivalence" almost inevitably wind up as attempts to establish "essential superiority," i.e., to acquire an edge over the U.S.S.R. that assures even the most doubting of Thomases that the United States is "equal" to its adversary. And even when this extreme is not pursued, the effort requires substantially larger and considerably more costly strategic nuclear forces than would other concepts of deterrence.[66] Needless to say, unless the Soviet Union attaches the same value to weapons systems as does the United States, and hence comes to the same conclusion concerning "essential equivalence," the attempt to acquire this is likely to make strategic arms limitation agreements much harder to reach—and much more expensive if and when they are reached.

Obviously, this problem would not exist if the Soviet Union either structured its forces the same way that the United States has done (which it doesn't) or shared American concepts of deterrence, which it doesn't; instead, Soviet leaders apparently believe that nuclear war can be deterred only if one possesses the forces needed to "win" such a war. Moreover, they seem also to believe that superiority in the "correlation of forces" is required to insure U.S. acceptance of arms control, to promote the relaxation of tensions, and to enable the U.S.S.R. to promote successfully and safely that transformation of the world that it envisions as taking place under the umbrella of "peaceful coexistence."[67] Thus, Soviet concepts, like American ones, may create problems as we go further into strategic

arms limitations—not least of all with respect to reductions in strategic nuclear forces.

What of the Future? It is apparent that the Carter administration is faced with a number of difficult problems, both in its current efforts to arrive at a satisfactory SALT II and in looking toward SALT III. Some of these problems (like the vulnerability of the Minuteman force) are the almost inevitable results of technological innovations of the past 20 years and of decisions made a decade ago—by both U.S. and Soviet leaders. Others may derive from the Administration's own impetuosity in making to the Soviet Union such a far-reaching proposal that the virtually inevitable fallback toward a more negotiable agreement can be portrayed as a retreat—or even as a betrayal of principle. Some problems, like those deriving from concepts of deterrence fashionable among U.S. political elites, and many of the strategic doctrines currently in effect, have been inherited from predecessor Administrations. Here the record is mixed. The Carter administration has changed some of them (such as the concept that deterrence requires a U.S. edge in the capacity for assured destruction—and hence, because the asymmetries in the distribution of people and industry in the United States and the U.S.S.R., an even larger edge in survivable forces), thereby gaining "elbowroom" in the SALT negotiations. Others, such as the need for "essential equivalence," they have accepted in part but not in whole with consequent implications for the numbers and types of SNDVs required—and hence for the possibility of agreement on SALT. On balance they must, at least in recent months, be credited with a more moderate position on defense requirements than their predecessors and, perhaps in consequence, with a greater willingness to push for extensive constraints on strategic nuclear forces.

It is both difficult and presumptuous for an outsider to advise the Government on arms control policy and negotiating positions, not because outside ideas or judgments are inferior to theirs but because outside information is undoubtedly much poorer. Moreover, outsiders have the luxury of detachment as they do not have to assume responsibility for persuading the U.S. Congress and the American people of the desirability of their proposals—though I would be remiss if I did not consider that factor in formulating my proposals. My first suggestion (which does not relate directly to SALT but which could have portentous consequences for future arms limitations) is that the Carter administration further examine the requirements for deterrence—a process it apparently has begun. In my view, this examination should cover:

1. A realistic justification for "essential equivalence" in terms of its importance in the eyes of our allies, its implications for political leverage, and its contribution to crisis stability. While the work at my Center[68] is not yet at a stage where one can confidently make judgments about these matters, it has gone far enough to raise doubts about conventional wisdom—for example, with respect to the importance of military power in affecting crisis outcomes;

2. The essentiality to deterrence of particular kinds of capabilities and uses of them: Is it, for example necessary to strike at civilian targets as well as military ones, or *vice versa*, in order to deter aggression?

3. Does it really matter whether one side or the other has a residual advantage in SNDVs following a first or second strike?

4. To what extent does assured destruction, of whatever level and against whatever targets, need to be proportional to the damage inflicted on the deterrer or related to the kind of damage inflicted, as in a disarming strike?

I must admit that I have no good answers to these kinds of questions, though I have been studying deterrence for more than a decade. Nor can I rule out the possibility that a reexamination of deterrence may result in larger and more diverse requirements for strategic missile forces, given current Soviet beliefs, to which most of our thinking about deterrence seems unrelated. Because, however, the Soviets themselves have argued that "military détente must extend to military-strategic doctrines and concepts"[69] there may be at least a possibility of reconciling our concepts with those of Soviet leaders and arriving at conclusions more compatible with arms control and stability.

My second suggestion is that the Carter administration should, following its reexamination of deterrence, relook both at strategic doctrine (or, if you will, targeting doctrine) and force requirements—a look that is apparently already under way.[70] Pending the results of that relook the Administration should, it seems to me:

1. Avoid committing itself to any new programs that would markedly complicate SALT—as would the deployment of a mobile ICBM, even if this were not accompanied by adoption of the "Multiple Aim Point" Plan.[71]

2. Examine ways of meeting current requirements for survivable retaliatory forces with different weapons (i.e., SLBMs instead of ICBMs or GLCMs).

In the long run the United States (and the U.S.S.R.) will have to choose between the maintenance of certain kinds of strategic nuclear capabilities, and the precarious stability that goes with them, and the more largely assured stability that can come from détente and arms control. At the very least, the Administration should not make that difficult task more difficult by near-term choices based on old concepts.

My third suggestion is that the Administration agree as quickly as possible on SALT II. I am aware of the political implications of appearing to make significant concessions to the Soviet Union and the desire to assuage concern by obtaining marginal improvements that would, for example, extend Minuteman survivability another 2 or 3 years. Against this, however, must be set the probable delay in coming to agreement, during which time weapons systems programs inexorably go on; Soviet anger at this delay, which may jeopardize any agreement; and the fact that neither Soviet policies nor the individuals making them are eternal: should Brezhnev die, chances of any agreement may be small.

At the risk of rushing in where angels fear to tread, I would suggest that the Administration:

1. Settle (if it can) for range limitations on ALCMs closer to the 2,500 km already accepted by the U.S.S.R. than to the 3,250 reportedly desired by the Department of Defense, as the Air Force allegedly plans to mount ALCMs on penetrating bombers as well as on standoff transport-type aircraft.

2. Accept some restrictions on the number of ALCMs that can be carried by any one aircraft or on the total number of ALCMs authorized—a restriction that would still enable the United States to add 2,400-4,800 warheads to its arsenal.

3. Take, if necessary, less precise constraints on the Backfire bomber inasmuch as:

(a) the kinds of constraints sought (as with respect to limits on the monthly rate of production and restrictions on basing) are essentially cosmetic;

(b) the relative contribution of Backfire in a nuclear exchange is, in my opinion, marginal.[72]

This does not mean that I am in favor of resolving all debatable points in favor of the Soviets; indeed, were it possible to reopen the issue, I would, for political and psychological reasons, insist on the "right" of the United States to 308 heavy ICBMs, the number

U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES,[1] 1978-1985

Launch Vehicle	1978	No Agreement 1985.1	Comprehensive Option 1985.2	Vladivostok Accords 1985.3	Intermediate Option 1985.4
Titan II	54	54	0	54	54
Minuteman II	450	450	450	450	450
Minuteman III	550	700	364	550	464
	1,054	1,204	814	1,054	964
A3 Polaris	160	80	0	0	0
C3 Poseidon	496	336	336	336	336
C4 Trident I	0	160	160	160	160
D5 Trident II	0	240	840	240	240
	656	816	736	736	736
B-52 D/F	75	0	0	75	75
B-52 G/H	241	0	150	225	235
B-52 G/H (ALCM)	0	265	100	130	120[2]
FB-111 (A)	66	0	0	0	0
FB-111 H	0	165	0	0	0
	392	430	250	430	430
SNDV	2,102	2,450	1,800	2,230	2,130[3]
MIRVs	1,046	1,436	1,200	1,286	1,320
Throw-weight (000)	26,252	32,074.5	20,051.5	31,732	31,616.5
Warheads	11,182	21,172	14,062	17,482	16,136
MIRV Warheads	6,610	20,428	11,812	13,978	12,512
MT	3,994	4,530	2,987	4,593	4,939
EMT	4,442	6,860.2	4,417.3	6,536	6,054
K'.N Time Urgent	35,362	128,505.1	88,258.6	110,717.1	100,642
K'. N Total		1,442,879.5	361,858.6	604,291.5	482,962

[1]Estimates of yearly launch vehicle totals derived from: *The Military Balance: 1978-79,* International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1978; and Tinajero, A.A., *Projected Strategic Offensive Weapons Inventories of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.: An Unclassified Report,* CRS 77 59F, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

[2]The U.S. retains the option to introduce wide-bodied cruise missile carriers to replace/supplement the B-52 cruise missile carriers.

[3]Though the U.S. under the Intermediate Option retains the right to 2,250 SNDV, it is unlikely that the total may be reached as current programs do not provide sufficient non-MIRV systems.

U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES,[1] 1978-1985

Launch Vehicle	1978	No Agreement 1985.1	Comprehensive Option 1985.2	Vladivostok Accords 1985.3	Intermediate Option 1985.4
SS-7	0	0	0	0	0
SS-8	0	0	0	0	0
SS-9	190	238	0	0	0
SS-11	780	800	296	0	310[4]
SS-13	60	60	0	0	0
SS-16	0	60	0	60	0
SS-17	60	462	0	462	0
SS-18	110	308	150	308	300
SS-19	200	550	514	550	560
	1,400	2,478	960	1,380	1,170
SSN-4	0	0	0	0	0
SSN-5	21	0	0	0	0
SSN-6	544	544	304	544	544
SSN-8	388	0	0	476	0
SSN-18	0	536	536	0	536
	953	1,080	940	1,020	1,080
TU-95	100	100	-	-	-
MYA-4	35	35	-	-	-
	135	135			
SNDV	2,488	3,695	1,800	2,400	2,250
MIRVs	370	1,856	1,200	1,320	1,320
Throw-weight (000)	13,695	22,817	7,851	13,354	11,033
Warheads	4,573	11,312	6,492	9,764	8,222
MIRV Warheads	2,320	9,400	6,188	7,792	7,588
MT	9,837	15,958.4	5,011.6	8,552.4	7,811
EMT	6,547	12,114.7	5,091.8	8,403.4	7,429
K',N Time Urgent	30,748	129,468.6	68,601.9	124,199.6	102,259
K',N Total					

[4]It is assumed that the Soviets will eliminate its aging bomber fleet first under a SALT imposed limit retaining ICBMs instead, although they may opt for maintenance of some bombers as the third leg of a triad.

Legend:

SNDV - Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles
MIRV - Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles
MT - Megatonnage
EMT - Equivalent Megatons
K'N - Time Urgent: Delivered by Ballistic Missiles against Targets of Immediate Military Interest
Total: Includes Slower Cruise Missile Systems

Note: Please refer to footnote #39

which the Soviets are now authorized. Nor would I concede permanent constraints on the transfer of cruise missile technology to the allies—though I might be willing to do so for the 3 years during which the protocol held. In the best of all worlds, there would be no cruise missile and no MIRV, but as these do exist, one must consider ways of using them to enhance stability as well as ways of heading off destabilizing developments.

In this context, my final suggestion would be that the question of cruise missiles, like that of other "gray area" weapons, be taken up in a European context, if not in a larger one. The desires of West Europeans for cruise missiles stem in part from their belief that they have few or no weapons systems that could deter Soviet MR/IRBMs and medium bombers, and certainly none that could be traded off against these weapons. The feeling of these people that they have no bargaining power vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R., in arms control negotiations or outside them, is a factor that must be taken into account. In my opinion, the best way of doing so is not to arm Western Europe with cruise missiles, short-range or long-range, but to use the possibility of so doing to induce the Soviet Union to open negotiations on those weapons systems that so far have fallen between the cracks of SALT and M(B)FR. If this ultimately brings up the question of "forward based systems," or other TNDVs in Western Europe, it will at least do so in a forum wherein all relevant weapons are discussed and in which all interested parties participate, rather than in bilateral negotiations, to which the contribution of West Europeans is necessarily limited.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Joseph Coffey is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and received the Ph.D. degree in International Relations from Georgetown University. He has served on Department of the Army, Department of Defense, State Department, and White House staffs and has been associated with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Institute for Defense Analysis. He is now Professor of Public and International Affairs and Director, Center for Arms Control and International Securities Studies at the University of Pittsburgh.

NOTES

1. For the emphasis on a war-winning strategy, see Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Congress on the FY 1978 Budget, FY 1979 Authorization Request and FY 1978-1982 Defense Programs, 17 January 1977* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977), p. 68. The argument that the United States sought to achieve this capability with little regard for the implications for SALT is justified both by the kinds of proposals put forward by the United States (as at Vladivostok) and by the fact that Mr. Rumsfeld, in 21 pages of discussion on strategic nuclear forces, devotes only one page to SALT, in the course of which he denigrates the potential contributions of arms control to stability. (This document will hereafter be cited as the *Rumsfeld Report*, FY 1978.)

2. See for example, his Press Conference of 24 March 1977, reported in the *Boston Globe*, 25 March 1977, p. 1.

3. *SALT II: Problems and Prospects*, Issue Brief #IB77030, Major Issues System, Congressional Research Office, Library of Congress, 6 May 1977, pp. 2 and 3.

4. *The New York Times*, 15 April 1977, p. 6.

5. *SALT II: Problems and Prospects*, p. 4.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 7. See also Paul H. Nitze, "An Analysis of the Two U.S./Moscow SALT Proposals of March 1977" in Paul H. Nitze, et al., *The Carter Disarmament Proposals: Some Basic Questions and Cautions*, Special Reports on International Affairs, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1977, pp. 10 and 11.

7. For a detailed analysis, see Herbert Scoville, Jr., "The SALT Negotiations," *Scientific American*, August 1977, pp. 24-31.

8. "A.A. Gromyko's Press Conference," *Pravda*, 1 April 1977, p. 2, translated and reprinted in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP)*, 27 April 1977, pp. 7 and 8.

9. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication; Special Report No. 46, July 1978, *The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks*, p. 8.

10. For details of these and other differences, see p. 17.

11. L.I. Brezhnev, speech of 5 April 1977, translated and reprinted in *CDSP*, 4 May 1977, p. 10. See also the report of the meeting between Brezhnev and U.S. Ambassador Toon in *Pravda* for 16 March 1977, appearing in *Soviet World Outlook*, December 1977, p. 4.

12. Rep. Les Aspin, "SALT II or no SALT," January 1978, mimeographed, Fig. 2, p. 9.

13. *Pravda*, 10 July 1976, cited in *Soviet World Outlook*, 15 July 1977, p. 2.

14. See, for example, Henry Trofimenko, "The 'Theology' of Strategy," *Orbis*, Fall 1977, especially pp. 503-504.

15. See, for example, C.G. Jacobsen, "Soviet Attitudes to 'Controlled Strategic Conflict'" in *Current Comment 10*, The Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, May 1976, especially pp. 15-16. This point is made not only by academic analysts but also by specialists from the Central Intelligence Agency, for which see *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government*, Joint Economics Committee, Congress of the United States, Part II, 24 May and 15 June 1976, p. 68. (For a somewhat different view, which links Soviet combat capabilities to the maintenance of a stable military balance and emphasizes that the measures taken should be viewed more as a hedge against the failure of deterrence than as an end in themselves, see Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, Summer 1978, pp. 112-114.)

16. *Pravda*, 14 April 1977, p. 4, translated and reprinted in *CDSP*, 11 May 1977, p. 1.

17. See the statements of these objectives in *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Deterrence Policies and Procurement Issues*, Budget Issue Paper, Congressional Budget Office, Congress of the United States, April 1977, pp. 3-4 and 9-10.

18. "A.A. Gromyko's Press Conference," p. 7. See also the *Pravda* editorial "Strategic Arms Limitation: A Problem that Can and Must be Solved," 14 April, pp. 4-5, *CDSP*, 11 May 1977, pp. 1-4. Cautious agreement with this opinion was expressed by Jan M. Lodal, "Carter and the Arms Talks," *The New York Times*, 12 April 1977, p. 29 and by David Linebaugh, "Seeds for SALT Progress," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 28 April 1977, p. 27. Mr. Nitze in his piece, "An Analysis of the Two U.S./Moscow SALT Proposals of March 1977," p. 15 argues "had the U.S. Comprehensive Proposal been accepted by the U.S.S.R., it would have favored the Soviet side . . . ," but he is almost alone in this judgment.

19. "A.A. Gromyko's Press Conference," p. 7.

20. In this connection, see the Report of Rep. Samual S. Stratton, "Strategic Missile Counterforce Capability: [The] United States vs. The Soviet Union," mimeograph, n.d., p. 14.

21. *Rumsfeld Report*, FY 1978, p. 74; Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979*, 2 February 1978, mimeograph, p. 5 (hereafter cited as *Brown Report*, FY 1979). President Jimmy Carter, *Message to Congress*, 19 January 1978, extracted in *Selected Statements*, 78-3, 1 March 1978, p. 6. Actually the concept of, and concern about, essential equivalence originated in the Nixon administration and may be found, *inter alia*, in *U.S. Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace, Report to the Congress by President Nixon*, 3 May 1973, p. 195.

22. *Rumsfeld Report*, FY 1978, p. 68.

23. *Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget*, 22 January 1968, mimeograph, p. 30.

24. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., *Hearings on ABM, MIRV, SALT and the Nuclear Arms Race* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970), p. 308.

25. *Rumsfeld Report*, FY 1978, p. 68.

26. "Remarks at Wake Forest University," 17 March 1978, *Selected Statements*, 78-4, 1 April 1978, p. 61.

27. *Brown Report*, FY 1978, pp. 5 and 6.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

29. *Ibid.*

30. This results from a number of factors:

a. as former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said, such static indicators as numbers of

warheads, throw-weight, etc., are more likely to influence perceptions than are more detailed analyses. (*Rumsfeld Report*, FY 1978, p. 74.)

b. these static indicators are not only imperfect reflections of strategic capabilities but have different implications for different kinds of targets. (Thomas A. Brown, "Number Mysticism, Rationality and the Strategic Balance," *Orbis*, Fall 1977, especially pp. 489-490.)

c. given asymmetries in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear postures, these indicators will always show imbalances: thus, the United States may claim a "throw-weight gap" and the Soviet Union a "warhead gap"—even within conditions of strategic parity.

d. it is almost impossible to persuade critics that advantages in one area offset disadvantages in another.

31. *Brown Report*, FY 1979, p. 55.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 103-105.

34. A 1975 estimate by the Department of Defense indicated that 2,158 nuclear weapons would be required for a disarming strike against the Soviet Union (U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-Committee on Arms Control, International Organization and Security Agreements, *Analyses of Effects of Limited Nuclear Warfare* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), p. 149, cited in Trofimenko, p. 513.)

35. For the hard target kill capability of cruise missiles see A.A. Tinajero, *Cruise Missiles: U.S. Programs*, Issue Brief #IB76018, Major Issues System, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 29 April 1977, p. 3. For the projected accuracies of Trident II see *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Deterrence Policies and Procurement Issues*, pp. 45-46.

36. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, Text and History of Negotiations*, February 1975, p. 146, quoted in *SALT and the U.S. Strategic Forces Budget*, Background Paper No. 8, Congressional Budget Office, Congress of the United States, 23 June 1976, p. 9.

37. *U.S. Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace*, 3 May 1973 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973), pp. 202-204, cited in *SALT and the U.S. Strategic Forces Budget*, p. 10.

38. *Rumsfeld Report*, FY 1978, pp. 71-72. See also the statements by Malcolm Currie, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, who expressed similar concern about the instabilities deriving from a partial disarming strike by the Soviet Union. *Program of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation*, FY 1978, mimeograph, pp. III-3 and III-5.

39. *Brown Report*, FY 1978, p. 45.

40. *Ibid.* See in this connection, the testimony of Secretary of State Vance before the House Subcommittee on International Operations, excerpted in *Selected Statements*, 78-4, 1 April 1978, p. 1.

41. The formula for probability of kill against hardened targets is $P_K = \exp(-f(h) \cdot K)$ where $K = \text{Yield } 2/3 / CEP2$ and $f(h)$ = function of hardness. See Thomas A. Brown, "Missile Accuracy and Strategic Lethability," *Survival*, March/April 1976, pp. 52-60.

42. *The Stratton Report*, with the judgments reached by Alton Quanbeck and Barry Blechman, *Strategic Forces: Issues for the Seventies* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1973). One of the most comprehensive and balanced computations is that by Thomas Garwin and John Steinbruner, "Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance between Prudence and Paranoia," *Long Range U.S.-U.S.S.R. Competition: National Security Implications* (Washington: National Defense University, 1976), pp. 54-94.

43. This is also the conclusion of the Congressional Budget Office, *Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., January 1978), pp. xii-xiii.

44. *SALT II: Problems and Prospects*, p. 11.

45. *Brown Report*, FY 1979, p. 64.

46. The United States is considering building a new mobile ICBM—the so-called Minuteman X—that would be moved from one to another of some 4,000 empty silos. (*The New York Times*, 18 June 1978, p. 3.) If this plan were carried out, or if large numbers of long-range GLCMs were built, verification of numerical limits on missiles would be virtually impossible.

47. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "U.S. Weighs New SALT Offer to Soviets," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 4 September 1978, p. 24. Paul Warnke, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in his address to the Conference on United States Security and the Soviet challenge, Pittsburgh, Pa., 17 October 1978, did not mention the issue of new missiles but did add two others: disagreement over the schedule for reductions in Soviet SNDVs necessitated by the proposed treaty and over the number of ALCMs which an airplane could carry.

48. For example, Brezhnev allegedly expressed to U.S. Ambassador Toon on 9 November "the urgency of completing preparation of a new agreement on the limitation of strategic armaments on the basis of the agreements and principles reached as a result of recent talks."

Pravda, 16 November 1977, cited in *Soviet World Outlook*, December 1977, p. 4. Following the visit to Moscow in April 1978 of Secretary of State Vance, the Joint Communique issued "Expressed the intention [of both sides] to work intensively to conclude an agreement . . . at the earliest possible time," *The New York Times*, 23 April 1978, p. 18.

49. For one in a long series of reports see the article by Flora Lewis, "The Insulated Nuclear Talks," *The New York Times*, 15 July 1978, p. 2.

50. Secretary of Defense Brown, in a carefully worded reply to a question on this subject, stated that "The United States has made no commitment not to transfer [cruise missiles] technology to its European allies"—but he did not specify the time when this technology might be transferred and his references to actual deployment of GLCMs and SLCMs said nothing about the ranges or the armaments of these missiles. News Conference Following Defense Planning Committee Meeting at NATO Headquarters, 7 December 1977, in *Selected Statements*, 78-1, January 1978, p. 2. See, however, *The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks*, p. 8, that states that the United States "Has taken into account allied security concerns in its negotiating positions."

51. *The Chicago Tribune*, 16 June 1977, p. 8.

52. See the article by Hedrick Smith, *The New York Times*, 14 November 1977, p. 18, and that by Adam Clymer, *The New York Times*, 20 April 1978, p. A-9.

53. Article by Richard Burt, *The New York Times*, 14 November 1977, p. 18.

54. *Ibid.*

55. *The New York Times*, 12 February 1978, p. 1. See also *Soviet World Outlook*, December 1977, pp. 4 and 5; 15 March 1978, pp. 3-6; and 15 April 1978, pp. 1-2.

56. *Brown Report*, FY 1979, p. 63.

57. *The New York Times*, 6 October 1977, p. A-6.

58. At present, the Navy Tomahawk cruise missile, which can be readily adapted to ground launches, has a projected range of only 1,200 nautical miles (Tinajero, p. 2). However, there is no reason why the range of these weapons cannot be increased by adding a "fuel plug," as the Air Force is doing with the AGM 86B, or by increasing the overall dimensions of ground-launched cruise missiles. Alternatively, medium-range GLCMs could be deployed in areas close to the Soviet Union, as were early U.S. IRBMs.

59. Testimony by John Walsh, Deputy Director for Strategic and Space Systems, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, in FY 1977, *Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserves and Civilian Personnel Strength*, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 94-2, 1976, Part 12, p. 6613, quoted in *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Deterrence Policies and Procurement Issues*, Budget Issues Paper, Congressional Budget Office, Congress of the United States, April 1977, p. 45.

60. *Brown Report*, FY 1979, p. 110.

61. Address Before the U.N. General Assembly, 4 October 1977, excerpted in *Selected Statements*, 77-9, 1 November 1977, p. 10.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Brown Report*, FY 1979, p. 56.

64. "News Conference at Moscow, July 3," *Department of State Bulletin*, 29 July 1974, p. 215.

65. "Number Mysticism, Rationality and Strategic Balance," p. 490.

66. *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Deterrence Policies and Procurement Options*, Table 3, p. 28 and Table 4, p. 32.

67. See for example, Leon Gouré, *et al.*, *The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy*, Monographs in International Affairs, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974, especially pp. 1-5 and 8-10, and *Soviet World Outlook*, August 1976, p. 7. A discussion of the implications for arms control of these beliefs will be found in Wiegand Pabsch, "Détente and Disarmament," *NATO Review*, October 1977, pp. 9-13.

68. The Center for Arms Control and International Security Studies is just completing one analysis of the Political Utility of Force and is starting another of the Political Implications of Shifts in the Strategic Balance: The Case of Western Europe.

69. *USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology*, April 1976, translated and reported in *Soviet World Outlook*, 15 May 1976, p. 5.

70. *The New York Times*, 12 February 1978, pp. 1 and 12.

71. Under this plan, 200 or so Minuteman X ICBMs would be secretly and randomly rotated in and out of some 4,000 silos, more or less as is the pea in the "shell game" so familiar to carnival-goers.

72. It is only fair to record that this opinion is not shared by everyone. See, for example, the interchanges between Arthur M. Cox and George F. Will in the *Washington Post*, 2 April 1978, 12 April 1978 and 13 April 1978.

The recent coup in Afghanistan raised more questions for U.S. strategists than it answered. For Moscow however, at least for the moment, the changes all appear favorable. This paper examines those and similar implications of events in the area.

THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF THE U.S.S.R.:

AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, AND PAKISTAN

by

Shirin Tahir-Kheli

Events of recent months have once again raised the question: Has there been a significant change in Soviet fortunes? This question is applied in this paper to three countries on the southern flank, the underbelly so to speak, of the U.S.S.R., namely Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. The Soviet Union has actively pursued relations with all three countries with varying degrees of success. The history of these relations has also differed.

I

Afghanistan, the smallest of the three, has the longest history of interaction with its northern neighbor. After Britain completed her takeover of India, she competed with Russia for influence in Kabul with money and guns. The Afghans never gave in to either side completely. They learned to play one against the other and continued this strategy when withdrawal of Britain from the subcontinent was followed by her replacement by the United States as Moscow's major challenger. The 1950s and 1960s were full of benefits derived by the Afghans from this Great Power rivalry. Airports, roads and factories were built as Washington and Moscow competed to demonstrate the advantages of their friendship. The Afghans took without joining the Soviet orbit or subscribing to the alliances pressed earlier on them by the United States.

Iranian relations with Moscow were not good after the Second World War. The occupation of Azerbaijan, attempts to set up an independent Socialist republic there, the subsequent crackdown on Communists in Iran, all added to the deterioration of relations. Soviet criticism of Iran's membership in pro-Western alliances was intense and frequent. Both Iran and Pakistan were criticized for giving into "the insidious

policy of divide and rule"[1]; disastrous effects on their economies that would make these countries "vassals of the United States"[2] were predicted.

Coupled with these general denouncements, Moscow retaliated in specific ways towards Pakistan. It supported India's position against Pakistan by calling Kashmir an integral part of India. It supported Afghan calls for autonomy in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan and for their formation into "Pakhtoonistan."

The Soviets no doubt recognized the place of Afghanistan in the emerging scene in Asia. As Pakistan joined the military pacts, Afghanistan, which had created the issue of "Pakhtoonistan" against Pakistan, looked on with disapproval, stating that American military aid to Pakistan was a threat to Afghanistan. Knowledgeable sources in Pakistan have pointed out that this was the beginning of direct "outside influence" on Pakistan-Afghan relations, meaning that Soviet and Indian opposition to Pakistan's alliances actively encouraged Afghan hostility towards Pakistan. They cite as an example the abrogation by Afghanistan in December 1953 of the 1921 Treaty that had acknowledged the Durand Line as the international boundary between Afghanistan and what was then British India.[3]

The years between 1956 and 1959 saw no appreciable thaw in East-West relations. In Asia, Soviet policy aimed at the strengthening of ties with nonaligned states, and condemnation of states that were part of the Western alliance system. The crises in Hungary, Suez, Lebanon and other distant parts did not have any direct bearing on the three states under study here, except that it usually put them on opposite sides; the allies of the West naturally siding with the West, and the nonaligned countries, India foremost among them, usually with the Soviet Union. And in the United Nations, the Soviet Union continued to veto resolutions on Kashmir.

In an attempt to pursue a "soft" policy in Iran, the Soviet leadership invited the Shah of Iran and the Queen for a State visit to the Soviet Union. The Russian leaders stated that their policies were geared towards peaceful coexistence and noninterference in the affairs of other nations and that this mitigated the need for Iranian membership in the Baghdad Pact. They then asked why had Iran joined the pact? The Shah said in reply that the answer could be found in the history of the relationship between Iran and the Soviet Union; reminded his hosts that for centuries the Russians had tried to advance southwards through Persia; that in 1908 the Russians had "invaded Iran in an effort to check our rising tide of constitutionalism"[4]; that during the First World War the Russians had aggressed against Iran; that during the Second World War, treaties of friendship notwithstanding, the Soviets occupied Iranian territory; and that in 1946 the Soviet Union had set up a puppet government in an attempt to take over control in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. To this lesson in history, Khrushchev, who could not have been unaware of these events, replied that he was "not responsible for these acts."[5]

However, as a consequence of the Shah's visit, the Kremlin during 1956-57 pursued a conciliatory policy and concluded several important agreements with Iran dealing with the security of their common frontier, transit rights through the Soviet Union for Iranian exports to Eastern Europe, and the feasibility of irrigation and hydroelectric projects along the rivers dividing their common frontier. But when in 1958 Iran began negotiating bilateral agreements with the United States,[6] the Soviet Union showed its disapproval by breaking off, after 2 weeks, talks for a nonaggression treaty with Iran then underway in Teheran. The Shah has

written that the Soviets required as a price for their treaty Iran's nonentry into any new pact with the United States (saying that as the Soviets were willing to enter into a nonaggression treaty, it was unnecessary). Iran, remembering how ineffective the 1921 Treaty of Peace and Friendship had been in discouraging Soviet encroachment against Iran, refused to go along. The talks were broken off, but the Shah is said to have given Khrushchev his personal guarantee that Iran would not permit medium or long-range ballistic missile sites on its soil.

By 1959 the tone of Russian diplomacy was changing. Khrushchev declared that the Soviets would overtake the West, not as a consequence of war, but would "bury" it in peaceful competition, particularly in the economic sphere. Peaceful coexistence became the ideological justification for policies that prevented nuclear confrontation, and such countries as India were said to be valuable members of the "zone of peace." In an attempt to arrive at some understanding with the Americans, Khrushchev met with President Eisenhower and emerged talking of accommodation in the "spirit of Camp David."

Following the U-2-triggered crisis in Pakistan–Soviet relations in May 1960, Pakistan-Afghan relations (which tend to follow the trend in Pakistan-Soviet relations) worsened. Reports began to circulate that Afghanistan was threatening Pakistan militarily because of the support it enjoyed from the Soviet Union, reportedly $400 million worth of arms. On the one hand the Soviet Union, because of its growing rivalry with China, was making overtures towards Pakistan (friend of China) with offers of aid in 1960. Yet, on the other hand the U.S.S.R. continued its policy of supporting Afghan claims against the territorial integrity of Pakistan. Reflecting the Soviet attitude towards the worsening border situation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Moscow stated in March 1961 that it could not remain indifferent as the Soviet Union bordered directly on this region. The Soviet Government therefore supported a "just" settlement of the problem, by which it meant "respect for the interest of the people inhabiting Pushtunistan,"[7] i.e., total support for the Afghan position.

A visit to Afghanistan by road from Pakistan gives an impressive demonstration of what competitions between the superpowers can do for a small, strategically located country. Roads are considered essential as Afghanistan has neither rail nor water transport facilities. The Russians have built two strategic roads in Afghanistan; one that terminates in the south, at Kandahar, a short distance from the Baluchistan border with Pakistan (and close to Iran) and the other at Kabul. The Americans have improved and considerably widened the road from Kabul to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border at Torkham.

The United States replaced Britain as the traditional guardian of the northwest. Americans were increasingly worried at the prospect of advancing Soviet influence in Afghanistan, a major preoccupation of Britain throughout the 19th century. The United States was also concerned that its supply route for aid goods destined for Kabul lay through Pakistan, while the Soviet Union was contiguous to Afghanistan. The 1961 diplomatic break between Pakistan and Afghanistan disrupted the flow of American aid. Concerned about growing Afghan dependence on trade routes through the Soviet Union, the White House announced that Mr. Merchant, the American Ambassador to Canada, was to go to Pakistan and Afghanistan to offer his "good offices" in settling the dispute between the two countries.

Although the Merchant Mission was, ostensibly, to deal with the issue of

transit trade through Pakistan, the basic disagreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan lay over Pakhtoonistan, and no compromise was possible here. Mr. Merchant met with no success and announced within weeks that his Afghanistan transit trade mission had failed.[8] The Soviet Union continued to be a strong supporter of Afghan policies. And neither was the Soviet Union willing at this time to modify its position on Kashmir. Its veto of a mild resolution on Kashmir in the Security Council in the summer of 1962 was indicative of its support of India.

However, two events took place in 1962 that greatly affected Soviet policy in South Asia and its foreign policy in general. The first event, the Cuban missile crisis, was important for two reasons. It worsened still further the Sino-Soviet dispute and it increased Soviet fears about confrontation with the West. Soviet support of India in the Sino-Indian border clash revealed the extent to which the Soviet Union and China were working at cross-purposes in Southern Asia.[9] At the same time the clash revealed the weakness of India alone as a counterweight to China, both militarily and politically, because India's declining prestige in the developing world was indicated by the failure of many developing countries to denounce the Chinese attack. Finally, the Sino-Indian border clash was significant because it resulted in Western military aid to India that angered Pakistan and turned her towards China.[10] Thus, the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian border clash combined to increase Soviet fears of confrontation with the West, worsen the Sino-Soviet rivalry in South Asia to show the weakness of India as a counterweight to China, and to push Pakistan closer to China.

Soviet concern with China was reflected in Soviet mediation in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, and her more even-handed policy towards Pakistan vis-a-vis relations with both India and Afghanistan for a period thereafter. Yet there was little success in winning Pakistani friendship away from China. As Sino-Soviet relations worsened after the 1969 border clash, Moscow decided that the Pakistani position was no longer acceptable and was particularly displeased with Pakistan's role in the Sino-American rapprochement of 1971. In retaliation, the U.S.S.R. signed a treaty with India that ensured Indian victory in the 1971 war and led to the defeat of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in what was formerly East Pakistan.

The situation in Afghanistan changed rapidly as the King tried with little success to achieve some measure of modernization. However, opposition to the King remained and when the King was in Rome on a private visit in July 1973, his first cousin Daud Khan successfully executed a *coup d'etat*, assumed leadership, abolished monarchy, and declared Afghanistan a Republic. The coup was carried out by the Army, had total Soviet support, and was well received in Afghanistan by the supporters of Pakhtoonistan, who saw in that scheme a rekindling of the age-old dream of an Afghan empire to the River Indus, a perfect vehicle for mobilizing tribal support, and by the students who saw in the abolition of monarchy a chance for Afghanistan to finally move forward.

As expected, shortly after his takeover Lieutenant General Daud renewed the Pakhtoonistan issue with the statement: "As regards our relations with Pakistan, we have a political dispute with that country, the only country with which we have an unresolved dispute."[11] After that, Pakistan-Afghan relations chilled noticeably, and clashes occurred on their border. Furthermore, Afghanistan, backed by the Soviet Union, encouraged secessionists in Baluchistan, which drew in Iran, a friend of Pakistan worried that separatist movements could ultimately lead to similar attempts along the Iranian-

Pakistani border—the Baluchi tribes, after all, are on both sides of the border.

II

The defeat of Mrs. Gandhi in 1977 was a setback for the U.S.S.R. The speed with which Foreign Minister Gromyko arrived in New Delhi to consult with the new Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Desai, indicated Moscow's nervousness at the turn of events and talk of a more balanced Indian foreign policy. Nothing substantial changed but the level of intimacy of the Gandhi era was reduced.

The difficulties encountered by Mr. Bhutto after his reelection in March 1977 increased his reliance on the Soviets. Convinced that the American Embassy in Islamabad was engineering attacks on his regime because of the confrontation between the United States and Pakistan over the nuclear reprocessing plant issue, Bhutto is said to have turned to Moscow for information and advice. The fact that at the forefront of Bhutto's opposition were members of the Islamic parties who are traditionally anti-Soviet added to Moscow's stake in Bhutto's survival.

With the declaration of martial law in Pakistan on 5 July 1977 and the overthrow of Bhutto, Soviet policy in Pakistan suffered a setback as the military was more likely to be pro-West and suspicious of the Soviet Union. Soviet statements in support of Bhutto were bound to alienate them from the new rulers of Pakistan.

There were other reverses for Soviet policy in the area. The expulsion from Somalia with the loss of important base facilities at Berbera was a definite drawback. It was reminiscent of earlier Egyptian actions and the magnitude of Soviet help to Ethiopia and the intensity of Moscow's support to Addis Ababa may well have been meant as a lesson to nations that expelling the Soviet Union was henceforth not an action to be undertaken lightly.

In addition, aid coupled with pressure led to the end of support given by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the rebellion in Oman. Increasing Saudi influence in the PDRY did not augur well for Moscow there.[12] As an important foothold in the Arabian Peninsula, Moscow could ill afford to lose South Yemen to conservative and anti-Communist Saudi Arabia.

More recently, Soviet relations with Iraq worsened after the government of President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr foiled a plot by pro-Soviet Communists to overthrow the Baath Party and its leader. Although the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Cooperation signed in 1972 remained in effect, it was being ignored in Baghdad.

Economic cooperation between Iraq and the U.S.S.R. has declined rapidly since 1975 from a level of 150 million rubles in Soviet loans to only 25 million rubles in 1977. Instead, with its annual income of $13 billion from oil, Iraq can and does buy American and West European technology. Charges of Soviet support for Kurdish self-determination in Iraq[13] and penetration by Communists of the Kurdish movement has caused further deterioration. The seriousness of this charge was reflected in reports that Iraq was considering joining Iran and Saudi Arabia in some form of a security arrangement for the Persian Gulf. In addition, Iraq is in the process of diversifying the sources of its military supplies in order to break its dependence on Moscow. Iraqis are also angry with Soviet and Cuban moves against the Muslim population of Eritrea.[14]

Against all of the above-mentioned setbacks one must weigh the gains for Soviet foreign policy in the region. First, the Ethiopian victory against Somalia was not only a successful demonstration of the advantages of Soviet support, it was also a lesson to Somalia (and other nations so inclined) that the expulsion of the Soviet Union had been a great mistake. While success

in Addis Ababa has not returned Berbera to Moscow, it has provided a strong foothold in the region and a base for future action.

A second and more recent gain for Moscow is reflected in the coup in the PDRY where President Salem Ali, who had been in contact with both Washington and Saudi Arabia, was overthrown and killed by the supporters of Moscow. The new President, Mr. Ismail, leader of the ruling National Liberation Front, is expected to keep his distance from the West and the Saudis. In fact, Aden has gone further. The improvement in relations between the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and the PDRY that had taken place under the aegis of Saudi Arabia was destroyed when an emissary of the PDRY visited North Yemen, carrying a bomb in a briefcase that exploded and killed the President. This assassination has led to Arab League censure of the PDRY coupled with strong warnings of further sanctions. But it has returned Aden to the fold as far as Moscow is concerned.

Part of the same trend but of even greater significance was the bloody *coup d'etat* in Afghanistan that overthrew Daud Khan. Not only was he killed along with members of his family, the entire Cabinet, all members of the Afghan elite, was also killed. Other members of the Durrani family and the Mohammadzai clan who were suspected of loyalty to Daud were either killed or relieved of their posts.[15]

The 1973 coup also had been engineered by the Moscow-trained military, and Daud had a reputation as a supporter of Moscow. His turned out to be the first revolution that was necessary before the second, more basic revolution could take place. The question is whether the pro-Moscow faction used Daud, recognizing that only a man of his stature could overthrow the King and once that was done were going to have to replace Daud; or whether it was Daud's failure to deal with problems and his slow shift away from Moscow that led to his demise?

There is no doubt that fears of Socialist reforms and pro-Soviet policies that were voiced after the 1973 coup proved largely unfounded. Political power in the country continued to rest with traditional leaders usually linked to the Mohammadzai clan.[16] However, when Daud revived the Pakhtoonistan dispute with Pakistan immediately after taking over, it seemed that he was once again the exponent of this cause which was also dear to the military. The rapid deterioration of Pakistan-Afghan relations reflected, as was usually the case, the poor state of Pakistan-Soviet ties.

While Daud ruled with the assistance of a Central Committee, he made important decisions himself. He soon began to run into difficulties and there were several attempted coups against him.[17] He was aware of the demand for greater reform and the expectations of a faster pace of modernization made by what were called the "progressive" or leftist elements. He was also attacked by the right wing for his Soviet contacts. Perhaps because of his inability or his unwillingness to move to adopt any real social reforms Daud slowly shifted his foreign policy.

Crucial in this phase of Afghan policy was the relationship between the Shah of Iran and Daud. By 1974 the Shah was actively trying to lessen Soviet influence and was using his new found oil wealth toward this end. He was seeking an end to Iraqi support of Baluchi rebels in Iran and wanted a cooling off in Afghan border problems with Pakistan on the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. In March 1975 an accord between Iraq and Iran settled their problems with the former ending support for the Kurds in Iraq (and the latter support for Baluchis in Iran) and the solution of the Shatt-al-Arab dispute according to Iranian wishes. Following this agreement, Daud

visited Teheran in April 1975. The Shah committed $2 billion in economic aid for Afghanistan, much of it for the construction of Afghanistan's first railway network connecting Kabul with Kandahar and Heerat with Zahidan and Bandar Abbas in Iran, thus providing landlocked Afghanistan with direct access to a port and relieving Afghan dependence on Moscow.[18]

The improvement of Iranian-Afghan relations had a favorable effect on Pakistan-Afghan relations. The Shah had apparently correctly assessed that Daud was prepared to be more flexible in his dealings with Pakistan over Pakhtoonistan because shortly thereafter, Bhutto was invited to visit Kabul in 1976. Bhutto's visit to Afghanistan was returned by Daud, and gradually a new spirit of accommodation replaced the old hostility. Both nations committed themselves to an "honorable solution of their political and other differences."

There were several reasons for the Afghan shift in policy. First, Daud was considerably shaken by domestic discontent as represented in the Panjsher uprising of July 1975. Second, the record clearly demonstrated the lack of success for Daud's anti-Pakistan policy. Third, Pakistani actions against pro-Afghan elements in the NWFP were judged as being legal by the court which weakened the Afghan case for interference. Finally, there was pressure from the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular, to normalize relations with Pakistan. And Daud, in search for new sources of aid[19] and needing to show the rightist elements in Afghanistan that he was on good terms with Muslim countries in spite of ties with the Soviet Union, had to oblige.

With the diversification of Afghan options, Daud's reliance on Moscow decreased. The Soviet Union continued to be an important country to Afghanistan; its sheer size and the fact that it has the longest border with Afghanistan and has remained a major partner for trade and aid insured that. But the cycle of almost total dependence was broken.

While successive Afghan rulers were (in the 19th and 20th centuries) able to play Russia off against Britain and later the United States without seemingly giving in to either, this game became more complicated with the building up in Afghanistan of domestic forces, trained in Moscow, who demanded change. In other words, Moscow acquired local allies who could press for reforms and policies that would work in favor of the U.S.S.R. and that the latter could not press for itself directly. Elements in the Afghan military, a crucial source of support and power in the Afghan system, are a good example of this.

Daud's moves away from a revolutionary path (which existed at least in name in 1973) towards monarchical, conservative regimes like Saudi Arabia and Iran, both openly anti-Soviet, may have pleased the traditional religious elements in Afghanistan but it did not sit well with the young more modern officers of the army and air force. In a backward country such as Afghanistan the army is the only real source of modernization. Their education and training, both completed under Soviet auspices, gave them a very different set of values from those they perceived were Daud's.

The showdown was precipitated by the assassination of Akbar Khaibar, the chief Communist ideologue. His funeral procession consisted of 10,000 men and women (very unusual for Afghanistan) who denounced Daud and the United States. When Daud responded by rounding up Communists and arresting their leaders, the army and air force moved. And in the ensuing bloodshed, Afghanistan became a Democratic Republic. A young air force officer, Col. Abdul Khadir, who had led the way, gave power to Nur Mohammad Tarakki, who had been incarcerated by Daud under his anti-Communist crackdown.

A shift in emphasis by the new government was indicated in statements that implied that this was the real revolution in Afghanistan, "the true democratic and national revolution."[20] In his first press conference after taking office Tarakki stated that "our main objective is to secure the welfare of the workers and peasants right here in Afghanistan . . . . We are not the aristocrats . . . we came out from among the people."[21] He added that the government had nationalized the holdings of the royal family and would implement land reform.

The takeover of Afghanistan by avowed Communists was certainly a victory for Moscow, it having at last gained a foothold in a region that it had coveted for centuries as part of "the Great Game"[22] for control of Afghanistan. The new Prime Minister and chairman of the ruling Revolutionary Council is also general secretary of the Khalq Party, regarded by both foreigners and Afghans as the country's Communist Party. The new Cabinet of 21 ministers consists entirely of members of this party that comprises a broader ethnic base than the upper-class Pathan domination of previous regimes.

The Soviet Union immediately extended recognition to the new regime while the United States took it under advisement and expressed surprise at the coup.[23] The change was taken as being an unfortunate one by other countries in the region. Coming on the heels of Soviet successes in the Horn of Africa it appeared to be another thrust by the U.S.S.R. towards vital sealanes.

Other neighbors of Afghanistan responded with alarm. The Chinese attacked expanding Soviet influence and pointed out once again that "this superpower, flaunting the label of socialism, is more aggressive and adventurous than the other superpower; it is the most dangerous source of a new world war and is sure to be its chief instigator."[24]

The effect on Pakistan was electric. Suddenly, the improvement in relations that had been achieved so painfully was wiped out. Sealing of the border seemed ominous. Although the new Afghan leadership tried to reassure "our Muslim brethren" of good relations, the fact that Moscow's role appeared enhanced in Kabul was not a favorable development from Islamabad's point of view. There are several reasons for this. First, the new Afghan Government could revive talk of a "Greater Afghanistan" and renew claims on Pakistani territory. This could have serious implications for Pakistan which is in the throes of internal troubles. Also, lacking access to weapons, the Pakistani Military Establishment could feel the effect of the Afghan military supplied and backed by Soviet arms and officers. The examples of such Soviet roles in Addis Ababa and Aden are not lost on Islamabad.

Second, the Afghan coup once more interjects an element of uncertainty into this volatile area. A limited amount of normalization had occurred between several hostile countries after 1975; for example, between Iraq and Iran, Afghanistan and Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Pakistan and India, China and India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. For the first time in many years, there was some hope for the development of more positive relations. The shift in Kabul could affect the normalization in a very real way by altering relations with Pakistan and Iran.

Third, from 1969 onwards when Brezhnev first spelled out his scheme for collective security in Asia, Moscow has regularly pressured Islamabad to join. After the East Pakistani debacle, the Soviets pressed their case pointing out that only membership in the collective scheme could guarantee their future security. Recognizing the anti-China nature of the scheme, Pakistan has steadfastly refused to have enything to do with it. The Soviets may now hold a trump card in their hands in that they

can use their influence with the Afghan military to renew the Pakhtoonistan issue and thus raise the stakes for Pakistani friendship with China.

Finally, Afghanistan's former President Daud had visited Pakistan earlier in 1978 and was about to agree to the Durand Line as constituting the legal boundary between the two countries. The new government in Kabul not only seems unwilling to sign any agreement, it has in fact renewed its concern for Pathan tribes on the Pakistani side of the border, indicating that it did not consider the region as a part of Pakistan. With increased Soviet influence in Kabul, the agreement becomes remote. Even if Moscow does not immediately press for claims against Pakistan, it could always hold the threat in reserve, hoping to extract concessions at an appropriate time.

Iran is concerned that direct Soviet influence has been activated in Kabul. The Shah spent a good deal of time and pledged a considerable amount of money towards weaning Daud away from Moscow. His policy had succeeded to a considerable degree. He was able to check Soviet expansion through Afghanistan, particularly by encouraging Daud to settle with Pakistan. All this has now come undone.

The Shah has ridiculed statements by Tarakki that he will keep Afghanistan nonaligned, calling the statement absurd in view of the dominant Russian role and the fact that Tarakki heads the Communist Party of Afghanistan. These statements are viewed in Teheran as being aimed at impressing the devout Muslim and strongly anti-Communist hill tribes who could pose a threat.[25] There are already reports of some opposition to the Moscow-oriented regime of Tarakki in most of the provinces surrounding Kabul. President Tarakki himself lent credence to these reports in an interview with the BBC.[26]

The Iranian Government has stated that it will use "all means" to keep Afghanistan from renewing trouble in Baluchistan and the NWFP, and the Soviets from expanding influence to the Persian Gulf's shipping routes for oil from the Middle East. Iran would, in such event, call on concerned countries to respond, militarily if necessary. Such action had been undertaken in Oman to the south of the Strait of Hormuz in the early 1970s and could again occur to keep the northern side of the strait and Gulf of Oman out of Communist control.[27]

Events in Afghanistan have raised another issue as well—that of Soviet access to the Indian Ocean.[28] Given the importance of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean as strategic and economic trade routes for the United States, Europe and Japan, direct access would certainly be welcomed by the Soviets.

Soviet access through Pakhtoonistan and Baluchistan to the Indian Ocean, a distance of only 300 miles, would enable the Soviet Navy to operate for extended periods at a great distance from Russian shores, to service Soviet ships that increasingly patrol the area, and to permit a Soviet naval presence in areas close to important oil tanker routes to Western Europe, the United States and Japan. Russian concern with the importance of the Indian Ocean has led it to object strongly to the proposed establishment of an American naval communications base at Diego Garcia, with the statement that it was an "endeavour by the Pentagon to secure for itself a military staging ground with far reaching aims in this strategically important part of the world."[29] This area's importance lies not only in the fact that trade routes linking Asia with Europe and America run through it, but also because, as *Pravda* pointed out: "the countries of the Indian Ocean basin possess more than half of all proven oil reserves; the world's rubber and tea production and the extraction of tin ore is largely concentrated there."[30] Moscow called Peking's role

in all this one of duplicity, where the Chinese leadership is said to be paying lipservice to the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, while in fact backing the establishment of the American base by "repeating the imperialist fabrications about the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean . . . ."[31]

In recent years, the Soviet Union has seen its carefully built influence in the Middle East slip away. It may be anxious to hold onto influence in Afghanistan, where the absence of normal relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan has once again offered Moscow a chance to take advantage. The formation of "Pakhtoonistan," for which Moscow's support is a prerequisite, would certainly lead to a chain reaction in the entire area extending up to the Soviet Union. It would serve as a lesson to Pakistan that further dismemberment would require its membership in the Soviet proposed collective security system. Finally, it would demonstrate the weakness of China in its inability to prevent the disintegration of Pakistan, a point already made in 1971.

III

Soviet fortunes in the south appear to have undergone a favorable change. From a position of neutralized presence, as one of many powers in the area, it has now become crucial to Afghanistan. Moscow's influence in Kabul is bound to increase and, given the fear of such involvement in Teheran and Islamabad, the future looks more uncertain than it did prior to the Afghan coup.

The history of Soviet relations with Pakistan has been such that whenever Moscow has perceived Pakistan as being unfriendly or inimical to its interests, pressure has been applied through Afghanistan. The more recent improvement in Pakistan-Afghan relations after 1976 was undertaken to prevent Moscow from using Kabul in this fashion. With the overthrow of Daud and his replacement with the Communist Party, pressure will certainly be applied on Pakistan, pressure it may not be able to withstand.

Iranian cultivation of a zone of influence has also been affected by Soviet successes in Kabul, in Aden and in the Horn of Africa. The Shah envisages a role for Iran as a keeper of regional peace. Such a role may become more difficult in the face of active Soviet involvement with the neighbors of Iran. The special relationship with Afghanistan that was so carefully nurtured at a considerable cost is bound to be affected adversely by the changes in Kabul.

Finally, there is the larger question of the strategic results of the revolution in Afghanistan and its implications for the United States and its allies. Soviet expansionism has been moving rather aggressively and could signal a changed Soviet strategy from a "no-win" to one in which Europe could be neutralized, sealanes brought under Soviet control and a second (or even third) nuclear strike capability would give Moscow a decided edge against the West. Iran, a major U.S. ally, faces the possibility of an eastern neighbor not only armed with Soviet weapons over 10 years, but also being advised by Soviet advisers.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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Pakistan, poorly armed and already besieged by internal problems, may feel the pressure of Soviet expansion through Afghanistan. As stated recently by an American general: "If Pakistan should fall apart, the Russians would have a clear road to the Arabian Sea and the capability to build bases near the exit from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz."[32]

NOTES

1. *Izvestia*, 20 May 1954, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, (*CDSP*), Vol. VI, No. 20, 1954.
2. Donald N. Wilber, *Contemporary Iran* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 196.
3. The rationale given by Afghanistan was that the treaty had been signed with Britain and could not be transferred to the inheritor of the boundary, i.e., Pakistan.
4. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlevi, *Mission for My Country* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960), pp. 118-119.
5. *Ibid.*
6. As did Pakistan and Turkey.
7. *Pravda*, 21 March 1961, *CDSP*, Vol. XIV, No. 13, 1961.
8. Relations were finally restored in 1963 through the Shah's mediations.
9. R. Vaidyanath, "Some Recent Trends in Soviet Policy Towards India and Pakistan," *International Studies*, June 1966, p. 432.
10. China was the only country willing to help Pakistan. The U.S.S.R. was pro-India and anti-China, and as far as Moscow was concerned, Islamabad had once again chosen the wrong ally.
11. *The New York Times*, 29 July 1973.
12. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Soviet Persian Gulf Policy," *Middle East Review*, Winter 1977-78, p. 53.
13. *The New York Times*, 11 June 1978.
14. *The New York Times*, 15 June 1978.
15. The ruling family in Afghanistan.
16. "The power of the family has been put to an end . . . Daud is gone forever, the last remnants of imperialist tyranny and despotism have been put to an end" stated the first broadcast after the coup. *The New York Times*, 28 April 1978.
17. Dilip Mukerjee, "Afghanistan under Daud: Relations with Neighboring States," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XIV, 1974.
18. Thirty percent of Afghan trade passes through Pakistan; the rest through the U.S.S.R., which is also Afghanistan's chief trade partner.
19. In addition to the $1.5 billion thus far given by the U.S.S.R., $500 million by the United States and $75 million by China. Soviet aid combines both economic and military. Aid from the United States and China is economic.
20. *The New York Times*, 6 May 1978.
21. *The New York Times*, 4 June 1978.
22. Labeled as such by Rudyard Kipling.
23. Statement by the State Department spokesman, reported in *The New York Times*, 2 May 1978.
24. Speech by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, to the U.N. General Assembly special session on disarmament, 29 May 1978.
25. *The New York Times*, 20 May 1978.
26. *The Daily Telegraph* (London), 4 July 1978.
27. Statement reported in *The New York Times*, 20 May 1978.
28. For the growth of Soviet interest and activity in the Indian Ocean see Alexander O. Ghebhardt, "Soviet and U.S. Interests in the Indian Ocean," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XV, 1975, pp. 672-683.
29. *Pravda*, 27 February 1974, *CDSP*, Vol. XXVI, No. 9.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. Stated at the "Sea Link" Symposium at Annapolis. Reported in *The New York Times*, 24 June 1978.

The Admiral Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize is awarded each year to the Naval War College student author of the best of the professionally worthy essays submitted in competition for the prize. The 1978 winner argues herein for an understanding and exploitation of the benefits technology can lend to the design and production of warships.

TECHNOLOGY AND WARSHIP DESIGN:

CAPTURING THE BENEFITS

by

Captain W.F. Fahey, U.S. Navy

One need not dwell on the wonders or the progress of modern technology; moon landings, hand-held computers, and microwave cooking are part of the everyday vocabulary of today's elementary school pupil. Even more advanced concepts are well within the understanding and common use of high school and undergraduate students: microcircuitry, nuclear fission, Venus probes, solar energy cells.

The most striking characteristic of technology, however, is not its present level but the rate at which it is evolving. Civilization's rate of technological growth, which for several thousand years had been immeasurably ponderous, is now exponential. The reason for this is that technology feeds on itself. Advanced technology makes even more advanced technology possible, and the cycle of invention, innovation, exploitation, and diffusion becomes shorter and shorter, eventually overlapping itself. The development of microcircuitry and silicon chips, for example, has been described as having the same force and significance as that of the development of handtools or the discovery of the steam engine.[1]

Today's naval warships can and do claim benefits from this technological explosion: missiles instead of guns, electronic sonar signal processing, the computerized Naval Tactical Data System, nuclear propulsion (in some cases), "smart" bombs. In today's smaller Navy it is claimed that technological quality is the replacement for quantity and recruiting posters imply that a tour of duty in the Navy will provide a young man or woman with the equivalent of an advanced scientific degree.

The application of technology to today's warships is indeed praiseworthy, but it is not unreasonable to ask whether maximum application of technology is being made. Are our warships

getting as much out of today's technology as they should? Will future warships be as technologically advanced as they could be?

Before addressing these questions, it is appropriate to provide some perspective by examining a few projections of the future. Predicting the future is admittedly a risky business because of gross uncertainties in the speed and direction in which we are moving. Military technology, in particular, is difficult to forecast because so many nontechnological uncertainties (the budget, politics, national strategy) affect the speed and direction of movement. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that, as in the past, our wildest expectations may be exceeded.

Kahn and Wiener[2] have prepared long lists of innovations that may appear in the last third of the 20th century. In order to illustrate where warship design could be headed, I have chosen several items from these lists. In reviewing these items, one should keep in mind that the Kahn-Wiener projections address the period 1967-1999, a relatively *short*-range view:

Multiple applications of lasers and masers (sensing, measuring, communications, welding, power transmission, weapons).

–Extreme high-strength and/or high-temperature materials (ship construction, defensive shielding, propulsion plant materials, projectile launchers).

–Widespread use of nuclear reactors for power (propulsion).

–Superperformance fabrics (insulation, fireproofing, protection).

–New and improved material for (shipboard) interiors (variable transmission glass, heating and cooling by thermoelectric effect, electroluminescent lighting).

–Ultrareliable, high-resolution, high-capacity communications by light pipes and lasers.

Admittedly these projections do not stretch the mind (or imagination) too far; Kahn and Wiener may in fact have been too conservative. The Foreign Policy Association[3] has ventured a projection to the year 2018, not too far beyond Kahn and Wiener:

–Antigravity machines.

–Computers with a capacity on the general order of the human brain that could be carried in a shoebox.

–Infrared laser radar using holographic techniques, providing a major breakthrough in radar performance.

–Underwater surveillance systems using sound and lasers, making the ocean "transparent."

Remembering that the two lists above represent relatively short-range and conservative projections of from 22 to 40 years, we realize that as we discuss the technology of the future we are also discussing the warships of today, for naval ships are expected to have a service life on the order of 30 years. Thus when we consider laser technology, transparent oceans, or superperformance fabrics, we provide a framework within which to evaluate our new *Spruance*-class destroyers, *Perry*-class frigates, or *Nimitz*-class aircraft carriers. If we apply these same projections to our decade-old DDGs or *Knox*-class frigates, we realize that the ships we are operating today may be considered to be technological neanderthals. Within the perspective of accelerative technological growth, our present warships fall near the bottom of the technology scale.

The claim is made that these ships, as they come off the ways, contain the best that technology can offer. Engineering plants are safer and more efficient, guns are automated, sonars reach farther, and computers link ships in a task group. Some advances are indeed technological gains. But close observation will show that most of the improvements made are simply incremental advances in *engineering*, not technological leaps forward.

Technology is more than just machines and equipment; it includes *techniques* as well. No matter how efficient, clean, and powerful a modern ship's steam engineering plant may be, it still involves the ancient technique of boiling water to make steam to turn a windmill. Sonar, which involves the technique of "yodeling and waiting for an echo," has extended its range not by changing the technique but by "yodeling" louder.

A true technological advance, however, is represented by the introduction of the gas turbine engine to surface ship propulsion. The gas turbine represents not only new, improved machinery, but a new methodology, a new technique. Nevertheless, in the year 2008, "boiling water" will be the predominant method of propelling our warships.

Furthermore, a close look at warships being launched today will show that they make very little use of the levels of technology that have already been widely diffused throughout modern society:

–In a day when housewives can routinely cook with microwaves, food is (and, for the next 30 years, will be) cooked in giant cauldrons and ovens aboard ship.

–Today, small hand-held computers are routinely used by school children to solve fairly complex math problems; for the next 30 years officers and sailors aboard most of our ships will labor with pencil and paper to solve maneuvering board, navigation, and other simple problems.

–Stockbrokers routinely communicate among each other and share complicated data by electronic display techniques using microwave links, telephone, cathode ray tubes, and computer terminals. Today (and for the foreseeable future) our ships will communicate by voice radio and that wondrous mechanical marvel of a thousand moving parts, the teletype.

–Although high-impact plastics, exotic protective coatings, sonic cleaning devices, and superstrength epoxies and bonding materials are available and in use commercially, sailors are today (and will be for the next 30 years) engaged in the brutalizing manual labor of chipping and painting aboard ship.

–Over a decade ago, a surface-to-surface missile sank an Israeli destroyer. Today our ships still do not have an effective antimissile defense. Indeed, without air support provided by an aircraft carrier, an amphibious task group today would be helpless if challenged by the Ecuadorian Navy (EXOCET missiles) or the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard (PENGUIN missiles). The American nonresponse to the whole revolutionary technological change in naval warfare introduced by the surface-to-surface missile is inexplicable in rational terms.

The above examples range from the barely important to the crucial, but it is plain to see that our warships have failed to make full use of the technology already available and in use in commerce and industry. This gap must necessarily grow throughout the life of ships being launched today; as technological advances surge on, the ship remains relatively static as there is no way to introduce truly major advances in technology into a ship once the construction is complete. This is an *application gap:* much of the available technology is not applied during the construction of a ship, and cannot be applied once the ship is built.

In those areas where advanced technology *has* been applied, it appears that there are uncertainties regarding its use. The HARPOON missile, for instance, cannot be used to its full potential because we have not yet solved the problem of over-the-horizon targeting. Despite almost 20 years of operational use, recent fleet exercises have shown that the computerized Naval Tactical Data System provides a commander with so much erroneous information that his own ships are in almost as much

danger of being attacked by his forces as are the enemy's. Despite the introduction of surface-to-surface missiles into naval warfare, there are no schools that teach a task group' commander how to fight his missile forces (or defend against missiles) nor are there any radically new tactics or doctrine available. This is *doctrinal lag:* even in those cases in which technology has been applied, the understanding of its use lags many years behind its physical application.

A century ago, Victor Hugo observed that nothing is so powerful as a new idea whose time has come. That technological innovation is a powerful idea whose time has come is undeniable. But some organizations and individuals find the idea so powerful that they are unable to cope with it. Bureaucracies, in particular, are ill-suited to deal with change and uncertainty. The Defense Department's (and within it, the Navy's) programming process, for example, emphasizes marginal program adjustments in the near future, and therefore tends to promote evolutionary rather than revolutionary increases in military capabilities.[4] Accelerative technology, however, is revolutionary in nature, and cannot be managed—or capitalized on—on an "incremental improvement" basis.

The most important step in capturing the benefits that technology offers is to gain an understanding of what technology *is,* and what its economic implications are. This may seem to be an oversimplification until we realize that in all the literature about technology *per se* (one bibliography contains a listing of almost 300 books) there is no military compendium. At no military school is there to be found a course on pure technology and how to deal with it. The simple fact is that we really do not understand what technology is, nor how to avoid its pitfalls or capture and apply its benefits to warship design and construction.

Technology is man's way of doing things easier or faster, or of doing things (like flying) that he could not do otherwise. It is also man's way of extending himself. Thus the microscope and telescope are extensions of his eyes; the bicycle and car extensions of his feet; and computers are extensions of his brains.[5] It should also be clear that, as pointed out earlier, technology is not just hardware, it is also technique. Put in the most simple terms, John Kenneth Galbraith states that technology means the systematic application of scientific or other organized knowledge to practical tasks.[6]

Technology is expensive. An increasing span of time separates the beginning from the completion of a task to which the frontiers of technology are being applied, and there is an increase in capital investment, especially the "front-end load" of research and development. This commitment in time and money tends to deter change or, in other words, to increase inflexibility. Specialized manpower, with its attendant high cost, is required, and the job of organizing the total effort is extremely complex. Yet, despite these high costs, technology roars ahead. Obviously the benefits obtained must be (or seem to be) greater than the costs. Whether or not the cost of technology is too high is, in fact, the subject of some debate. Nevertheless, the sum of technological benefits during the past few decades is staggering: radar, computers, transistors, space flight, supersonic transport, antibiotics, mass communications; the list goes on and on. Analysts agree that major advances will continue to be needed in food and energy technology just to keep abreast of Earth's burgeoning population, and that continued development in military technology is a necessary condition of maintaining the international balance of power. On the whole, our society perceives the benefits as outweighing the costs.

Therefore, it appears that the cost of technology will continue to be paid by a willing society at large. Basic research

continues, industrialization spreads, travel and communications speed up, farms become more productive, energy sources become more efficient, knowledge grows. In a macroeconomic sense, the nation is willing to pay for these technological developments, and the Military Establishment (and the Navy within it) is paying a share of that cost. While the Navy's direct costs are highly visible (budget dollars), the indirect costs are too often ignored: higher training and education costs, more taxes paid by Navy personnel, costs to preserve the environment, higher telephone bills at the Pentagon, more expensive travel, more expensive office equipment, subsidized mass education, ad infinitum. These additional, albeit invisible, costs represent the Navy's share in paying for the nation's technological and industrial growth.

If this is the case, the Navy's goal should be to maximize the benefits to be derived. Indeed, the practice of paying for something and then not using the product purchased (technology) can only be characterized as waste, not good management. Thus the claim that closing the application gap is "too expensive" is not valid. With the proper strategy, we should be able to design and purchase technologically up-to-date warships at reasonable cost.

In designing ships, there is a tendency to focus on the wrong measure of effectiveness. The *Spruance* class, for instance, is hailed as satisfying the needs of the Navy into the 21st century. But the technology of today will not be the technology of the year 2001; *Spruance* may not be obsolete if age is a measure of effectiveness, but it may be useless if combat effectiveness is the measure of effectiveness (as it should be). What we should be concerned with is not the chronological age of a ship, but whether it is able to perform its mission in the face of the expected threat, that is, whether it is "tactically obsolete."

Some may respond that *Spruance* is designed for periodic updates as weapons systems evolve, and that she can be modernized to keep up with technology. Unfortunately, a subset of the "technology-is-hardware" philosophy is the "technology-is-weapons" philosophy. Even if it were possible to keep abreast of weapons technology by frequent updates, the remainder of the ship—the basic platform, fuel, engineering, interior communications, habitability, etc.—will remain as it was built in the mid-1970s. Millions of man-hours will be expended on maintenance, upkeep, repairs; the crew will still live in metal below-deck caverns; the antennas, masts, and bridge will remain exposed and vulnerable to weather and whatever weapons an adversary can devise; the ship will never travel faster than her 1975 speed; and rust, electrolitic action and age will take their toll. All of these factors must render the ship largely, if not totally, ineffective after the turn of the century. Worst of all, the stupendous costs of attempting to maintain *Spruance* "on the line" after 15 or 20 years of service will preclude purchasing more technologically advanced ships!

This consideration leads directly to one of the main characteristics of technology: impermanence. In particular, technology requires that the economics of permanence be replaced with the economics of transience.

First, advancing technology tends to lower the costs of manufacture much more than the cost of repair. It is often cheaper to replace than to repair, and in this situation it is economically sensible to build cheap, unrepairable, throwaway objects even though they may not last as long as repairable objects. Second, advancing technology makes it possible to improve the object as time goes by. The second generation computer is better than the first, and the third is better than the second. (A computer "generation" is generally recognized as 7 years; the computers installed in

Spruance may be aboard for 30.) Because we can anticipate further rapid technological advance, it makes hard economic sense to build for the short run rather than the long. Third, as change accelerates and reaches into more and more remote conceptual corners, uncertainty about future requirements increases. Recognizing this, we should hesitate to commit large resources for unchangeable objects or equipments intended to serve unchanging purposes. Products should be built for the short run, or alternatively, built to be highly adaptable.

It appears that these economic fundamentals of technology are being ignored when we build large, expensive, relatively permanent and unchangeable warships. Our ship design does not capitalize on technology, and we need a new ship design and construction strategy.

A strategy that would capitalize on technology will be one that recognizes the following imperatives:

—Technology is a *change* agent, not just an improvement agent. As such, technology requires new and innovative approaches to problem-solving.

—Technology, although expensive, is already being paid for. That is, the hidden costs of a technological society are already built in, unavoidable, and should be capitalized on.

—Technology requires specialized manpower, specialized training and education, and specialized skills.

—Technology has its own economics, the economics of impermanence, rather than permanence.

—Technology involves uncertainty, which requires maximum flexibility.

A strategy that recognizes the nature and economic implications of technology suggests radically different concepts of designing and building warships. It is evident that, in order to capture the benefits of technology, we must accept, rather than resist, the concepts of impermanence, disposability, diversity, uncertainty, and accelerative growth. In particular, we should move in the same direction as high-technology private industry: research and development funds and technological advances are used to reduce cost and increase reliability while performance gradually improves (as design matures) and technology and components become available at reasonable cost.

Ships which would meet these technological imperatives would probably be smaller, high-technology ships designed for an extremely short (5 years?) lifespan. Production runs of these ships would be shorter but more frequent, thus allowing for more frequent updates to close the application gap. At the end of their useful life, such ships could be sold to lower-technology navies, or sold for scrap, since their scrap value would still be relatively high.

Soviet warships are often criticized (by the U.S. Navy) for their poor watertight integrity, inadequate damage control equipment, and lack of weapon reload capability. They are denigrated as "one-shot" ships. Yet it must be admitted that they carry more weapons that are, in many cases, more sophisticated than the weapons carried by our own ships. It would appear that these Soviet ships have capitalized on the economics of impermanence to obtain the benefits of technology. Not only are they highly sophisticated where it counts—in weapons systems—but there seems to be a growing number of them, indicating that capitalizing on the economic imperatives of technology may permit buying more ships for the money, despite an economic base that is smaller than our own.

Alternative to (or concurrent with) a concept of "throwaway" ships, a concept of "building block" ships would capitalize on another economic imperative of technology: uncertainty. Basic hull forms could be designed to accommodate a diversity of major

self-contained modules, including weapons systems, communications, ammunition, command and control spaces, engineering plants, and habitability modules.[7] In this manner truly significant technological updates would be possible by replacing obsolete modules. Repairs could be facilitated, ships could be specifically mission-configured, training could be conducted in "out-of-ship" modules, and modules could be updated without a necessity for the entire ship to be withdrawn from service while modernization is accomplished.

Once again, private industry has already learned to capture the benefits of technology by adapting to, rather than resisting, the economic imperative of flexibility to deal with technological uncertainty. U.S. industry is pioneering in the successful development of modular design and construction techniques, ranging from interchangeable electronic "black boxes" to huge containerships.

And the Soviets seem to be dealing with technological uncertainty by applying their own brand of flexibility: their new aircraft carriers are really aircraft carrier/cruisers, with a multiplicity of combat roles and weapons systems. At the very least, we could learn from the Soviet approach and build truly multipurpose ships. At best, we could learn from our own private industry and build truly flexible modularized ships.

Admittedly, the ideas of "throwaway" or "building block" ships are shocking. Yet, within the technological perspective, they are no more shocking than walking on the moon, "smart" bombs, liquid-crystal diode wristwatches, or cooking with microwaves. This is not, however, an exercise in advocacy for any particular ship design; rather it is to demonstrate that warship design requires greater breadth and understanding of technology. I use these examples to demonstrate that there are aspects, ramifications, and unique characteristics of technology that appear to be little understood and even less applied in designing a warship. It seems obvious that merely continuing past approaches will not provide the needed solutions. Indeed, to continue the present course may well lead to spending more to achieve less.

Developing a new ship design strategy based on an understanding of technology's economic imperatives will not be an easy task. But it is technology, not an inexhaustible fund of money, that gives us our lead in naval warfare capabilities. Given the facts that no single country can put unlimited resources into armaments and that there are urgent social uses to which our national wealth must be applied, efforts to exploit technology must continue to expand if our dual national goals of peace (safety) and prosperity are not to become mutually exclusive.

Goethe said: "What a man doesn't understand, he doesn't have." The Navy cannot design a rational strategy for exploiting technology to the fullest until we understand what technology is. Unfortunately, we have an organization which confuses technology with R & D, with weapons systems, with engineering, or electronics, or computers. This will not do. There are, however, certain fundamental steps that could be taken at little or no cost to introduce an understanding of technology into our thinking.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Captain William Fahey is a 1978 graduate of the College of Naval Warfare, Naval War College. His undergraduate work was at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and his career has been in operational and intelligence billets. He is now assigned to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

First, we need a mechanism, an organization, within the uniformed Navy itself to trigger studies on the application of technology, in a systematic way, at the earliest stages in the process of development and diffusion; to explore means of deciding whether a given set of events does indeed represent an early stage in a significant technological trend; to inject the possible ramifications of technology into the decision-making process itself.

Second, in our War College, Postgraduate School, and Naval Academy, we need courses that will teach what technology is and how to exploit it.

Third, we need seminars, retreats, and refresher courses where senior officers with operational experience are exposed to intellectually challenging ideas and discussions on what technology is, where its leading edge is, and what it means—and could mean—to the Navy.

In short, we need to institutionalize an effort to understand and capitalize on technology.

The Navy is a bureaucracy, with all the strengths and weaknesses of an old, honorable, and very conservative bureaucratic structure, and there will be drawbacks to institutionalization: resistance to change, careerism, bureaucratic inertia. But the rewards to be reaped are so great that they must not be foregone.

An institutionalized search for understanding, then, would represent the first step toward developing a ship design strategy that captures the benefits of technology. Where that strategy will lead us is, like technology itself, largely uncertain. But as it takes us deeper into the Age of Technology, we may find that the concept of the "throwaway" ship is not new after all, and that the greatness of the American Fleet in the mid-1800s was grounded in recognition of the principle of technological impermanence:

> . . . I accost an American sailor, and I inquire why the ships of his country are built so as to last but for a short time; he answers without hesitation that the art of navigation is every day making such rapid progress that the finest vessel would become almost useless if it lasted beyond a certain number of years. In these words, which fall accidentally and on a particular subject from a man of rude attainments, I recognize the general and systematic idea upon which a great people directs all its concerns.
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> —Alexis De Tocqueville, 1840

NOTES

1. "The Age of Miracle Chips," *Time*, 20 February 1978, p. 44.
2. Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 51-57.
3. The Foreign Policy Association, *Toward the Year 2018* (New York: Cowles Education Corporation, 1968), pp. 9, 10, 171.
4. CNO Policy and Planning Guidance, 1978. SECRET
5. Hal Ellerman, *Technophobia* (New York: Evans, 1967), p. 72.
6. John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 12.
7. See George H. Miller, "Crisis and Commitment," *Seapower*, January 1978, pp. 20-26, for an excellent discussion of Modular Ships.

The problem of international terrorism has not been ignored by the Security Council nor the General Assembly of the United Nations. It seems generally agreed that it is unlawful for states to support terrorist activities that adversely affect other states. Definitions flowing from this agreement and applying its sense to specific situations have surfaced many areas of disagreement, however.

COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:

THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENTS

by

L.F.E. Goldie

Introduction. Although reflected in one word, "terrorism" has become refracted, in the numerous U.N. bodies dealing with it, into a multicolored concept—and all its qualities tend to be given different emphases. Also, although that one word has been with us since the last decade of the 18th century, its connotations have changed as states mature and yesterday's partisans become today's establishment. Over and over again the model of Lord Wellington's (as the Duke of Wellington then was) protest to Marshal Massena (the former general of the French Revolutionary Armies) against the latter's order to his troops to shoot the Portuguese Ordenanza—ununiformed milita who were harassing the French lines of communications during the peninsular campaign of the Napoleonic Wars. Wellington wrote:

> Ce que vous appelez "des paysans san uniforme," "des assassins et des voleurs de grand chemin" sont l'Ordenanza du pays, qui comme j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous assurer sont des corps militaires commandés par des officiers, payés, et agissant sous les lois militaires. Il paraît que vous exigez que ceux qui jouiront des droits de la guerre soient revêtus d'un uniforme; mais vous devez vous souvenir que vous-même avez augmenté la gloire de l'armée francaise en commandant des soldats qui n'aient pas d'uniforme.[1]

To those who permit themselves to be struck by the paradox of that most conservative of beings, the Duke of Wellington, protesting against short shrift being given in 1810 to the

guerrilleros and Ordenanza of the peninsula at the hands of a veteran of the French Revolution, it should be emphasized that such is the nature of this paradoxical subject, and that its underlying necessities continue to call for pragmatic responses independently of ideological commitments or perspectives.

Refraction of "Terrorism" in the U.N.'s Many Prisms. There appears to be abroad in the world, and reflected in many meetings, panels and symposia, an expectation, indeed a demand, that the United Nations "do something" to prevent the recurrence of transnational terroristic acts. The United Nations has done many things in this regard that are within its competence. Apart from the Security Council, especially when it contemplates action under Chapter VII of the Charter, the organs of the United Nations, and in particular the General Assembly, constitute forums of debate rather than the repositories of legislative or executive authority.[2] In the General Assembly, moreover, the 150 member states reflect almost every ideology now forming part of the political ideas and premises of policy (if such a word is applicable) at large in the world today. General Assembly Resolutions, in particular those resulting from a hard-won consensus, while not having the status of legislation, reflect compromise and accommodation regarding emerging common values and, possibly, an agreed view of future state practice. It may, furthermore, direct incipient development of national policies into cooperative channels. In short, the General Assembly tends to achieve, as its work product in any field, the highest common factor (low as this may appear to many) of the relevant values and perspectives of the multipolar world it reflects.

Specifically, the three Resolutions relating to terrorism[3] that the General Assembly agreed upon last fall at its 32nd Session, were inscribed as agenda items, intensely negotiated, amended and carried with the purpose of both articulating and defining proscribed acts of terrorism and of bringing the pressure of world public opinion to bear on states often known as "sanctuary States." These are the states that provide training, weapons and safe havens to which terrorists can flee after a caper or be received after release from jail through hostage-taking, and, generally, make acts of terrorism safer for their perpetrators to commit. It is observable that, with the Mogadishu rescue of the Lufthansa passengers last year, Somalia has ceased to be a sanctuary state. Indeed, the expression of a widespread disgust with terrorists' excesses through General Assembly resolutions has assisted in the erosion of the number of safe haven states for terrorists. Thus, while not acting as a legislature, let alone as an effective one, the U.N. General Assembly tends to bring moral opinion to bear, making gratuitous acts of cruelty and the denial of human rights more embarrassing or more costly to perpetrate.

On the other hand, it may be observed that the greater the number of resolutions passed condemning terrorism, and the greater the number of committees, subcommittees and working groups deliberating on the subject, the more innocuous and watered down the resolutions and reports tend to become. The diffuseness of the institutional treatment of terrorism in the United Nations has tended to weaken the force of specific proposals to limit let alone eliminate it.

The United Nations General Assembly. In the General Assembly of the United Nations there is consensus that terrorism cuts against the ideals of justice and peace. There is also agreement that such a deplorable institution should have no place in the relations of nations and peoples. But there is no

consensus on the cure. While some hold that terrorism is a crime, in the punishment of which states should cooperate, others insist that when a terrorist act is committed for political ends such cooperation is not due. Others, again, insist that terrorism can only be cured if its underlying causes of misery, frustration, grievance and despair are themselves eliminated. In addition, different bodies in the United Nations have offered different prescriptions. For example, the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation proposed, and the General Assembly adopted, the following clauses regarding terrorism in the Resolution on Friendly Relations:

> Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State.
>
> Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force. . . .
>
> No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.[4]

Of course, in agreeing to the above paragraphs, members of the General Assembly implicitly excluded persons or organizations whose activities were, in those states' perceptions, more validly characterizable as national liberation fighters and movements than as terrorists. Indeed, the question who is a terrorist and who is a resistance fighter provides another basis of disagreement once the debate moves from the general to the concrete. Despite these reservations in terms of specific situations, it is clear that a widespread consensus exists, at the level of generality, that the United Nations stands for a norm asserting that it is unlawful for states to support terrorist activities that adversely affect other states.

By contrast, the General Assembly's Resolution on the Definition of Aggression,[5] which came up from the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression—a different body from the General Assembly's Special Committee on Friendly Relations, reflects its Committee's compromise on the inclusion of terroristic activities within the concept of aggression in terms of "sending" by or on behalf of a state of armed bands and other irregular groups usually included within the category of terrorists for carrying out acts of armed force. This prohibition is, one should stress, limited to "sending." Terms such as "organizing," "encouraging," "instigating," or "participating in" and, in addition, "foment," "finance," "incite" or "tolerate," all to be found in the Declaration of Friendly Relations, are missing from the Definition of Aggression. Also a state becomes guilty of aggressive conduct when it puts its territory "at the disposal of" another state. But this latter conduct is narrowed by the limitation of the beneficiaries of such a disposal to states, not private individuals. Accordingly it would not be germane to many instances of terrorism.

In response to the General Assembly's resolution on its 1971 Report,[6] and especially the favorable reception given to paragraphs 133 and 134 thereof,[7] the International Law Commission produced in 1973 the draft articles that were more or less endorsed by the General Assembly through their adoption in a Resolution[8] and became the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against International Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. This Convention entered into force on 20 February 1977.[9] Its thrust is to ensure that persons who commit, or attempt or threaten to commit, or participate as accomplices in the commission of such crimes of violence as murder, kidnapping or other attack on the person or liberty of heads of states or governments, or diplomatic or other representatives, or attack official premises or private accommodation or means of transport of such persons, shall be either prosecuted or extradited "without exception whatsoever and without undue delay" (Article 7).[10]

The history of the General Assembly's adoption of this Convention and its recommendation that the member states ratify it is of interest. Despite the widespread feeling that such a convention was needed, a considerable number of developing countries was very disappointed by the failure of the drafters to include exculpatory provisions for those asserting "the legitimate right of self-determination" and might well have prevented the passage of the Resolution recommending that member states should adopt the Convention which the General Assembly had before it.[11] A compromise was reached when the accompanying draft Resolution, which included a paragraph condoning such acts, was amended by the addition of a paragraph instructing the Secretary General always to publish the Resolution together with the Convention.[12] The paragraph on the right of self-determination was as follows:

> 4. Recognizes also that the provisions of the annexed Convention could not in any way prejudice the exercise of the legitimate right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, by peoples struggling against colonialism, alien domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid;[13]

In a note of 8 September 1972[14] the Secretary General took the initiative by requesting the inclusion in the agenda of the General Assembly's 27th session of an item entitled "measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms." At its 2037th meeting on 23 September 1972 the General Assembly decided to include the item in the agenda of its 27th session and to allocate it to the Sixth Committee in the following amended form:

> Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair which causes some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical change.

On 2 November 1972 the Secretariat produced its *Study Prepared in Accordance with the Decision taken by the Sixth Committee at its 1314th Meeting on 27 September 1972.*[15] This study

concluded with the following paragraphs:

> It is clear from the foregoing study that the origins and underlying causes of terrorism are complex and various, but that many of them lie in international political or social situations which the United Nations was founded to improve. The effort to eliminate those causes should be intense and continuous, as mankind, despite its intellectual powers, has not yet succeeded in creating a social order free from misery, frustration, grievance and despair—in short, an order which will not cause or provoke violence. Yet terrorism threatens, endangers, or destroys the lives and fundamental freedoms of the innocent, and it would not be just to leave them to wait for protection until the causes have been remedied and the purposes and principles of the Charter have been given full effect. There is a present need for measures of international cooperation to protect their rights as far as possible. At all times in history, mankind has recognized the unavoidable necessity of repressing some forms of violence, which otherwise would threaten the very existence of society as well as that of man himself. There are some means of using force, as in every form of human conflict, which must not be used, even when the use of force is legally and morally justified, and regardless of the status of the perpetrator.
>
> Measures, more or less effective and appropriate, have been devised or attempted in the past by the international community to deal with parts of the problem of terrorism or with related problems. These measures afford some help in the work which should now be done in order to prevent new violence towards new innocent victims.[16]

The Sixth Committee debated the issues and considerable divergences of opinion came to light. While some states stressed the distinction between adventurist terrorism and the cause of national liberation and people's revolution, others stressed state terrorism, yet others again condemned colonialism as not only a form of terrorism, but also as causes of "individual terrorism." The United States submitted a Draft Convention[17] that stressed international cooperation in the apprehension of terrorists, their arraignment, trial and appropriate punishment (Article 2—"punishable by severe penalties"). Article 3 provides:

> A State Party in whose territory an alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State.

And Article 4 calls upon states to establish effective jurisdiction over terroristic crime under national law. Some states argued that the U.S. Draft Convention could be the basis of a convention. Others, however, viewed it as a helpful contribution for further work. But no further steps were taken for the implementation of either its terms or the goals it prescribed.

By Resolution 3034 (XXVII)[18] the General Assembly established an *Ad Hoc* Committee to consider the subject and submit a "report with recommendations for possible co-operation for the speedy elimination of the problem."[19] This *Ad Hoc* Committee met from 16 July to 11 August 1973 and concluded its *Report*[20] with the following statement:

> During the general debate, the *Ad Hoc* Committee heard state-

ments by 27 delegations of Member States. A similarly large number of delegations participated in the discussion held in each of the three sub-Committees. In taking up the study of the delicate and complex problem entrusted to it by the General Assembly, the *Ad Hoc* Committee was fully aware of the difficulties of its task. Representatives of the various geographical groups took part in the debates of the plenary *Ad Hoc* Committee and of each of the Sub-Committees. The resulting frank and extensive exchange of ideas brought out the diversity of existing views on the various aspects of the subject submitted for consideration to the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Those views are faithfully reflected in the summaries of the plenary and Sub-Committee debates contained in the report, the careful consideration of which the *Ad Hoc* Committee recommends to the General Assembly.[21]

Subsequently, at its sessions in December 1973,[22] 1974,[23] and 1975,[24] the Sixth Committee reported that "because of the lack of time," it had been unable to deliberate on the subject and recommended that it be carried forward on the agenda to the next session of the General Assembly. On 15 December 1976, however, the Sixth Committee recommended, and the General Assembly adopted, Resolution 31/102[25] in which, *inter alia*, it noted that the *Ad Hoc* Committee had "been obliged to suspend its work"[26] and invited it "to continue its work in accordance with the mandate entrusted to it"[27] and decided to include the item in its next (32nd) session.

Nineteen seventy-seven proved to be a year of considerable activity. In March the *Ad Hoc* Committee met, but it did not produce a draft convention or any legal propositions adherence to which would bind states to specific legal obligations. Instead, its Report showed agreement only on the following generalizations:

(1) An inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence exists;

(2) The need to condemn and repress acts of international terrorism is obvious;

(3) The General Assembly should continue its efforts to combat international terrorism; and

(4) There is a need for international cooperation in tackling international terrorism.

At its 32nd Session the General Assembly instructed the Committee to continue its work but imposed a new set of priorities. In the seventh operative paragraph the General Assembly stated that it;

> *Invites* the *Ad Hoc* Committee on International Terrorism to continue its work in accordance with the mandate entrusted to it under General Assembly resolution 3034 (XXVII), first by studying the underlying causes of terrorism and then by recommending practical measures to combat terrorism;[28]

The United States voted against this Resolution.

In August another *Ad Hoc* Committee, this one on the taking of hostages, met. It had been created as the result of an initiative taken by the Federal Republic of Germany[29] in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly's 31st Session.[30] The Committee was requested, in the same resolution, "to present its report and make every effort to submit a draft convention" in good time for its consideration at the 32nd session of the General Assemby.[31] Because of the greater specificity of its definition and subject matter, the proponents of this agenda item were sanguine that the new committee would focus on issues more closely related to the procedures and methods of

combating acts of taking hostages rather than on the sociopsychological factors that have tended to render the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on International Terrorism rather more diffuse. This may, perhaps, have been premised on a faith in the power of words and definitions to control effectively the purposes and the perspectives of the various regional and ideological groups that constitute the General Assembly. Despite its mandate, the Hostage Committee, after many vicissitudes, failed to produce a draft convention in the 3 weeks available to it.[32]

After the hijack on 12 October 1977 of the Lufthansa Boeing 737 aircraft, its 6,000-mile odyssey, the murder of its captain, and finally the rescue of the passengers and crew at Mogadishu on 18 October by a special unit of German forces, the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations called a 2-day strike of mainly Western airlines. After the General Assembly agreed to debate within the Special Political Committee the issues of the pilots' concern, especially airport security measures, international cooperation in the apprehension, trial and punishment of the perpetrators of aerial piracy, and the problem of hijackers' "safe havens," the Federation agreed to postpone its threatened strike. Rather than discuss this emergency-inspired topic under one of the existing agenda items, a new agenda item "Safety of International Civil Aviation"[33] was inscribed and the Special Political Committee proceeded to debate the problem. This body drafted a Resolution that apparently satisfied the International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations. On the other hand, a comparison of its operative paragraph 3 with the equivalent provision of the 1972 Terrorism Resolution,[34] namely paragraph 5, and paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the General Assembly's 1970 Resolution on Aerial Hijacking or Interference with Civil Air Travel[35] illustrates a decline in the definitiveness and positivism of the language employed:

1977

Appeals to all States which have not yet become parties to the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1968, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971, to give urgent consideration to ratifying or acceding to those conventions;

1972

Invites States to become parties to the existing international conventions which relate to various aspects of the problem of international terrorism;

1970

1. *Condemns*, without exception whatsoever, all acts of aerial hijacking or other interference with civil air travel, whether originally national or international, through the threat or use of force, and all acts of violence which may be directed against passengers, crew and aircraft engaged in, and air navigation facilities and aeronautical communications used by, civil air transport;

2. *Calls upon* States to take all appropriate measures to deter, prevent or suppress such acts within their jurisdiction, at every stage of the execution of those acts, and to provide for the prosecution and punishment of persons who perpetrate such acts, in a

manner commensurate with the gravity of those crimes, or without prejudice to the rights and obligations of States under existing international instruments relating to the matter, for the extradition of such persons for the purpose of their prosecution and punishment;

3. *Declares* that the exploitation of unlawful seizure of aircraft for the purpose of taking hostages is to be condemned;

4. *Declare further* that the unlawful detention of passengers and crew in transit or otherwise engaged in civil air travel is to be condemned as another form of wrongful interference with free and uninterrupted air travel; . . .

Furthermore, the above formula used in the 1970 Resolution may be contrasted with that in the General Assembly's 1977 Terrorism Resolution. This reflection of the contemporary international consensus on the subject ordained that the *Ad Hoc* Committee on International Terrorism should merely study the "underlying causes of terrorism" before "recommending practical measures"[36] for combating it. Of the three resolutions agreed upon in 1977, that on International Terrorism was the most general and the mildest. On the other hand, that on interference with international civil aviation, while perhaps lacking the unequivocal force of the relevant paragraphs of the 1970 statement, was more strongly expressed than its two contemporaries; and the question of hostage-taking is the subject of continuing investigation, study and negotiation.

During February 1978, the General Assembly's *Ad Hoc* Committee on Hostages met in Geneva with a view, pursuant to a General Assembly Resolution[37] prescribing its mandate, to drafting an international convention against the taking of hostages. This committee would appear to have agreed that the taking of hostages is prohibited by international law. A number of states have asserted that safeguards to be assured to national liberation movements should in no way entail the granting of a license to take hostages. Certain participants have also pointed out that in drafting the Convention no confusion should be permitted between the status of prisoners of war (captive military personnel participating in hostilities) and hostages (human beings held in order to extract an advantage or concession, including money, from a third person). Some states have shown concern for safeguarding the right of asylum. Emphasis was placed on the obligation not to derogate from the duty to respect the territorial integrity and sovereign independence of states in connection with the release of hostages. Although certain technical and administrative articles were agreed upon, a convention could not be drafted owing to fundamental political differences over safeguarding the rights of movements of national liberation. The next meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on International Terrorism will be held in 1979.

"Host Country" Problems. The United Nations seems to be confronted by the problem of terrorism in a number of additional contexts. For example, one is said to have arisen in the United States as the proceedings of the "Committee on Relations with the Host Country" reflected (this is a committee set up by the General Assembly to take care of such housekeeping problems as the complaints and conditions of life of diplomats and, generally, relations between the United States and the United Nations) at its 60th meeting:

Strongly condemns the terrorist and other unlawful acts perpetrated against the Permanent

> Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations and its personnel as well as those committees against any other missions to the United Nations as fundamentally incompatible with the status of missions and their personnel under international law.[38]

It recommended at its 65th meeting on 9 November 1976, that:

> Considering that the security of the missions accredited to the United Nations and the safety of their personnel are indispensable for their effective functioning, the Committee noted with satisfaction the assurances given by the competent authorities of the host country and recognizes the usefulness of the various measures taken to this end.
>
> The Committee considered with deep concern the serious acts of terrorism and other criminal acts which had nevertheless been committed against several missions to the United Nations, their personnel and property, including demonstrations and picketing accompanied by violence, threats, malicious harassment, attacks and insults against personnel of those missions.
>
> The Committee condemns terrorist and other criminal acts in relation to any mission, its personnel and property as being totally incompatible with the status of missions and their personnel under the norms of international law, especially those of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.[39]

In this committee the inhibitions and hesitations so apparent in other committees were not so evident. Condemnations of "terrorism" in the United States was clearly felt not to need to wait upon the elucidation of causes as was, for example, the felt need for proceeding further with the far more generally formulated General Assembly Resolution 32/147 of 16 December 1977.[40]

The Security Council and Entebbe—Invasion or Rescue? The aerial hijack that led to Israeli action and that action itself at Entebbe Airport on 4 July 1976 precipitated a meeting of the Security Council. The Security Council held its first session on 9 July 1976[41] on the complaint dated 6 July 1976[42] of the Prime Minister of Mauritius on behalf of the Organization of African Unity, Heads of State and Government who were then present at the Organization's meeting then being held in Mauritius. The African complaint stemmed from the unpermitted use of force on Ugandan soil—President Amin never having agreed to the landing of Israeli forces. The subsequent meetings of the Security Council were inconclusive. Whereas one group of states, including the United States and the United Kingdom, stressed the need to condemn aerial hijacking, both in general and specifically with regard to the case before the Council, the Arab and African states stressed the need to condemn the action of the Israeli forces as

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contrary to Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter. Each side presented a draft resolution[43] that reflected the aspect of the debate it was stressing. Neither draft resolution was adopted. No permanent member of the Security Council used its veto power. The somewhat analogous Mogadishu air rescue of the passengers of a Lufthansa aircraft by special forces of the Federal Republic of Germany over a year later did not stimulate the calling of a meeting of Security Council because the Government of Somalia permitted the landing of the rescue team.

Conclusion. While the United Nations has tackled the problem of international terrorism through a plurality of organs and in terms of approaches to the subject in general and of specific topics, it becomes clear that the more general the topic undertaken the less effective the resultant action adopted. In addition, the greater the number of bodies deliberating on the topic, the less positive the resultant outcome appears to be. Again, the longer a formulation satisfactory to all points of view takes to emerge, the more insipid it becomes. On the other hand, when the issue is attached to a specific subject matter, for example acts of violence against representatives of states and diplomatic persons, or aerial hijacking, or a specific grievance, for the symbolic acts by various U.S. groups towards members of certain Missions to the United Nations and their families, the more definitive and effective the formulations of the organ's point of view becomes.

NOTES

The views expressed in this study are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.N. Secretariat.

1. (What you call "peasants without uniforms" and "murderers and highwaymen" are l'Ordenanza (militia) of the land who, as I have already had the honor of assuring you, are paid military bodies, commanded by officers, and operating under military law. It would appear that you require those who enjoy the rights of war to be uniformed but you should remember that you yourself have added to the glory of the French Army while commanding non-uniformed soldiers.) Reproduced in William E. Hall, *A Treatise on International Law*, 8th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 619, note 1.

2. A study that discusses the limited areas of the specific competences of the General Assembly under the Charter of the United Nations and the scope and limits of its "recommendations" apart from specific topics it may regulate see Blaine Sloan, "The Binding Force of a Recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations," *British Year Book of International Law*, v. 25, 1948:

> Bin Cheng, *United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary Law*, 5 Indian j. Int'l. L. 23 (1965). For the relevance of voting support for the United Nations General Assembly resolutions to the formation of international law, see Goldie, *The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases—A Ray of Hope for the International Court?*, 16 N.Y.L. Forum 325, 342-49 (1970), and the authors cited therein as participants in the debate.

3. a. Resolution on Safety of International Civil Aviation, Resolution No. 32/8;

b. Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence which lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, Resolution No. 32/147;

c. Drafting of an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Resolution No. 32/148.

4. Resolution 2625 (XXV), United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*, Supplement No. 28, 25th Session, U.N. Document A/8023 (New York: 1971), p. 123.

5. Resolution 3314 (XXIX), United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*, Supplement No. 31, 29th Session, U.N. Document A/9631 (New York: 1975), p. 143. Article 3,

paragraphs (f) and (g) where the words referred to in the text are to be found, state the following to be acts of aggression *(inter alia)*:

(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by the other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;

(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.

6. Resolution 2780 (XXVI), United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*, Supplement No. 29, 26th Session, U.N. Document A/8429 (New York: 1972), p. 136.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Resolution 3166 (XXVIII), United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*, Supplement 30, 28th Session, U.N. Document A/9030 (New York: 1974), p. 146.

9. *Department of State Bulletin*, 21 February 1977, p. 155.

10. Resolution 3166 (XXVIII), p. 148.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-146.

12. *Ibid.*, para. 6, p. 147.

13. *Ibid.*, para. 4.

14. U.N. Document A/8791.

15. U.N. Document A/C.6/418.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

17. See Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Terrorism, United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*, Supplement No. 28, 28th Session, U.N. Document A/9028 (New York: 1974), p. 48.

18. United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*, Supplement No. 30, 27th Session, U.N. Document A/8730 (New York: 1973), p. 119.

19. *Ibid.*, para. 10.

20. United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*, Supplement No. 28, 28th Session, U.N. Document A/9028 (New York: 1973).

21. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

22. See Sixth Committee, Report, U.N. Document A/9410, 10 December 1973.

23. See Sixth Committee, Report, U.N. Document A/9947, 11 December 1974.

24. See Sixth Committee, Report, U.N. Document A/10465, 10 December 1975.

25. U.N. Document A/RES/31/102 (mimeo 19 January 1977).

26. *Ibid.*, Preamble.

27. *Ibid.*, para. 7.

28. Resolution 32/147, para. 7.

29. Agenda item 123. The Federal Republic of Germany introduced its draft resolution on 26 November 1966, A/C.6/L/10. It became U.N. General Assembly Resolution 31/103 of 15 December 1976.

30. Resolution No. 31/105, 15 December 1976. See Report of the Sixth Committee, Drafting of an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. Document A/32/467, 15 December 1977.

31. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, Drafting of an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. This was reflected in Resolution 32/t48 of 19 December 1977.

32. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. General Assembly, *Official Records*, Supplement No. 39, 32nd Session, U.N. Document A/32/39 (New York: 1977).

33. This became agenda item 129.

34. U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 3034 (XXVII), U.N. General Assembly, *Official Records*, Supplement No. 30, 27th Session, U.N. Document A/8730 (New York: 1973), p. 119. See also General Assembly Resolution on Aerial Hijacking or Interference with Civil Air Travel, Resolution No. 2645 (XXV), U.N. General Assembly, *Official Records*, Supplement No. 28, 25th Session, U.N. Document A/8208 (New York: 1971), pp. 126-127.

35. Resolution 2645 (XXV), U.N. General Assembly, *Official Records*, Supplement No. 28, 25th Session, U.N. Document A/8028 (New York: 1971), p. 126.

36. See para. 7, Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 32/147. U.N. Document A/RES/32/147 (mimeo 8 March 1978). See also text accompanying note 28.

37. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 32/148, U.N. Document A/RES/32/148 (mimeo 2 February 1978).

38. Committee on Relations with the Host Country, Report, U.N. General Assembly, *Official Records*, Supplement No. 26, p. 12, U.N. Document A/31/26 (New York: 1976).

39. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

40. See notes 28 and 36 and the text accompanying them.

41. See U.N. Document S/PV. 1939 (mimeo, 9 July 1976).

42. U.N. Document S/12126 (mimeo, 6 July 1976). See also:

a. Letter dated 6 July 1976 from the Assistant Executive Secretary of the Organization of African Unity to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12126).

b. Letter dated 6 July 1976 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritania to the United Nations address to the President of the Security Council (S/12128).

c. Letter dated 4 July 1976 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/12123).

d. Letter dated 5 July 1976 from the Charge d'Affaires, a.i., of the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12124) S/Agenda/1942 (12 July 1976).

43. Draft Resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States, U.N. Document S/12138, 12 July 1976. Draft Resolution submitted by Benin, Libyan Arab Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania, U.N. Document S/12139, 12 July 1976.

The isolation of principles of military command method and style beyond that now extant might have the confining effect that doctrine often has. There may be danger implicit in trying to make seem certain those things that cannot be reduced to an abstract or predictable model. Perhaps command method must share with creativity and innovation a high tolerance for ambiguity.

COMMAND METHOD:

A GAP IN MILITARY HISTORIOGRAPHY

by

Roger A. Beaumont

> Examples from history make everything clear, and in addition they afford the most convincing kind of proof in the empirical fields of knowledge. This applies more to the art of war than anything else.[1]
>
> Perhaps a final and vital conclusion is that a prolonged peacetime service is not necessarily conducive for the preparation of military personnel for war.[2]

Description or discussion of command methods is relatively rare in military analysis. Military biography and operational history alike often focus on what happened or why, but rarely how. In current discussion on "C^3"—command, control and communications—technology and organization are dominant. In spite of the relegation of command method to marginality, the idea of military professionalism itself is based on the assumption that command method can be taught. Given the central focus on the *role* of command, method has received relatively little close analysis; one may ask why the actual method of command has been so casually treated.

Since the 17th century at least technologies of command, including organization, have been evolving ever more rapidly in scale and complexity. Turenne had maps, a personal and headquarters staff, housekeepers and aides-de-camp, telescopes and staff riders, reports from cavalry and spies, as well as pen and paper. Current command systems for far smaller forces than his include an array of general staff officers, specialized technicians, a headquarters complement, wireless and wire communications, computer and map displays, projectors, television and sensor linkages, typewriters, duplicating

equipment, infrared and standard photography, motorized and airborne reconnaissance, grease pencils, acetate, stereoptical viewers, photogrammetric and computer aids and much, much more.[3]

The role of the commander on the field and in the fleet, personally controlling a geometrically arranged human chess game, was changing from the late 17th century onward. In stages over the next three centuries, war on land, at sea, and eventually in the air was dispersed, moving away from linear form and toward what S.L.A. Marshall called "eddy currents of battle," in a fragmenting and scattering of operations, often out of touch with immediate central control and monitoring. Yet even though commanders were growingly removed from the zone of action, they continued to be held responsible within a framework based on the image of the *grand chef*. While Wellington, Napoleon, Alexander, Caesar, Bayard, Gustavus Adolphus, Cromwell, and Eugene shared danger on the field with their troops and were often splashed with blood or nicked by bullets, half a century later, in the Crimea, Napoleon III was commanding—or trying to command—by telegraph. In the American Civil War, the model of the tense map room and clicking telegraphs and the isolation of high command at the node of an electromechanical nervous system was established at the same time that, as Patton observed, modern battles had become "simply an agglomeration of numerous small actions . . . [that] practically never develop according to preconceived notions."[4]

The subsequent extension in space of the battlefield was accompanied by developments in communication and a staff system based on division of labor and consequent reduction of the administrative burdens of command.[5] Radio and airpower penalized the concentrating of headquarters as other factors seemed to demand it. From 1914 on, headquarters location became less and less easy to disguise because of electronic "signature," while investment in headquarters systems—communications equipment, manpower, defensive systems on the ground and in the air, camouflage and deception—continued to increase.[6] Since 1945 the special problems of nuclear weapons have added problems of control only partially offset by communications refinements, radar, and computers. Jamming, monitoring, codebreaking and new targetting systems also paralleled these changes, and from the First World War onward added new dimensions to the dynamics of battle to the point that damaging the electromechanical nervous system of the opposing force began to offer rewards greater than inflicting heavy casualties on his fighting units. Conversely, the rising importance of the "nervous system" created the need for new technologies and the people to man them. As the old image of linear battle was eroded by new weapons systems, communication technologies sometimes seemed to offer a chance for commanders to draw in the strings of "real-time," after watching them unravel for so long. Whether the effects of electromagnetic pulses and countermeasures would allow a conversion of the battlefield to an electronic chessboard is another question, one not different in essence from the quandaries that faced Halleck or von Schlieffen, but certainly different in degree of consequence. Indeed, the first command system that took account of communications technology, that of the Germans, accepted the problems of overload, dispersal and changing situation, through delegation of discretion to commanders in the form of the *Auftragbefehlsgebung*, "the issuance of executive orders related to a task"—as it still does.[7] Over time, however, attempts by military intellectuals and professionals to grapple with rational models of command and of warfare

have been infrequent and uneven. On the one hand, the attempts of the school of Jomini to develop a geometrical typology seem naive and ludicrous.[8] Such exercises in hyperrationalism (which are not lacking recent counterparts) seem quite a bit farther away from wisdom than do the more verbal and discursive works of Sun Tzu, de Saxe and von Clausewitz. The latter certainly chose a different path from that taken by Jomini when he described the essence of the commander's role in the age of expanding armies:

> the commander of a great mass finds himself in a constant surge of false and true information, of mistakes committed through fear, through negligence, or acts of disobedience, committed either from mistakes or indolence or exhaustion, of accidents which no mortal could have foreseen.... He is the victim of a hundred thousand impressions....[9]

Whether out of the awareness of the above effect, or through reflexive avoidance of a particularly complex aspect of military phenomenology, there is sparse treatment of command method in the general array of writing on strategy or war and what is there, unhappily, is sometimes a cardboard front for ideology.[10] Military history, journalism and fiction have, moreover, kept alive the image of the heroic leader standing as a rock above the command, using his will to influence events. If nothing else, such an image of individual control and responsibility may be attractive to those caught in the foils of an organizational society, to whom Lindbergh or Lawrence of Arabia symbolize the individual triumphant over fate. Such imagery, however, ignores the fact that the work involved in arraying details for decision-makers as well as implementing the execution has become the province of anonymous functionaries. Bureaucrats, politicians, captains of industry and commanders come and go, but the system has its momentum. Many of the popular heroes, real and fictional, of the late 19th and 20th centuries had as their stage of action the sea, the battlefield, the frontier, the sky and space—and sports—where the writ of complex organization runs thin. As with the definition of heroism, the perception of the role of *grand chef-Feldherr-Great Captain* is highly subjective. In lists of "all-time greats," Napoleon overshadows Wellington, Nelson and Blucher. Stonewall Jackson and Lee are virtual demigods relative to the Union victors, and Rommel has eclipsed Montgomery. What that is all about one may perhaps best leave to psychohistorians. Notably, in the Communist world, while there has been much deference to common denominators and group norms, e.g., commissars, indoctrination, and depersonalization of all but "maximum leaders," in the heat of battle clear rank symbols, decorations, and even bribes have been used to stimulate performance, in a kind of military piecework analogous to Stakhanovism.[11] One might well ask whether emphasis on idiosyncratic style and imagery among Western commanders does not reflect an assumption: that the soldier has a choice to make, and it is better to build his allegiance on the foundation of mystique, situational and immediate, than upon an ideology that might transcend the immediacy of war. Some might suggest that the early experience of the American Republic with its many general-presidents and that of a number of other nations runs counter to that assertion and that charisma is itself a potential ideology. The eagerness with which many modern political leaders have invested themselves with the trappings of military experience suggests that it is not an inconsiderable factor.

The image of an overweening personal power is the basis of most popular perceptions of war, e.g., "The Commanders" television series. Only

occasionally does one glimpse how ground, air and sea actions of the First and Second World Wars were actually being controlled by relatively junior officers in intermittent and confused communication with their "leaders," usually reporting after the fact. Combat became more fluid, diffuse and irregular in its form, many senior commanders attempted to exercise control in the manner of the Great Captains. In the Civil War, post-Napoleonic models of geometric warfare, filtered through Jomini, Dennis Hart Mahan and Halleck, led to costly slaughter as the variable equation of factors omitted the change factor of the rifle. In the First World War, the effect was even more pronounced as veterans of peacetime maneuvers and colonial wars grappled with the vast differences between battlefield reality and preconception.

The naval Battle of Jutland, for example, fought in late May 1916, dramatized the gap between the dispersal of the forces and the image of the *grand chef*. Indeed, results were hard to determine immediately. The British Grand Fleet's commander, Adm. Sir John Jellicoe, was castigated on a number of counts. In the years following the war, however, when the "word" got out regarding the deficiencies in British shell fuzing and other problems, Jellicoe's stock rose in professional circles. A "show" was held at the Royal Navy's Tactical School using ship models, slides showing visibility conditions on the flagship's bridge and a matched series of slides showing the message flow between Jellicoe and units engaged. Those who witnessed the display felt that there was little Jellicoe could have done beyond what he had done.[12] Nevertheless, the continuing vigor of the concept of command responsibility was implicit in the clash of factions that mushroomed after the fight, just as the Battle of the Memoirs overshadowed systemic analysis in the postmortems after the Second World War. Military organizations and the general public remained quick to assign blame. In view of this, even if quantitative indices of command effectiveness were developed, one could expect little agreement about the importance or the weighting of such figures, especially within the realm of military history where blame, glory and the adversary posture are so well-entrenched. If defeat and victory in themselves are not clear correlates to military reputation, why should one expect, say, "POWs taken-ground gained-enemy casualties versus friendly casualty ratio" to have much effect on the shaping of impression? Indeed, the dynamics of the leader/led relationship elude the seeker of simple explanation or rationalism.[13]

There is little wonder, given the focus of military historians and journalists on weapons and personalities, that the question of technique and method has been treated fragmentarily. The elusiveness of leadership predictability has also added to the problem, as the search for effective leadership and command models oscillates between personalities and systems.[14] No doubt the gamelike nature of tactics reviewed in tranquillity has also had an effect, as have the salability of topics, the availability of documents, and the politics of military analysis. It is easy enough to say, as many military historians have said, that there is no didactic value in military history, while persevering in research and analysis in a way that assures marginal utility, whether seen from the perspective of military utility or peace research. Moreover, aside from basic agreement on the need of professional leaders to master certain mechanical rudiments of their trade,[15] most social science analysis relative to the "art" of command falls short of precision and is not wisdom. The question may be seen as academic, of practical interest only to professionals, or merely an exercise in woolgathering. Yet beyond utility a major problem emerges

from the phenomenon of command method, that of error produced by scale. Has, for example, the increasing size and dispersion of conflict in terms of levels as well as the extension of actual combat in time and space created an unstable and error-loaded complex that in itself works against the broader use of force and coercion as effective instruments of policies?If, as Marxists purport, all acts are political, and if the Clausewitzian dictum that war is a continuation of policy by other means is valid, what does this portend for military–and political–leaders who have less and less relatively clear boundaries and formalism to aid them in determining when their actions are appropriate? The expansion of the staff model since 1941 to deal with psychological warfare, propaganda and civil affairs and military government, the institutionalization of paramilitary forces with a rather less than traditional outlook in the body military, and the experiences of Van Fleet, Templer and Westmoreland all underline the problem, as do the frustrations of some commanders of the old school, in facing a world of subtleties and weak boundary definitions. Beyond that, J.F.C. Fuller's observation that the Occidental symbol of war is a sword and the Oriental a bow, suggests a variant of the "constabulary" model in which greater tolerance for ambiguity is implicit. On the other hand, there is no clear evidence that evolution from the heroic to the professional will pause at a point where the values of professionalism and honor are foremost. A further stage of evolution might produce a refinement of Lord Wavell's ideal general with the instincts of a cat burglar. The skills involved in motivating and orchestrating people in war have often been transferred to politics, e.g., Napoleon, Ataturk, MacArthur, Eisenhower, de Gaulle and Mao. In spite of the symbolic aggression and drive implicit in the role of commander, as little of most officers' careers are spent in war, the shaping norm for outlook, style and habit is that of a bureaucracy. In many countries this not only means conforming to stringent economy, but enduring hostility or apathy on the part of the general society toward the role, opinion or welfare of military professionals. As Nevil Shute noted in *Slide Rule*, commenting on red tape in the Royal Navy in early World War II, virtues rewarded in peace are often antithetical to the drive and decisiveness at a premium in war. The sense of shared danger and purpose of those who serve in war is far different from that of those who enter and rise in peacetime, and the relationship of such variants to command style might well be worthy of further research.

In respect to such linkages to the realm of politics, command method is also related to headquarters ambience and therein further constitutes a blend of technique and of political behavior. It is a truism that stress alters perception and the ability to cope and react, but there are also other types of filters at work. Depersonalization is produced by distance between operations and the relatively pristine and relaxed and routine atmosphere of the headquarters. John Masters, a novelist who served in the Indian Army, has related how he visualized a Gurkha rifleman when drafting orders in order to keep his perspective on the consequence in human terms of whatever lofty plans he might concoct at the staff level.[16] Technology has created a growing detachment of higher headquarters from the fighting zone and even though anecdotes of command error, misperception, arrogance and foolishness abound, there has been little recognition of the way in which that detachment has shaped expectancies or doctrine up and down the chain of command. Experiments underlining the ease with which individuals adapt to group norms may or may not be relevant to the question, but there is

no question that the environment of headquarters often cancels the bond between leaders and led that exists at the operational level. There is, moreover, an implication in the creation of the command structure that because something is created to do something that it must therefore do something; hence the sense of relief that comes with having suspense and ambiguity resolved, and the rise in morale among diplomatic as well as military functionaries during the initial stages of a crisis.[17] In such cases, the hunger for resolving action may be viewed less as a function of professionalization, or as a function of the exercise of power, as a reaction to protracted tension.[18]

On the other hand, if one considers the question of ambience from the standpoint of industrial engineering one might ask how much the command-staff system (in terms of work environment, personnel selection, training and the technologies of information handling) has come into line with data flowing out of such areas as ergonomics-human factors, the psychology of perception, neurology, endocrinology, systems analysis, General Systems Theory and so on. As with any other management system, adaptations to such external factors and data have been uneven. Military map symbol systems, for example, still have not broken free of their rectilinear boundaries, while headquarters have become subject to rather than masters of the mechanical problems of uprooting and moving sensitive communication equipment. Behavioral psychologists, leadership theorists and management consultants all might look closer at the increasing splendor of environment that contributes to the "headquarters syndrome," the aloofness, impersonality, and pettiness common in perceptions of the headquarters historically. The contempt for "brass hats" is a steady theme in the literature and subculture of war, e.g., Jean Larteguy's Colonel Raspeguy in *The Centurions* who categorized officers as consisting of fighters and "the others"; James Jones' Sergeant Warden in *From Here to Eternity* who expressed a Populist view of officers when faced with taking a commission; and Irwin Shaw's World War II enlisted men setting up visiting staff officers for an enemy ambush in order to get their winter clothing. The "them-us" problem is always implicit in the isolation of the higher levels in administrative structures; this area in particular where official histories and academic military history alike shows marked deficiencies in penetrating the social aspects of armies. Tolstoy, Kipling, Crane, Barbusse, Remarque, Jones, Forester, Dos Passos, Mottram, Mailer, Chamales, Zweig, *et al.* described the life of soldiers in terms rarely seen in official histories or even commanders' memoirs. One might argue that empathy for the plight of the "lower participants" is a key element in the evolution of a command style, if not technique. One can, in any case, hardly overlook the memoirs, biographies, and histories in the search for data on command method. They constitute a vein of ore, however rare the nuggets. Rommel's observations on command, for example, were as terse as his style in the field. His main objection was to fitting plans and operations into a predefined structure, and overdetailing what he referred to as "unnecessary academic nonsense." In defining leadership characteristics, he stressed flexibility, decisiveness, mental alertness, technical competence and awareness of the human component.[19] On the other hand, Francis de Guingand, Montgomery's chief-of-staff, and James Harbord, Pershing's, both commented extensively on the structure and the method of work in their respective headquarters,[20] as did Adm. William Sims, commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe in 1917-18, in a detailed description of the "London Flagship" in *The Victory at Sea.*[21] In

respect to self-consciousness and thought about command method, Patton was one of the most energetic analysts among modern military writers. Observations, maxims, and principles that eventually found their way into his guidelines for staffs and commanders in World War II are scattered through *War as I Knew It*,[22] in which one finds continual expression of frustration stemming from Patton's awareness of the need to leave control of combat to his subordinates. He commented at length on how his function as a tactician was marginal relative to the manipulation of the symbolism of combativeness and confidence. While Patton has been characterized as neurotic, vain and a remnant of the age of chivalry, in his writings he expressed great awareness of how major commanders had become more like coaches on the bench and less like quarterbacks. While many critics of Eisenhower focused on his lack of combat experience and his failure to play Great Captain in World War II, as time passes one sees how the detachment of senior leaders from the tactical realm was vital to success in World War II. In spite of bullying, Churchill and Roosevelt rarely played tactician, while Hitler was busy moving battalions.

Courtney Whitney provided a detailed sketch of MacArthur's headquarters routine which reveals the same sense displayed by Patton in keeping disengaged from the basic mechanics of the staff system, and maintaining a somewhat detached yet commanding role. MacArthur's refusal to have a private secretary or a phone in his simply furnished office, his casual "dropping-in," leaving the staff alone during half of the working day, the use of dinner and an evening movie as a means for informal discussion and long hours of solitude when reviewing decisions are as destructive of the stereotype of simple bluff soldier as are Patton's cerebrations.[23] In both cases, the awareness of the importance of what Kipling called "the sweet leaving well enough alone" are evident as is the sense that the command includes a strong symbolic aspect well beyond the realm of administrative efficiency.

It is interesting to note the thinness and unevenness of less than spectacular major commanders memoirs. In Sir John French's recounting of his brief time in command of the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1915, one sees the staff only in glimpses, almost impressionistically. He had, after all, made his public reputation in directing a massive cavalry charge in the field. In fairness, however, one must admit that his fall and the assumption of his command by a "modern" university-trained soldier, did not end the sense of frustration.[24]

The memoirs of Sir Charles Townshend, who surrendered at Kut al Amara in 1916 are, like French's, really an apologia, and at the other extreme from French's, an example of the problems that can stem from overintellectualization. Perhaps they are the last gasp of post-Napoleonic geometry. Townshend's conduct of the defense against the Turkish siege of Kut, which led to the first surrender of a British field army since Yorktown, is described and detailed, with much theory and many diagrams. His ignoring of the fate of his troops at the hands of the Turks while he lived in splendor as a captive must be contrasted with his soaring essays. In this instance, at least, rationalization, logic and systemization served as a camouflage for something else.[25]

The case of Lt. Gen. Sir John Monash who commanded the Australian Corps (in reality a field army) in France and Belgium 1917-18, also provides interesting data in regard to command method. A reservist, overage, overweight, a civil engineer and lawyer in peacetime, a colonial and Jewish, Monash was nevertheless the man with whom Lloyd George hoped to replace Sir Douglas Haig as Commander of the

British Expeditionary Force.[26] In spite of his deviance from the image of the appropriate commander, Monash won steadily and with lower casualties than most of the B.E.F. The political pressures of commanding an all-volunteer force raised by Prime Minister Hughes and Monash's own habits of concise and organized thought shaped his tactics and produced significant results in a war in which the Germans had referred to the British as "lions led by donkeys."[27] Monash used an intuitively developed systems approach, constantly honing and realigning the structure of command in the spirit of the motto: "the staff is the servant of the troops."

Among other officers of the First World War, Monash examined the implication of radio, and became conscious of the tendency for headquarters in battle to get swamped and to communicate fitfully or unevenly as well as, on occasion, to distort or hold back information. Montgomery, on a division staff in 1918, formulated the beginning of what became his "J" system, the placing of independent reporters on the battlefield to supplement command information by direct transmission to higher headquarters, bypassing the ordinary chain-of-command signal network,[28] along the lines of the much more elaborate "Phantom" system of World War II.[29]

In surveying doctrine, biography and history, one finds little evidence of a steady approach to command method, or of definition of the command function itself. The blur of the actual process may stem from the fact that much of the work is done by anonymous staffs. The names of the chiefs of staff of major commanders in military history—Berthier, Halleck, Bullard, Aldinger, Bedell Smith, Whitney—are on the margin of memory compared with the names of the fighting captains. As Maurice Baring noted in World War I, staff duty is onerous, not only because of the nonrecognition of grinding work and references to "gabardine swine," but because most staff officers, like Major Bellamy in "Upstairs, Downstairs," want to be at the front.[30] Thus in much military writing the actual command process and its essential flow of information and technique eclipsed, by the descriptions of what happened on the map (with perhaps a reference to formal structure of the organization) the interaction of personalities and not a little might-have-beening.[31] In respect to even such simple things as headquarters siting, for example, there is little treatment beyond such obvious rules of thumb as centrality, natural camouflage, blending in with the normal traffic flow and keeping in contact with the next subordinate layer. (In 1943, when Mark Clark was criticized in front of the press for his cautious headquarters placement by Gen. Henri Giraud, Clark responded by observing that Giraud had been captured in both World Wars.)[32]

Whatever the realities of the growing importance of the staff, the command role has remained to most officers the "sole reason and justification" of a professional's career, while the staff officer's role is seen as that of virtually a civilian, where only a "quick and accurate mind and a retentive memory are needed."[33] Nevertheless, with the growing sense in the 20th century that increasing complexity and scale have been eroding crisp control, a common theme in recent fiction and popularization of war is dysphasia of command monitoring and operations, e.g., *The Naked and the Dead, Twelve O'Clock High, A Bridge too Far*, and *Midway*. There is, of course, in such versions of "reality" often an intent born of politics or alienation to depict war as futile and commanders as dunces. Many such efforts suffer from the imbalance implicit in polemic. Yet the pattern is also evident in postmortems born of officially sponsored research and records. Midway, for example, now seems a victory born of accident upon

accident, in which the levels of "high" command on the American side were virtually out of touch with the main events.[34] Verdun, 1916, far bloodier, saw a similar pattern of the breakdown of perception and effective control.[35] The First World War was the first psychological encounter of Western Europe with the dispersed, depersonalized protracted form of battle on land and at sea that had been the experience of Americans in 1861-65 and the Russians and Japanese in 1904-1905. The microwars of Empire had kept alive the tradition of the commander on the field controlling events, a *la* Kitchener at Khartoum. Command malfunction led Hemingway to describe the collective performance as equivalent to the line-breeding of idiots. The Chief of Staff of the British Expeditionary Force went forward toward the front for the first time during the Passchendaele campaign in late 1917, a battlefield churned into a swamp by weeks of artillery fire during a rainy season, where infantry attacked while laying their own footway with duckboards, and was reported as having burst into tears and blurting: "Good God, did we really send men to fight in that?" His guide, who had been at the front, merely advised: "It's worse further on up."[36]

To be somewhat more charitable and clinical, one could say that the attempt of commanders to overcome the growing gap between central control and operations has been uneven. Some, like Rommel and Montgomery, attempted to keep their headquarters far forward, beyond what some critics felt was appropriate. Montgomery's avoidance of written orders and keeping in touch through maintaining a forward headquarters in "battle atmosphere," as well as bypassing the chain of command through the use of *aides-de-camp* did not gain him points in the game of reputation-building with the press or his colleagues, as Henry J. Taylor noted.[37] In spite of the growth of delegation and task specialization, the expectancy within and without military systems that a commander should appear omniscient and in control of things has continued. Yet to exercise their function as symbols, commanders often left actual command in the hands of chiefs-of-staff. At the same time, the *actual mechanical* ability of the commander to intervene and direct operations has been growingly difficult. In the First World War, it was noted in the British Army that commanders promoted for their abilities at low levels failed at higher commands, a paradox known then as the "fighting commanders' syndrome," a form of the Peter Principle in which personal combativeness and closeness to the troops in combat hampered the ability to administer at higher levels. In a wartime army—or navy or air force—the probability of having an able second-in-command to carry on is reduced by the thinning out of professional competence. Bravery and aggressiveness can thus create problems, if saliying forth leaves marginal competence or sluggishness in its wake.

Yet the fact that promotability is based on a "presentation of self" as aggressive, confident and forthcoming presents even yet another paradox, or rather several paradoxes. First, the functional role of commanders at each level of command above the zone of combat thins out over time. Many infantrymen in World War II saw their theater or army commander as often as they did any leader in their immediate parent organization above regiment. In the Navy, exposure to major command figures was rarer still. Perhaps this is the reason that Halsey in *The Caine Mutiny* and Eisenhower in *Patton* were depicted as faceless Olympian figures. Frido von Senger und Etterlin observed in considering the commander's function that "confidence is a magical source of power"[38] which calls to mind how frequently commanders are remembered from their manipulation of symbols,

such as dress, of exotic vehicles, habits or other distinctive personal signatures used to make them apparent to subordinates. MacArthur's sunglasses, scrambled eggs hat and corncob pipe; Napoleon's, Zach Taylor's, Montgomery's and Grant's simplicity of dress; Jeb Stuart's plume; Custer's gaudy tailoring; Rommel's goggles, scarf and leather coat; the Ike jacket; Ridgway's cap and hand grenades; Patton's strident thespianism; Wingate's beard and topee; Wellington's civilian hunting garb—all virtual gestalt signatures. Psychic distance poses problems for leaders in all types of organizations, and a special one in military organizations. The Soviet shift from consensualism to a rigid authoritarian system in the wake of the disasters of 1941 comes easily to mind, and reflects the paradox that when the military systems are used to act out or test political or social goals, such projects, however worthwhile in moral or political terms, can be irrelevant to or run counter to military effectiveness in war.[39] From the evidence available it appears that in spite of much of the rhetoric of the period, the North Vietnamese regular forces were far more traditional in their discipline than most American units. While the Vietnamese war has been generating a steady stream of postmortems, little of it has focused on the dynamics of command, other than passing references to such problems as commanders hovering safely over troops in action, ruthlessness, unethical behavior and similar problems stemming from a sense of frustration and alienation in a war when the dynamics of careerism became a major point of focus in the U.S. Army officer corps. The Department of the Army study *Command and Control* focused mainly on organizational structure and problems of coordination with the South Vietnamese in an unstable political environment. In passing, however, its authors pointed out a fact often forgotten and rediscovered, that political complexities in war may militate against a "simple, well-defined and flexible" structure.[40] Some might suggest that such a model might not have come into being even if no external political factors existed, for in the "real world" relations with Allies, interservice rivalry, careerism, personalities and similar factors shape structure and behavior, and contaminate ideal models.

Tension between leadership styles in peace and war has long been evident in professional officer corps. The "constabulary" model of officers—consensual, cerebral, and empathic—fits requirements of peace and limited war, and conforms to standards of professionalism laid down by Huntington. At the same time, this model, a product of evolution rather than design, conflicts with popular perceptions of leader/manager roles as directive and authoritarian, i.e., what Victor Thompson referred to as the Mosaic myth. Many expect leaders to be strong father figures, radiating the threat of force and a sense of surety, if not infallibility, a *la* Vince Lombardi, John Wayne and Patton. A typology of historical leaders, however, would show a full range of styles from bombast and swagger to virtual obscurity and semi-anonymity.[41] Are, then, preeminent leadership styles idiosyncratic, or deviations from the norm? Are they a designed imposition of will? Or are they systemic byproducts or outputs? A question following from this is how much—if leadership style is a product of self-conscious design—do tricks and symbol manipulations lapse into charlatanism whether it works or not? T.E. Lawrence was embarrassed by the ease of it, and Patton far more self-conscious about his veneer than those who took his histrionics at face value might believe.

Indeed, the most important pattern element in command method may be the commander's symbolizing authority in a way that stimulates motivation among potentially indifferent or hostile

participants, working against psychic and real distance between the upper echelons of command and the operational level. The role of bureaucratic structure and function and of "filters," i.e., functionaries, is extremely hard to follow in analyzing documentation. Being tedious and boring (provided documents reflect the actual decisions made and the interplay of personalities), such studies are less likely to attract the attention of those on the verbal side of the "Two Cultures."[42] A growing involvement of civilian politicians, bureaucrats and policymakers with military policy has also affected the image of the commander, and has eroded roles once seen as the exclusive province of the military.[43] It is interesting to compare Lincoln's visits to the War Department telegraph room with Doris Kearns' description of Lyndon Johnson's using of the situation room as a refuge, which endowed "illusion with the appearance of precision."[44] Given the trends in command-and-control technology which have steadily abstracted the realities of war and the images of Lincoln and Johnson, it is obvious there is need for more than a little probing to be done in the area of command method. Close analysis of this area might well be of considerable value to peace researchers and revisionist historians, as well as to analysts working in an advocate or clinical direction.

The benefits to the military profession of closer research on command method seem balanced by some counterforces. There is the Hamlet syndrome, the danger, evident in examples of many leaders given to too much reflection, that the native hue of resolution may indeed be sicklied o'er by a pale cast of thought. The isolation of principles of military command method and style beyond the broad and sometimes contradictory principles and maxims of leadership already extant as military and management lore might have the confining effect that doctrine often has, and therefore be either ignored or rigidly adhered to. Obviously, from the standpoint of military utility, too strong a set of guidelines or body of predictive data in this area would have profound influence on morale, on politics, and on intelligence and propaganda. An objectively identified "comer" would be a target for intraorganization rivals, not to mention an enemy in war. If promotion were certain, who would stay to compete? If doctrine rather than trait proved the key to command performance, the principle of surprise would be at least eroded. It is a worthy goal, of course, to optimize. There is also danger implicit in trying to make seem certain those things that cannot be reduced to an abstract or predictable model. Some feel that there is a conceptual time bomb ticking in the social sciences in respect to the dynamics of power and leadership, which has latent in it the power in social terms equivalent to the discovery of fission. Research in this area may never reach the point that it allows the design of a new organizational mousetrap or philosopher's stone. It may also be that the correlates to leadership performance may be pathologies of mind or environment, and which the structure and role expectancy of military organization and technology bring forth. The heart of the matter in respect to command method is the issue of the corporealization of power that reaches its ultimate form in the setting of military authority, and those who seek to understand and manage conflict cannot ignore the seductive aspects of authority extant in role of *grand chef*. Whatever one thinks of Wilson, one must concede that he, unlike most other major modern political leaders, did not lust to control the sword. Insomuch as the preservation of the essence of freedom implicit in civilian control is related to the apparatus of military authority that has been so greatly heightened in the nuclear age, the main

thrust of any investigation of command method must be the extent to which the system controls, or shapes expectancy and action, and thereby bends resolve and policy rather than bending to them.

In surveying the material extant, the question often passed through my mind: why has this vital problem been treated so often in passing, fragmentarily, at the expense of mechanistic detail or anecdotes? It certainly fits the conclusion of Irving Knickerbocker that leadership is something invested in leaders by the led rather than projected down, in a kind of live-action collective Rohrschach test. Yet there is another dimension, in keeping with Alistair Cooke's view that making money, like other arts, is something that cannot be taught, as critics of the "principles of war" have often suggested. Like medicine, war is an art practiced under great stress, and Lord Slim suggested generalship was one of the higher art forms. In analyzing the practice of command as an "art," dangers of abstraction and reduction quickly emerge, the very bane of military history and analysis along with hindsight. One would not expect any group of fledgling conductors to benefit evenly in their subsequent careers by an exposure to a Toscanini, a Beecham or an Ozawa. More critical, perhaps, is that analysis of art is like the problem biologists face when they speak of killing to dissect. Music may therefore be a better analogy to the model of military and naval leadership than literature and the visual arts as it is done live, under pressure. One can well imagine what any bureaucracy would do to the living process of art with a plethora of doctrine, manuals, and lesson plans. For some time to come one may expect, as with quarterbacks, that military leaders will learn as the game is played. That does not mean that the question of selection and training of leaders should not be of paramount concern to military systems, far more so than it has really been in the eyes of more than a few. It may well be fortuitous that the military leaders of democracies have not been broken to the harness any more than they have, given their unique problems of leadership and the political realities. The orgy of self-criticism that has emerged since Vietnam has not been a bad exercise in consciousness raising. Nevertheless, the hunger for structures as touchstones and the laboratory-tested American need for closure in problem solving can produce problems. Flies trapped in amber have a kind of immortality, but they do not fly again. If command style and method is too closely wedded to doctrine, it negates the factor of surprise. What is even and predictable on one side, may not be on the other. Many researchers in the field of innovation have noted that a major trait related to creativity is a tolerance for ambiguity. Thus tolerance above and beyond the norms of patience may be required in approaching the very delicate flower of command method. A recalling of Washington's family motto does not seem wholly inappropriate:

"Results prove the deeds."

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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NOTES

1. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, transl. by Q.J. Mathijs Jolles (New York: Random House, 1943), p. 109.

2. Peter G. Bourne, ed., *The Psychology and Physiology of Stress* (New York: Academic Press, 1969), p. 187.

3. For varying dimensions of the "C^3" complex see Donald H. Rumsfeld, "A Command, Control and Communications Overview," *Signal*, May-June 1976, pp. 24-26; Kenneth F.A. Openchewski, "The Role and Location of the Commander: How Will They be Affected by C^3?" *Military Review*, April 1977, pp. 12-19; Norman Friedman, "C^3 War at Sea," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1977, pp. 126-141; and "World Wide Military Command and Control System," *Commanders Digest*, 14 February 1974, p. 7.

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I gratefully acknowledge the counsel and criticism of Professor William Snyder of the Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University during the preparation of this paper.

As a result of the Bicentennial, there is hardly a patriot victory in the Revolution that has not been written about or reenacted. Yet in all that hoopla did anyone remember the ones we lost? One such was the battle of Penobscot Bay, a combined sea and land operation, that next to Pearl Harbor was the greatest naval defeat in American history.

DISASTER IN PENOBSCOT BAY

by

William Fowler

On a direct line, Penobscot Bay lies about 150 miles northeast of Boston, midway along the coast of Maine. At its entrance it stretches about 30 miles across and is about the same distance from the sea to its head, where the Penobscot River empties. The river is wide and deep enough to be navigable for almost 60 miles, all the way to the present city of Bangor. Along the northeast shore of the Bay, 10 miles from the river, there is a small (1½ miles long by 3/4 mile wide) rocky finger of land that juts out into the water. It was then called Bagaduce (today it is known as Castine) and was the key to control of the entire Bay.

British interest in the area was first aroused early in the war by William Knox, the Colonial Under Secretary. Knox thought a naval base at Bagaduce would help secure the line of communication between British Forces in Halifax and New York. Those in New York were being harassed by Yankee privateers out of Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Furthermore, the Secretary argued, a base there would help protect the outlying fringes of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia from American attack. It was an interesting idea, but when Knox suggested it, the government had other plans and Penobscot would have to wait. As the war dragged on and predicted quick victory failed to materialize, the Ministry took a second look at Knox's scheme and saw in it benefits other than those mentioned by the Under Secretary.

The area could be taken over for the Loyalists. Thousands of them had been displaced and the prospects of their ever returning home grew dimmer with each passing day. If the area was secured they could be settled in the Penobscot region. That would be helpful in

fulfilling a debt the British Government owed to those who had gambled and lost for the Crown while at the same time providing an occupied buffer zone between the Americans and Canada. This proposal received strong support from exiled Loyalists in England and they lobbied vigorously in its support.[1]

A second reason had to do with supply requirements of the Royal Navy. For some time the naval base at Halifax had been sending ships to Penobscot to bring back timber needed to repair and refit ships. Without firm control of the area this was a risky proposition and the ships were subject to constant harassment and attack by the Americans. As the need for timber at Halifax grew, this became an increasing concern. In 1779 the British decided to occupy Penobscot.

The expedition was organized from Halifax. With a small naval escort under the command of Capt. Henry Mowatt, about 700 Highland troops boarded transports in early June. On the 17th they arrived at Bagaduce and, despite the presence of several hundred American civilians in the area, they landed with no opposition. The commander of the force, Gen. Francis MacLean, immediately ordered his men to dig in and prepare fortifications.

In Boston the news was received with great alarm. For the first time in more than 3 years part of Massachusetts was in enemy hands. Newport, Rhode Island to the south had been in British possession since late 1776 and now, with the enemy pressing in from the north, the people of Boston felt trapped in a tightening vise and feared that they might well be the next target. That was the worst possibility, but even short of actual attack there were other distressing possibilities. With bases barely 300 miles apart, the Royal Navy could easily sweep along the New England coast, raiding and pillaging and closing down the very lucrative Yankee privateering operations.

The real and potential danger was too great to be ignored and too immediate to wait for congressional action. On 26 June the General Court ordered the Massachusetts Board of War to lay plans for dislodging the enemy and:[2]

> To engage or employ such armed vessels, State or National, as could be prepared and procured to sail in 6 days, to charter, or if necessary, to impress in the harbors of Boston, Salem, Beverly and Newburyport, a number of private armed vessels, belonging to individuals competent, when joined with the others, for the enterprise; to promise the owners a fair compensation for all losses and damages they might sustain; to give seamen the pay and rations of those in the continental service; and to procure the necessary outfits and provisions as quickly as possible.

Speed was essential. They had to attack before the British had enough time to strengthen and reinforce their position. Boston came alive as preparations for the biggest naval operation since the days of the Louisburg expedition got underway. The narrow isthmus across the neck into the town was clogged with wagons and carts bringing in supplies. Down on the docks teamsters yelled and cursed as they skillfully threaded their way through the piles of equipment being loaded aboard vessels. Everywhere the creak of block and tackle could be heard as seamen strained to hoist cannon and ammunition on board. The harbor was thick with ships making up the largest American Fleet ever assembled during the war.

The Massachusetts state navy sent their entire fleet, which then consisted of two brigantines, *Active* and *Tyrannicide*, while New Hampshire lent her state ship *Hampden*. The Massachusetts Council asked the Continental Navy Board what it would contribute. The Board offered, on their own authority,

to attach three vessels, Dudley Saltonstall's frigate *Warren* along with two smaller vessels, the sloop *Providence* under Hoysted Hacker and a newly captured prize, the fast brig *Diligent*.[3] Augmenting the state and Continental ships were about 16 privateers mounting 16 to 20 guns each. This fleet of 23 armed vessels was placed under Saltonstall's command, but as was usually the case whenever privateers teamed up with public ships, there was serious question of how amenable the former would be to the orders of the Continental officers. The Marine Committee always looked askance at such joint ventures and the events at Penobscot fully justified their misgivings. Saltonstall's orders were to take them and escort 20 transports loaded with militia safely to Bagaduce. After landing his cargo he was to remain at Penobscot and assist in taking the place from the British.

This was not only the biggest American naval undertaking of the war, it was also the largest American amphibious operation until Gen. Winfield Scott went ashore at Vera Cruz during the Mexican War. The whole business turned out to be a classic example of how not to conduct a joint Army-Navy attack. Such operations require the utmost in cooperation, experience and precise planning, but the Americans neglected every one of these requirements. Saltonstall seems not to have had the vaguest notion of how to support a land operation. His counterpart on land, Brig. Gen. Solomon Lovell, was a well meaning and relatively competent militia commander, but his experience did not go much beyond the local common on muster day. As usual, lines of authority and responsibility between commanders were fuzzy, resulting in squabbles over picayune issues that made joint planning an unpleasant and unproductive chore.

On 19 July, after less than a month of preparation, Commodore Saltonstall gave the signal and his fleet got under way for Penobscot. It was a pleasant summer sail down east with a short stop at Townsend (Boothbay) to pick up additional militia.

No operation of this size could be kept under wraps for very long, and from Loyalist informants the British at Bagaduce knew well in advance that the Americans were coming. They worked day and night digging in and improving their positions and artillery was shifted to take advantage of greater fields of fire. In the harbor Captain Mowatt ordered his three sloops, *North*, *Nautilus*, and *Albany* brought up to cover the mouth of the harbor. Behind them he placed four small transports that, if necessity required, he was prepared to set afire and send into the American Fleet.

Six days after leaving Boston the American Fleet came to off the Bagaduce Peninsula well out of reach of British guns. After surveying the situation Saltonstall ordered nine of his ships ahead in three divisions to engage Mowatt's sloops. With *Warren* in the van the Americans advanced towards the British but Saltonstall, cautious and not anxious to get too close, kept his ships at a respectful distance. At that range there was little danger and for a couple of hours the two sides exchanged shots with only slight damage inflicted. Despite their overwhelming advantages the Americans had not begun well. Ashore the British watched the confused evolutions and poor gunnery of the American Fleet and rightly concluded that their attackers were not nearly so formidable as they first appeared. Lovell ordered his troops ashore. They hit the beach and came under heavy fire from an enemy who was well concealed in thick brush. The Americans were driven back. The next day Lovell ordered a feint made towards the same beach while the main force of soldiers and marines assaulted a nearby island. The ruse worked. They took the

island along with an enemy battery that they could now turn against the British fort.[4]

Despite the bombardment the British held out. For the next few days the American militia poked and prodded around the enemy's defenses. Although he had the advantage, Lovell refused to make an assault. While the General paused outside the fort, the Commodore moved again to attack Mowatt. Led by *Warren*, three ships moved in but once again Saltonstall came about before they could get close enough to do any real damage. The British gunners with a better eye, more experience, and a good deal of luck managed to put two shots into *Warren*'s main mast, a shot into her bowsprit and one that parted the forestay. *Warren* withdrew and spent the next 2 days repairing her damage.

Inside Fort St. George things were beginning to look up. MacLean stripped his transports of cannon and mounted them on the ramparts, and at the same time he ordered sailors from the same ships into the fort to man the breastworks. Lovell's delay allowed MacLean time to improve and strengthen his position. The campaign was settling into a pattern that gave every advantage to the British. It was a siege and promised to be a long drawn out affair of desultory firing accompanied by a lot of digging and waiting. It was not the kind of operation that the militia and privateers had bargained for. They had expected a quick victory and an equally quick return home. Under these circumstances just how long Saltonstall and Lovell could hold their people at Penobscot was uncertain.

Saltonstall was not inclined to risk all in an attack. He had no stomach for pushing up the harbor after Mowatt as long as the guns at Fort St. George could bear down on him. The privateers, who thus far had been of no help at all, agreed. Saltonstall, Lovell and their officers spent endless hours together arguing about what the others should do. Lovell wanted Saltonstall to take the enemy sloops first, but Saltonstall wanted Lovell to take the fort first. The General would not budge. He told Saltonstall bluntly "the alternative now remains, to destroy the ships, or raise the siege."[5] Other militia officers felt the same way. Col. John Brewer, a Penobscot native, urged the Commodore to attack. Saltonstall responded angrily to Brewer "You seem to be d__d knowing about this matter! I am not going to risk my shipping in that d__d hole."[6] Like many American naval commanders Dudley Saltonstall had the heart of privateersmen. His overriding concern was the preservation of his ships and avoidance of risks. He could never quite accept the doctrine that under certain circumstances it might be wise to risk all in order to achieve victory. On the other side, Lovell and Brewer knew their men and they were none too anxious to lead raw militia against entrenched veteran troops.

Saltonstall tried to maintain his position but it was difficult. In early August a dispatch boat from Boston arrived with intelligence from the Navy Board—a British relief force was on its way. The Board told Saltonstall that unless he hurried all would be lost. Under pressure from all sides he relented and plans were laid for a full-scale land and sea assault to take place on 13 August.

All through the night of the 12th, militia officers moved among their men checking equipment and giving last minute instructions. Offshore, Saltonstall was watching as his ships, according to plan, began to move silently into position. In the grey dawn hours Lovell moved his men close to the fort. Everything was ready. A morning fog delayed the attack a few more hours. As it began to lift the Americans stood by their guns but before the firing commenced *Diligent* drew alongside the flagship with an urgent message. She had been

on picket duty off the coast and came to report that she had sighted several sail bearing up towards Bagaduce. The attack was called off and a hasty conference was called. What *Diligent* had spotted was a British squadron, 10 days out of Sandy Hook, sent to reinforce MacLean and Mowatt. It consisted of the 64 gun ship of the line, *Raisonable* accompanied by three frigates, *Blonde*, *Virginia* and *Greyhound*, along with three sloops, *Camilla*, *Galatea* and *Otter* George Collier was in command. At first Saltonstall thought about defending and trying to hold the British while the transports evacuated the troops to safety farther up the bay. That plan disintegrated as the British ships drew closer and the privateersmen saw their sides bristling with open gun ports. Saltonstall knew that he could never get his nervous privateersmen to join in a straightforward battle and even if he could it was doubtful how much help they would be against disciplined and well-trained British crews. Under the circumstances Saltonstall could do nothing but signal to his ships to scatter and seek safety as best they could. It was a donnybrook. Vessels ran aground. Some, including *Warren*, were blown up by their crews. Others tried to run to safety up the Penobscot River. That was futile and they too ran hard aground. Everywhere sailors and soldiers were scrambling through brush and woods trying desperately to get away.

When it was all over the Americans could count 14 vessels blown up or burned by their crews and 28 captured. Five hundred Americans were either dead or taken prisoner and more than $7 million wasted.[7]

News of the catastrophe got back to Boston before most of the survivors. Someone needed to be blamed and Saltonstall was the logical choice. He was, after all, the senior officer but there was another possible reason as well. The State of Massachusetts was saddled with nearly all the bills for the unfortunate expedition. The men in the Statehouse were anxious to find someone to share the burden if they could. Fixing the blame on Saltonstall would provide a strong argument in favor of the Continent splitting the cost. A Committee of Inquiry from the General Court found that Lovell had not been properly supported by Saltonstall and that the principal reason for the failure was the failure of the Commodore to display "proper spirit and energy." Shortly after that Saltonstall was court-martialed and dismissed from the service. Some thought he got off lightly and should have been shot for presiding over one of the saddest spectacles in American naval history.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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

SET AND DRIFT

THE WORLD OF MANAGEMENT

by

Robert F. Delaney

In the past quarter century a revolution of dimension has occurred in the managerial art, paralleling the earlier confrontation between the natural and the social sciences of last century. It has not come easily and it is accompanied by controversy.

Essentially, the change has been occasioned by six major factors:

- The increasing complexity and diversity of society, including both the private and public sectors and especially the $120 billion Defense Establishment.
- The arrival on the scene of new psychological and sociological insights helping to explain human behavior.
- The introduction of information systems, quantitative methodologies, decision theory and mathematics into the processes of management.
- The orderly substitution of trained management for family ownership, charismatic and combat leadership, and corporate "freebooters."
- The growing weight and influence of bureaucracy throughout our institutions, or, to put it another way, the ascendancy of the public sector over the private sector.
- Finally, the profound changes wrought in American management caused by America's emergence as a world power and political/economic competitor for scarce resources.

Management, for our purposes at least, concerns the organized structure of society's institutions centered about the human core in such a way as to permit timely, correct decisions to be taken when required.

It does not require wide managerial or military experience to sense the recent change in psychological insight, technical diversification and increasing attention placed on fuller utilization of people. Indeed, the process is accelerating, bringing with it new demands on institutions and managers.

A simple example suffices. Years ago, I attended what was the first advanced management program at Harvard Business School. Not one single word about mathematics, systems or the computer was mentioned. Two years ago at an American Management Association seminar I attended only mathematics, decisionmaking theory and the computer were discussed.

What had happened in the interim?

One could be flip and say, "a funny thing happened on the way to an MBA: The world changed. The '12 table' is not enough."

This is precisely what did occur.

There has been a:

- knowledge explosion
- technological explosion
- communications explosion

- economic explosion
- professional explosion

In addition, if we look at the effect on managerial programs, there has also been:

- the internationalization of markets, as with arms sales
- a shorter product life on industrial/consumer goods including weapons systems
- increasing importance of marketing
- basic revitalization of decision-making
- emergence of special line/staff relationships
- multiple memberships (NATO co-production efforts)
- a revolution in personnel management

We need not here overly dwell on societal change and its effect on institutions save to note that the heaviest affect on administration has not been in accepting the new array of management tools but in grasping the effects all of this has had and will continue to have, on individuals within the society, or to be more precise, the organization.

Look but to the immense shift in value systems in the last 25 years. English journalist Henry Brandon has called the change "the undressing of America," and Robert Townsend, in a more pragmatic context, explained it neatly as "Up the Organization."

Managerial man can often emerge from all this tattered and confused. But as Naval War College Professor George Brown has so ably demonstrated, new tools of logic and behavioral science provide an intellectually sized slide rule for us to assure ourselves that management is making the right decisions.

Man, the rational animal; man, the object of society; man, the manager, the consumer, the bureaucrat, the prize and the victim.

This brings us to the matter of economic (or is it rational) man. We find Professor Herbert Simon speaking of "administrative man." I find it a particularly disheartening, but realistic appraisal: man doing his thing, in the vernacular. This interpretation goes a long way to explain the "gold brick," the workaholic, the careerist, the "goof-off." Each man institutionally is doing his thing.

Techniques designed to assist in the rational decision process are at the core of organization: how to push decisions toward goals and missions. With the military world daily becoming more organized, it is vital to understand the world of management. This process of understanding has consumed 50 years: from the primitive human engineering studies of pre-World War II (including, incidentally, the classic study of *The American Soldier* by Samuel Stouffer, which did so much to argue the case for the development of a managerial theory centered on people, not things) through the rise of the computer crisis management conflict resolution, feedback of all sorts, to total organization development, a state in which we are immersed today.

It was management consultant John Dibold who coined the phrase "technology as an agent of social change." It was on the wings of this movement, which found its supporters at Carnegie-Mellon, Sloan, Stanford and A.D. Little, Inc. and its detractors in social theorists Franz Fanon and Herbert Marcuse, that American business, first, then American government, later, began to modernize corporate, institutional structures. The operative phrase was "to rationalize" the structure (a term interestingly enough taken not from Herbert Simon but from the literature of Soviet planned economics).

And what did this theory tell us of man and his governance: essentially that, all things being controllable, man, economic man, optimizes—goes all out. Graham Sumner called it Social Darwinism. Horatio Alger reflected it as the free enterprise system.

Such was not easily to be, for the practicalities of corporate and organizational life interfered. Man passes through the psychological filters of alternatives and compromises to a new organizational state, washed by social psychology and marketed as administrative man, he who simplifies and "satisfices," one of the great nonwords in Shakespeare's tongue. And what is this "satisficer"? He is known to each of us for he is an economic everyone. He settles for what he can get. William Whyte spoke of him in his classic on *Organization Man.* We heard more of him in Whyte's sequel *Is Anybody Listening?* and we see his tactics in Anthony Jay's acerbic treatise *Management and Machiavelli.* What does it add up to? It adds up to a conflict, resolvable, in most cases, but certainly inherent in the nature of today's organizations and management. Directly put, the social sciences tell us that the more rational, efficient and effective the organization, the more closely we should watch for human failing, for the "satisficer" is constantly prepared to adjust. Modern management to succeed must balance corporate/organization decisionmaking and the manager's need to focus on the individual to exact that measure of motivation and communication necessary to success and achievement. This is as true of EXXON as it is of the Department of Defense.

Thus man is central to the decision and to the objective sought. The variables are not hard to find; the leader knows them; the manager analyzes them. Therein the military dilemma: a tendency to place the combat leader in conflict with the manager of violence.

Values, motivation, perception, communication, authority, power, process, change and development form a continuum of interest to us organizationally and managerially.

The umbrella over these perishable and mutable variables is the structure of consistent, calculated, decisionmaking. Models, theories, concepts come and go, are tested, accepted or rejected. Perhaps the most insightful thing a manager can perceive in this process is the ability to distinguish "what is" versus "what ought to be"—the capability versus the intention.

Suffice to say, behavioral techniques, models and analyses are proven, usable tools to aid in decisionmaking, not necessarily to make the decision. Management's task remains to scan the organizational effort, become familiar with these new inputs, but never to forget the organizational structure through which rewards and goals flow. It is only then when appreciation of man, the manager, and man, the technician, is assessed that the range of administrative behavior will fall into place and man the satisficer will emerge, be it in IBM, Newport Naval Regional Medical Center or Aunt Tillie's variety store with her 35 seconds of computer time/month.

Just consider the 40 years from Frederick Taylor who "discovered" scientific management to Peter Drucker who raked up and "discovered" people in an organizational environment. From a Henry Ford Sr., entrepreneur, hardnosed and reeking with prejudice to a Robert McNamara, armed with computers, impersonal, fact-oriented, option open and decision prone, is but one generation. The trained manager represents progress carrying both strengths and weaknesses. The modern manager is a far cry from the businessman's view of the "salesman on horseback" in Samuel Huntington's overworked imagery. A programmed Walter Wriston, as Chairman of Citicorp, seems far more compatible with modern management than does the thought of Horatio Alger being put in charge of systems analysis. This analogy is as true of national defense as it is of business.

To understand and to process these immense changes from simplicity to complexity, from authoritarian,

hierarchial leadership to participatory management required many inputs and many schools of thought. Consider the list: the process school (the universal function of management), the empirical school (case studies of experience), the human behavior school (the active cooperation of people in pursuit of goals), the social system school (wherein society controls the inputs which eventually reemerge as outputs), the decision theory school (the rational procedures through which analysts assist managers to reach decisions), the mathematical school (the tools of assistance to bring precision within managerial reach), and finally, increasingly important, the comparative management school (which in management terms might be described as how to retain your cool, keep everyone happy, and still generate a bottom line).

There is obviously a price to be paid for all of this, humanly and institutionally: the growing weight and influence of the bureaucracy in both private and public sectors. It was the German sociologist, Max Weber, who first studied bureaucracy. It was exemplary. The bureaucracy in his hands was a meritocracy. It was the finest effort of the public sector. Bureaucracy has, to say the least, undergone change. In our society it has developed careerism, apathy, organizational jealousies and parochialism. Arthur Herzog has written a cynical little book on it, *The B.S. Factor;* Chester Bernard tried to cut it off at the pass with his early work on *The Growth and Development of Executives:* to no apparent avail. Neither the brilliant Harold Lasswell nor social economist Edward Banfield seems to know the answer save to explain how it works. It is a problem that today severely besets the national security apparatus, and hinders our ability to react to crisis with flexibility and innovation. Bureaucracy has become to defense planners the greatest single obstacle to change.

This reality, however, is our world. William Jennings Bryan may have died on a cross of silver laced with gold, but today's managers who violate the bureaucratic code are not nearly so fortunate. Their cross is likely to be early retirement. Organizational change and development within our national bureaucracy is an apt area for understanding and study. The management of America, public and private, as commentators and critics alike tell us, is an immense business.

And this leads one to close with an observation from one of those exceptionally fine business school case studies:

An interviewer speaking to a foreign entrepeneur once inquired,

"Sir, would you mind summarizing in a phrase how you managed to rise from pauper to millionaire in only six months without learning more than three words of English?"

"Stick 'em up!"

THE BAROMETER

27 October 1978

Dear Admiral Stockdale:

The reviewer chosen by the *Naval War College Review* for *The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: Vol. 1, The Setting of the Stage to 1959** indicates that what the volume "should have been all about" was "naval operations in Vietnam," focusing mainly on tactical activities and going into great detail. Something of wider scope seemed to be needed in the first volume of an official series, a volume which provides background, particularly for naval readers, and carries the United States Navy's part of the story only through the early advisory years.

From my own experiences in positions of responsibility during the Vietnam War and service as the Navy Member of the Joint Logistics Review Board (whose report on the Vietnam era consisted of three major volumes and eighteen monographs), I am convinced that by far the most important lessons to be learned will prove to be other than those of a tactical nature.

Summary treatment of historical background on Vietnam and of events leading to and shaping the conflict was believed to be essential to an understanding of the lessons which hopefully will be learned. Some of the decisions during this conflict raise doubts as to whether there was always a full appreciation of the maritime-related strategic importance of Vietnam as revealed by earlier history through World War II. Most works on periods prior to the French-Viet Minh War tend to neglect naval events and their impact on the history of the area, or treat the events in fragmentary fashion. One is reminded of Mahan's complaints that emphasis on the more easily understood war on land had resulted in misunderstandings as to the true purpose and potential influence of sea power. From earlier times navies and their use of the sea and inland waterways had key effects, sometimes decisive, on the course of the history of Vietnam. If these aspects of the past had been better understood, a number of different decisions might have been made during the period of American involvement. In any case, an overall appreciation of the naval impact on the earlier history of the Indo-Chinese area should help in understanding the more recent events.

*Reviewed on pp. 113-115 of the Fall 1978 (Vol. XXXI, no. 2) issue of this journal.

Another reason for the coverage of historical background was the complexity of Vietnam, its various peoples, and the internal sources of conflict. Your reviewer compiled a "documentary history" on the *Viet-Nam Crisis*. In his preface he saw two issues as important causes of the crisis. The first was the conflict between Communism and anti-Communism. The second issue, which he considered the crucial one, was "the unification of the country." During the Vietnam War and later, there were many who viewed this latter issue in oversimplified fashion. As our volume's brief coverage of earlier history indicates, "future conflict would be influenced by religious, cultural, and political divisions within Vietnam, a country never truly united and under single rule only for brief spans of time." Some overall appreciation of such divisive influences and prior relationships with China is a prerequisite to understanding and evaluating the Vietnam War, including naval aspects and potentials.

The reviewer suggests that the reader who is lacking in an understanding of Vietnam history should start with a more comprehensive historical work. Desirable as this may be, many readers will not start in this fashion. For those who do, a caution is in order. The reading of one such work will not suffice, both because of variations in coverage and the differing impact on contemporary writers of controversial American opinions of the war in its last few years.

With regard to the French-Viet Minh War, the reviewer would have preferred a "more intensive analysis of things such as kinds of craft found suitable (or not), the specifics of armament and protection, logistics and tactics, successes and failures" of the French riverine forces. This was considered beyond the scope of an introductory work on *The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict*. In volumes dealing with the period of American combat involvement, additional discussion of such specifics may prove desirable. Those interested in details should go to books and articles devoted to the French-Viet Minh War. It is hoped that the volume's references will provide some useful leads.

As for naval riverine activities, these were essentially an extension of naval power to inland waters, supported by sea power and closely coupled with other naval operations. Thus, the summary treatment attempted to encompass the full range of naval operations during the French-Viet Minh War, including coastal forces, amphibious landings, employment of carriers, naval gunfire support, and the dependence upon sea and coastal lines of supply.

The reviewer identifies one "thread" of the volume as being "the evolution of defense policy and organization and within that, of the Navy itself." To him this "too often seems remote from the main subject." The relevance of such changes should become apparent in later volumes in connection with the ways in which the Vietnam War was directed, controlled in detail, and supported–together with the ways in which the employment of naval forces and results were influenced. Matters of "defense policy and organization" are only a part of the story; for there were other related changes of importance, such as in command and the chains of operational command over naval forces. Before valid lessons can be drawn, it is believed necessary to

understand the process of change which started and gained momentum during the period covered by this first volume.

As for discussions of what the reviewer calls "weapons systems," an overall understanding of changing capabilities is believed of importance to an understanding of actions at the time of Dien Bien Phu, for instance, and of the missions and tasks to be treated in later volumes. Furthermore, important to the story is an overall appreciation of the reasoning advanced by those who believed that the means of war had been so altered as to eliminate the need for certain naval capabilities. The debates, which obviously cannot be covered in depth in such a volume, did have an effect on the composition and strength of the Fleet. Basic assumptions of some of those involved were proven invalid by future events. Some of the same arguments as to the obsolescence of certain forms of naval power are being advanced today in budget-related debates.

In attempting to draw lessons from the past that will be of value in determining the nation's naval power needs for the future and of help in deciding how that power can best be applied across the spectrum of conflict situations, there are grave dangers of misinterpretation if attention is focused too narrowly on the details of naval actions. These actions, and decisions concerning them, must be judged in the light of related considerations, including special features of the particular war or conflict in which they are involved. The danger is especially acute in the case of lessons drawn from the complex Vietnam War, in which the American military involvement, the controlled use of power, and the final outcome were influenced by many factors, subtle as well as direct.

The reviewer's belief that the "best of the various military history series" were written by single individuals is not supported by the actual output of service historians over the last three decades. Other specifics in the review also can be challenged. Nevertheless, the review does perform the important service of reminding naval readers that the Vietnam War—and the volumes concerning that conflict—will long remain a highly controversial subject.

Sincerely,

/s/ Edwin B. Hooper

EDWIN B. HOOPER



PROFESSIONAL READING

REVIEW ARTICLE

Just and Unjust Wars

Moral Responsibility and Conflict: A Post-Vietnam Perspective

by

Lewis Sorley

This is a book* one would like to praise. Stemming, the author tells us, from his concerns as an activist in the antiwar movement of the Vietnam era, it attempts a comprehensive consideration of moral issues involved with the use of force. In fact, the book's title provides a far too limited indication of the range of its concerns, which are not confined to determinants of just and unjust war. How wars may be fought is also a major subject; such classic problems as neutrality, preemption, intervention, surrender, proportionality, the siege, and reprisals are addressed. Divided into five parts, the book successively deals with the moral reality of war, culminating in an examination of the "war convention"; the theory of aggression, during the course of which the war in Vietnam is determined by the author to have been a civil war; the war convention again, revisited and revised according to his views of what is moral; dilemmas of war, which includes a denunciation of nuclear deterrence; and the question of responsibility, both individual and corporate.

But there are major problems with the book that become apparent at the very outset. The author, Michael Walzer, is a professor of government at Harvard University. Thus it seems appropriate that he has styled his work (in the subtitle) "a moral argument with historical illustrations." But the argument is based on some outlooks, understandings, and indeed self-conceptions that are at least highly contentious. An illustration is to be found in the opening paragraphs. Describing himself and his fellow members of the protest movement, Walzer asserts that they "suffered from an education which taught . . . that [such words as "aggression and neutrality, the rights of prisoners of war and civilians, atrocities and war crimes"] had no proper descriptive use and no objective meaning. Moral discourse was excluded from the world of science, even of social science."

No doubt some readers will find it surprising to learn that Walzer and his associates are under the impression that they revived philosophical discourse in contemporary America, even allowing

*Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 361pp.

for whatever sufferings in their own education may have deprived them of access to or even knowledge of the rich and continuing public and academic dialogues of the past three decades on a range of moral issues that included the production, possession and use of nuclear weapons; intervention, both economic and military, in many different contexts (from mainland China, Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Guatemala in the early part of the period through East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Congo, the Dominican Republic, the Lebanon, Suez, Israel and the Middle East more generally to Vietnam and now Angola and the Horn of Africa); human rights and such constituent concerns (not first introduced by the current administration) as food, disaster relief, economic well-being, population planning, education and health care; disarmament concerns and continuing efforts to negotiate superpower agreements of restraint; establishment and development of international organizations devoted to peace and prosperity; the establishment and perpetuation of alliances whose purpose was deterrence of warfare and aggression, and which often were notably successful; and the range of foreign assistance programs throughout the period. Perhaps the Marshall Plan and even the Peace Corps were before Walzer's time. But the unbridled self-righteousness of asserting that there was no moral discourse, and in fact that education in America denied the meaning of moral concepts, until the antiwar movement made its appearance, is instructive in terms of the self-image held by the author of this treatise on moral issues.

The Theory of Aggression. Mr. Walzer makes extensive use of analogy in shaping his arguments, and this sometimes leads him into problems of logic. In discussing the theory of aggression, for example, he complains of the lack of discrimination between differing degrees of aggression: "Every violation of the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of an independent state is called aggression. It is as if we were to brand as murder all attacks on a man's person, all attempts to coerce him, all invasions of his home. This refusal of differentiation makes it difficult to mark off the relative seriousness of aggressive acts—to distinguish, for example, the seizure of a piece of land or the imposition of a satellite regime from conquest itself, the destruction of the state's independence. . . . "

It is not clear that others share Walzer's difficulty in sorting all this out, or that they should. Various manifestations of aggression obviously can be and are differentiated, with the differences taken into account in determining what constitutes an appropriate response. The more appropriate analogy, furthermore, would be to say that aggression is like crime: all crimes are against the law, but not all crimes are murder. In like manner, all aggression is morally wrong, but not all aggression is of equal magnitude. Indeed even if the analogy were to murder it would be too simplistic, for murder itself is a category of crimes that involves a number of differing degrees recognized in law and ethics, with varying amounts of culpability associated with each.

The point of the author's having used the faulty analogy is apparently to permit him to go on to argue that, in the case of individuals, the nature of the crime is in part conditioned by the response of the victim, so that someone who resists may be murdered, while one who submits is only robbed. "Consider," he says, " . . . the German seizures of Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1939. The Czechs did not resist; they lost their independence through extortion rather than war; no Czech citizens died fighting the German invaders. The Poles chose to fight, and many were killed in the war that followed. But if the conquest of

Czechoslovakia was a lesser crime, we have no name for it."

I would argue that of course we have no name for it, because again we are confronted with a poorly chosen analogy which seems to illustrate a similarity when in fact none exists. In the case of the individual, resistance or the lack thereof changes the nature of the outcome: robbery on the one hand or murder (*and* robbery) on the other. In the case of conquest of one state by another, the outcome is the same, with or without resistance: the state loses its sovereignty and the citizens lose their freedom. Just as, in the case of murder committed in the course of a robbery, the robbery becomes of secondary importance in comparison to the more serious crime of murder, perhaps it is also true that with aggression the murders committed in the course of it become of secondary importance in comparison with the more devastating crime of forcible conquest and deprivation of freedom. And there is yet another significant difference undercutting the analogy: in robbery, there is some hope of redress through appeal to a higher authority, the police power of the state. States themselves have no such higher power to which to turn; thus they must, unlike the robbery victim, either resist or inevitably suffer loss.

While there is much of interest in the author's discussion of aggression, and one must be sympathetic to his desire to reduce the extremely complex issues involved to manageable proportions through the use of analogies to situations we know how to deal with, the result is sometimes an unfortunate oversimplification that does not seem to provide the basis for morally informed decisions in the cases in point.

In the course of his consideration of aggression, Walzer assesses the matter of appeasement. What is right, he implies, depends on the circumstances. In some cases "there might even be a duty to seek peace at the expense of justice." Alternatively, he suggests that it would be immoral to appease by giving in to "the rule of men committed to the continual use of violence, to a policy of genocide, terrorism, and enslavement. Then appeasement would be, quite simply, a failure to resist evil in the world."

This is a significant and challenging passage. It suggests that isolationism in a world where such evil exists is not morally acceptable. In illustrating his point, the author returns to Nazism: "Stability among states . . . rests upon certain patterns of accommodation and restraint, which statesmen and soldiers would do well not to disrupt. But these patterns are not simply diplomatic artifacts; they have a moral dimension. They depend upon mutual understandings; they are comprehensible only within a world of shared values. Nazism was a conscious and willful challenge to the very existence of such a world. . . ."

There is very little to choose, in these terms, between the Nazism of Walzer's example and the designs of aggressive communism in the following era. Thus opposition to the Soviets, equally dedicated to destroying the values upon which the international system of accommodation and restraint is based, constitutes a similarly morally permissible and even mandatory stance. In the author's own terms, that conclusion would seem to be inescapable unless one denied that to be the character of the Communist threat. Those who are so tempted might consider the words of the art critic of *The New York Times*—the *art critic,* mind—in a recent review of the concluding volume of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's powerful trilogy: "If, after 'The Gulag Archipelago,' we are still unable to imagine what the Soviet reign of terror and death signifies, both for its millions of victims and for us, too, in the precarious comfort of our freedom, it is because we do not want to—because we cannot

bring ourselves to face the worst about the politics of our century and the murderous morals of our species."

It seems that, in a volume on morality and the use of force that can acknowledge the obligation to oppose unmitigated evil, this historian might have done well to confront the current existence of such evil in the world and the resultant imperative for American political and, if necessary, military action. I suspect that he did not, at least in part, because it would mandate some less absolutist judgments about the war in Vietnam than he has chosen to make.

America and Vietnam. Walzer's denunciation of American involvement in the Vietnamese war is unrelieved. He denies the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government, argues that the Viet Cong had achieved legitimacy of its own, asserts that Americans ignored the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, and subsequently brands the resettlement of civilians to get them out of the path of battle as of "likely criminality." He maintains that it was a civil war, and that the American involvement belongs to a series of clear-cut aggressions in which he also includes "the German attack on Belgium in 1914, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, . . . the Russian invasion of Finland, the Nazi conquests of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Belgium, and Holland, [and] the Russian invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia," among others.

How does he reach this position, at least to his own satisfaction? He begins by asserting that, because it failed to hold the elections that had been scheduled for 1956, the government in South Vietnam lost its legitimacy. No consideration is given to the matter of whether those elections could have been conducted fairly in the circumstances then pertaining. Next he argues that "counter-intervention is morally possible only on behalf of a government (or a movement, party, or whatever) that has already passed the self-help test." This seems to be literal nonsense—can he possibly be saying that outside parties can only help those governments that do not need help? Apparently he is, for he argues as well that a government that cannot put down an insurgency has no claim to popular support, and that insurgents who can survive have thereby demonstrated that they have such support.

All of this seems to belie a total innocence of the nature and reality of subversive warfare. Perhaps if his extremely brief and inadequate chapter on terrorism had been more extensive it would have provided the author some insights into the techniques of coercion and disruption that are so congenial to subversives. While undeniably effective, they are far from demonstrations of popular support. If that were not the case, then the argument would have to be that the more effective the insurgent in the use of coercion, the greater his legitimacy, a very peculiar argument to find in a dissertation on moral conduct.

In a related passage the author asserts that "what is crucial is the standing of [a] government with its own people." Yet in continuing to maintain that the South Vietnamese government was not legitimate nor supported by the people, he ignores the persistent resistance to the external aggression and internal subversion that the people carried on, clearly preferring the government they had to that which others sought to impose upon them. It is remarkable, for example, that the government that Walzer so despises was able to issue tens of thousands of weapons to ordinary citizens without fear that they would be used to overturn it. There is no necessity to portray the existing government in South Vietnam during the war as any more effective, benevolent or popular than it actually was to contrast it favorably with the threatened regime that has now come to power. Given the

weighing of values in conflict that is the essence of ethical choice, it seems strange that Walzer is able to adhere to so unidimensional a view of the merits of this case.

Innocence and Involvement. A troubling inconsistency seems to appear when the issue of the ethical duty of a citizenry to restrain its government from aggression is discussed. Walzer's position is that in an ideal democracy (America's he characterizes as a flawed democracy) individual citizens who do not actively oppose aggression committed by their government are themselves morally culpable. He then portrays a kind of sliding scale of individual responsibility, determined by the degree of freedom or democracy that exists in a given state. Thus in a very repressive state, one in which a citizen could not oppose a government bent on aggression without grave personal risk in the doing, individuals are according to him absolved of such responsibility. While that may well be a reasonable view, it seems difficult to conclude at the same time that the failure of citizens in the grip of a murderous guerrilla subversion can be said to have conferred legitimacy upon that movement by their failure to overthrow it. Yet this is precisely the argument he has made in branding American assistance to South Vietnamese attempting to overcome Viet Cong terrorism as illegal intervention owing to the supposed legitimacy attained by that subversive movement.

If we are going to consider, as Walzer suggests, fundamental reformulations of the laws of war, then perhaps the provisions dealing with the status of civilians ought be addressed. At issue here is, among other things, what ethical duty a citizen has to restrain his government from committing aggression. Never mind that it be argued that the victor will inevitably determine who was the aggressor and who was not. We are concerned here, in the terms Walzer has set, not with what is practical, but what is right. So we are entitled to ask whether the population of an aggressor nation should be indemnified from risk, and more particularly whether the soldiers of the nation which is the victim of the aggression are obliged to accept increased danger to themselves in order to provide protection to the aggressor's civilians.

The key seems to be somehow tied to the question of innocence. It is surprising, given the author's expressed concern with the duties of a citizen to refuse to participate in a war which his conscience rejects, that he does not challenge the traditional view that all civilians are innocent, regardless of their government's acts, and entitled to be protected. It does not seem such a long way from firing a rifle, which subjects the soldier doing it to the vicissitudes of war, to manufacturing that rifle, or the ammunition for it, tasks which are equally essential to the effective prosecution of a war. Yet the latter contributions have not been considered such as to forfeit civilian immunity. It would be going a long way indeed to argue that citizens share fully the responsibility of their government and its leaders for aggressive war, and clearly this could not be sustained as a general proposition. But considerations of fundamental justice do bring us back to the question of whether soldiers who have taken up arms solely to defend their nation against aggression by another have an obligation to accept greater risk, to themselves and to the success of their enterprise, simply to provide increased protection to the civilians of the enemy power.

It may be granted that the citizenry in general is often powerless to restrain an aggressive government, especially one that has systematically sought to undermine and cripple any semblance of organized resistance. But does that necessarily mean that the soldiers of the nation that has been wronged, who

would themselves very likely have remained civilians were it not for the necessity to fight that has been thrust upon them by the aggression of others, must endure greater risks for the sake of hostile and at least putatively aggressive civilians? Perhaps we need a new concept of corporate responsibility for aggression, and reconsideration of the conventions of warfare that would derive therefrom.

Nuclear Deterrence. In considering the central strategic issue of the modern era, that of nuclear deterrence, the author holds that "against the threat of an immoral attack, they have put the threat of an immoral response." He is speaking of the threat of nuclear retaliation, of course, and goes on to hold that "the immorality lies in the threat itself, not in its present or even its likely consequences." This view seems wrong. It is only in response to massive immorality on the part of the attacker that retaliation would take place, and the overwhelming purpose is to dissuade him from such an attack. Thus, merely by refraining from immoral massive aggression, the potential adversary can avoid destruction. Surely it is not immoral to ask this much. How can such an outcome be evil, indeed "murderous"? Yet Walzer characterizes it as "the commitment to murder."

Perhaps his use of that term stems from his subsequent assertion that "it is a feature of massive retaliation that while there is or may be some rational purpose in threatening it, there could be none in carrying it out. . . . We could only drag our enemies after us into the abyss. The use of our deterrent capacity would be an act of pure destructiveness." Yet this seems to ignore the likely subsequent effects of refraining from retaliation. A Soviet Union that had visited great destruction upon the United States, and which had itself escaped such destruction, would then be in a position to impose its will on every other nation. Nowhere would freedom be safe or survive. Use of our retaliatory capacity under these circumstances, even if it were our final act as a civilization, would also be our last and decisive act of fealty to our allies and the prospects of perpetuating liberty and humane values. Without it, they would be doomed. There is a direct analogy with Walzer's earlier characterization of Nazi Germany, a regime so pervasively evil that the prospect of its triumph is prima facie a "supreme emergency."

Conclusion. In a passage put on the dust jacket of the book, thus giving it prominence above all else that he has to say, the author states that "war kills; that is all it does . . . the soldiers who die are, in the contemporary phrase, wasted. . . . " I take that as a political statement, and possibly an aspiration as well. But the substance of his book, historical and contemporary alike, belies the assertion. War frees or enslaves, brutalizes or ennobles, restrains or unleashes. It protects and preserves the precarious progress of civilization, or drives it back toward primitivism. But the existence of force is not the moral issue, nor even the use of it, but the purpose for which it is used, and the ways in which it is put to that purpose.

There is much more in this book than can adequately be addressed in a review. I have chosen to concentrate on some points which seemed to me in need of challenge, but both these and numerous other passages are useful in focusing thinking on the kinds of issues that in the event must be acted upon, and that one must therefore prepare for through prior contemplation. Walzer holds that "we are not usually philosophical in moments of crisis. . . . " Perhaps what he means is that there is no time in the midst of crisis to develop a philosophy, for I believe we do act philosophically in crisis, and that we do so on the strength of the values we have

incorporated into our approach to life; indeed this is what we mean when we speak of character.

Granted it is possible under stress (or otherwise) to act inconsistently with our principles, a phenomenon we recognize when we say someone has acted "out of character." But it is the deviation from the expected norm that points up the existence of such norms, chosen and customarily adhered to by those who are concerned to live their lives purposefully. There is much in this book that is useful in those terms.

There is even a bit of humor, welcome among so many difficult and somber issues: the author cites a proscription from ancient Indian law to the effect that among those who are to be exempted from battle are "those who are asleep, thirsty, or fatigued or are walking along the road, or have a task on hand unfinished, or who are proficient in fine art." Many a Vietnam veteran would agree that that sounds pretty good.

And it is Vietnam that haunts these pages. Whatever else the book may be, it is pervasively and persistently also a work of self-justification. It may be that Walzer is right, that America's involvement in Vietnam was not only unwise and ineffectual, but also immoral and criminally aggressive. But I do not think so, nor do I think that he has made his case to that effect in this book. Perhaps that case cannot be made except to those with a broader range of shared assumptions. It brings back a line from John LeCarre's novel *The Looking Glass War*: "nothing ever bridged the gulf between the man who went and the man who stayed behind."

Walzer would argue, no doubt, that the bases for ethical judgments transcend individual human experience, and in the abstract he would be right. But those judgments are, in the difficult and meaningful cases that put our humanity and good will to the test, matters of drawing balances among competing values, of seeking the most ethical course where values are in conflict. The weights we assign in making such judgments are, inescapably, conditioned by the lives we have lived and the personal and professional commitments that have absorbed our energies and dedications. Those who fought this war and lived to reflect upon it have etched upon their minds, whatever the pain and regret that may endure, a panoply of courage, compassion and sacrifice that defined what was best—and most typical—of the American soldier in that endeavor. No doubt others, whose convictions or self-interest led them to oppose or evade the war, find their later judgments likewise shaped by their experiences.

In this sense, at least, there can be no absolutes upon which to base moral judgments, except perhaps that of fidelity to values as one perceives them. And if that be true then, though the gulf remain, it is possible to conceive there are men of good will on both its sides who may, in better times, be reconciled in the service of worthy goals. I would like to think that that, too, is what this book is about.

BOOK REVIEWS

Bailey, Thomas A. *The Marshall Plan Summer.* Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977. 246pp.

This book represents a distinct departure from Thomas Bailey's other works. The author begins his Foreword with the statement that "This book is not a scholarly monograph on the Marshall Plan. It is primarily a journal that describes in intimate detail conditions in the sick countries of Europe at the time the Marshall Plan was struggling to be born. The emphasis is on the patients, not the doctor." The dean of American history never cloaks his position and his 1941 observations are simple and straightforward with no implied symbolisms.

Traveling under the auspices of the National War College from June through August 1947, Bailey presents a very personal, rare historic Baedeker of the year that spawned the Economic Recovery Act for Western Europe, gave birth to the postwar containment policy, and formally announced the beginnings of the cold war. The fast moving text is punctuated with cartoons and pictures that accurately captured the temper of the time, and Bailey's recorded observations are well mixed with hundreds of personal interviews and official documents that have only been recently released.

Because of the unique "journal" style of the book, Bailey is able to give the reader an insight into the broad issues of general continental concern: food, education, government, economics and displaced persons in addition to lesser issues that illuminate the social conditions at the time: prostitution, architecture, standards of living, the media, American ethnocentrism, discrimination and political disposition of the intelligentia. *The Marshall Plan Summer* is not a chronological forced march through facts and does not rely on the traditional means of compartmenting information. Rather, it is a whistle stop tour in which the traveler shares his 30-year old observations frankly and honestly and puts them into a casual country by country historical perspective. This is thorough history of the postwar climate in Europe without the mechanical facts that often make reading histories in general such a chore.

In his final chapter, Bailey suggests that the cold war was the inevitable product of clashing ideologies and misunderstood intentions, beginning with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the articulation of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of world domination. The Epilogue puts the Marshall Plan into present day context and briefly discusses its place in history. That it gave the recipients the means to shorten the postwar trauma is without question. That it forestalled the westward movement of communism is probable. Thomas Bailey has added an important book to his works, one that will allow meticulous students to fill the voids that are created by the obligation many historians feel to keep history in the third person, avoiding all the unique, colorful, and descriptive sensory information they might receive firsthand. As a layman often disappointed with the cold, articulate, and erudite histories on which we are forced to subsist, I found *The Marshall Plan Summer* to be a pleasant change. Even erudite historians can get something out of it.

JOHN MORSE
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Berman, Robert P. *Soviet Air Power in Transition.* Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978. 82pp.

With the widespread attention devoted to the Soviet buildup of nuclear weapons and increasing involvement in the Third World, relatively little public discussion has focused on the more

traditional instruments of force employed by the Soviets. In this Brookings study, Robert P. Berman examines the tremendous growth of Soviet airpower and the threat that this poses for the United States, especially in Europe. Fundamental to Berman's thesis is the idea that the Soviets would be inclined more to use conventional forces than nuclear ones in a European war (at least initially), and so the need to pay close attention to Soviet air capability is urgent.

Until the mid-1960s, the primary mission of Soviet air forces was to provide defense against NATO airpower. The air defense mission, though, has been increasingly transferred to Soviet ground forces with the development of large numbers of highly accurate surface-to-air missiles. Berman believes that Soviet air forces are not now targeted against their NATO equivalent but against Allied ground forces. Instead of trying to gain air supremacy over the West, the role of Soviet airpower is to prevent an effective ground defense by NATO against a Soviet attack.

One shortcoming of the book is that while the author mentions briefly that he feels the *Backfire* bomber is primarily a threat to Western Europe and not at all to the United States, he does not discuss this controversial point in depth. To be more convincing, he should have discussed why he feels *Backfire* is not a threat to the United States and also should have stated what particular defensive measures are needed to counter this new bomber in Europe.

The author also examines the growing potential wartime uses and the rising actual "political" peacetime uses of Soviet airpower. While he outlines what the United States and NATO must do to counter the former, nothing is said about how to deal with the latter. Particularly disturbing are Soviet overflights of our allies' airspace to deliver weapons to Soviet clients in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere. This reviewer believes that the United States must act firmly to persuade our friends to halt such overflights by forcing Soviet airplanes down if necessary. This can hardly be considered an extreme measure; it is exactly what the Soviets themselves do when Korean airliners accidently wander over Soviet territory.

All in all, *Soviet Air Power in Transition* is a valuable work that escapes certain needless constraints in thinking that have been all too common. Instead of seeing future conflict in Europe as a series of compartmentalized battles of armies fighting armies alone while, separately, air forces are fighting air forces alone, Berman stresses the threat that Soviet air forces pose to NATO ground forces as well as to Allied sea and airpower. The book thus merits reading by all those concerned with the defense of Europe on land, sea, and air.

MARK N. KATZ
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Betts, Richard K. *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1977. 292pp.

Most military officers will find this an interesting book, despite its probable origins as a doctoral dissertation. Mr. Betts has taken the period since World War Two to study the effect of advice offered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President in times of crisis. What makes his effort different is his use of sources. In addition to the usual published accounts and memoirs, he has employed interviews of the principal participants and their subordinates, mostly from the military side of the Potomoc. Actually, there is not much choice in this as the records of the proceedings at issue remain highly classified. And because of classification and other sensitivities, the interviews themselves are not always attributed directly either, but credit an anonymous "Military Interview" in the notes. So, this is

not definitive history, but then it is not intended as such. Rather Mr. Betts undertook the test of some commonly held assumptions about the effect of the professional military community on the formulation of national policy. In so doing, he debunks many of the popular New-Left articles of faith.

Betts concludes that in most cases the Joint Chiefs were neither more nor less aggressive than their civilian counterparts in the State Department when considering the military option in policy formulation, However, once conflict was joined, he notes a sharp difference between the two groups: The professional military men favored an intense application of available force, while the civilian advisors tended to advocate a gradualism abhored by the JCS.

The book would be worthwhile solely for the examination of these salient crises in such terms, but Betts then probes into the relationship between the civil and military branches to seek reasons for these similarities and differences. The greatest value of the book may be found in these subsequent chapters, which explore virtually every independent variable in the literature of decisionmaking and bureaucratic/organizational politics in this frame of reference.

With the models of Samuel Huntington, Betts explores the crises from the perspectives of the two modes of influence by which the military can affect policy decisions. *Objective Influence* is the narrowly professional approach of Huntington's preference. In this mode, the military leader is an apolitical advisor, concerned solely with the means of implementing policy conceived by his civilian masters. In contrast, *Subjective Influence* occurs when the political and military roles are combined, in a "soldier-statesman" fusion. Predictably, neither model is found to be an adequate description of historical reality, but Betts adds an interesting twist to a familiar story when he compounds the plot with the interjection of the other side of civil-military relations–that between the Pentagon and the Congress. He points out that it is not only possible but likely that the JCS might play an "objective" role in relations with the President and his men, while being nearly totally "subjective" in their congressional dealings, as logrollers and negotiators. The opposite could be as easily true, of course. The essential recognition is that roles change with circumstances, personalities and the particular game or games being played.

The method of selecting the Joint Chiefs is also examined as a possible explanatory variable. Betts categorizes each Chief since Admiral Leahy, but is unable to draw any conclusions as the great majority of selections appear to have been made by a logic he terms "routine professional"–drawn from the most likely or senior candidate in line for the job.

Betts then views policy formulation from two intrinsic perspectives: necessities and capabilities. He concludes that these are not independent variables either, but that policy is susceptible to change from either or both. He illustrates the point with concrete examples, some of which are very revealing. In this section, he brings under attack the common contention that capability predisposes the use of military force options. There is some support for the theory, but it is found to be unconvincing.

There is more of interest here to the professional, as the author looks at organizational imperatives, personality variances, and the effects of careerism. It is all written with the familiarity of an insider at the Pentagon rather than from the isolation of some scholarship. Betts has produced a workmanlike product that simply destroys a great deal of academic conventional wisdom about recent policy. It is not the last word on the subject by any means, and skeptics will fault its inability to cite

critical sources, as replication of the study will be difficult if not impossible. But the data will ring true to most Washington veterans, who have heard similar accounts at the bars of Officers' Clubs, or in the E ring itself. And the deft manipulation of the most popular models in organizational theory is a thought-provoking bonus for the reader.

JOHN B. BONDS
Commander, U.S. Navy

Blainey, Geoffrey. *The Causes of War.* New York: Macmillan, 1973. 278pp.

Professor Blainey has given lay and professional readers alike a stimulating critique of traditional theories of war's causation and provided a provocative alternative interpretation of his own. In this literate essay, the author dissects conventional explanations of modern warfare (since 1700), discrediting in the process most of the popular myths concerning causal forces. When it comes to presenting his own thesis, however, he is little more convincing than his predecessors, identifying what might be called "symptoms of bellicosity," but indulging in truisms when he attempts a more definitive diagnosis of basic causes.

Considering war and peace a continuum, the author begins his analysis with an inquiry into one end—the causal forces of peace. Herein, he systematically refutes arguments that peace has been attributable to either political stability, economic prosperity, commercial intercourse, expanded communications, common culture, disarmament, power balances, international associations or international law. He further finds that neither war weariness nor magnanimous treaty terms guarantee tranquillity. And just as these conditions reveal no clues to the sources of peace, so, according to Blainey, their absence is no certain precursor of war. Domestic strife, depression, nationalism, arms races, ideological differences, power imbalances, legal and institutional deficiencies are all shown to be equally unreliable indices of war.

Are there then no identifiable or universal causes of war? For Blainey, only one: disagreement over measurement of power. "War is [always] a dispute about the measurement of power," he asserts. It begins when two nations disagree on their relative strength and ends when agreement on this subject is reached. It is thus most likely to occur when there is a relative parity of power between competing states, and least likely in situations of great power disparity.

Beyond this, Blainey claims that there exist "recurrent clues" to this phenomenon, clues which determine the probability of conflict. The foremost of these is "optimism" and the expectation of speedy victory. This optimism is in turn the function of calculations concerning: size and availability of military force, probability of third-party intervention, prospect of internal strife at home or within one's opponent, present and anticipated state of economic health, and seasonal conditions. Favorable assessment of these factors encourages the optimism preliminary to war.

As corollary to this concept, the author claims that war occurs only when two or more powers agree that they have more to gain by fighting than by negotiating; therefore, war constitutes a form of convention between consenting states. According to this model, war is the deliberate act of all participants, never accidental or the consequences of rigid alliances, arms races, misunderstandings, or blundering diplomacy; it is not even the product of unilateral ambitions of nations or statesmen.

This reviewer, perhaps because of his suspicion of universal theories, found Blainey most rewarding in his demolition of the foundations of causation theory; the book is worth reading for

this contribution alone. When the author assays the creation of an alternative model of war causation, he serves to provoke more than to persuade.

At first glance, his thesis that war is a dispute about the measurement of power seems to ignore the policy imperatives that induce such calculations; it also seems to neglect conflicts where measurement of power does not appear to have been an obvious factor. Blainey surmounts such objections, however, by including prestige, ideology, trade, territory, alliances, etc., as forms of power. With such an all-encompassing definition of power, war can indeed be seen as a dispute over its measurement; but such an explanation becomes almost truistic. It has little value as either a predictive or descriptive formula concerning the causation of war. It reveals nothing that will suggest the imminence of war, indicate its symptoms, or imply techniques for war avoidance. And it leads the author into the questionable generalization that war is more likely under conditions of balanced power than those where serious imbalances occur.

The contention that optimism is the most important clue to the likelihood of war appears to be another truism. Nations do not, as Blainey admits, go to war unless they believe they have more to gain by fighting than by negotiating, and certainly they will anticipate, or at least say they anticipate, quick success. But is this optimism a clue to war's causation, or simply evidence of political necessity and man's enormous capacity for misperception and self-delusion—a normal way of preparing for crisis regardless of rational expectations? Manifestations of optimism are of little relevance in estimating the causes of war, and have limited utility even as symptoms, because they appear relatively late in the escalation of crisis, after many other danger signals have become obvious.

As for the factors Blainey contends are calculated to produce optimism, these constitute variations of the standard elements—forces, resources and will—that policymakers have traditionally used as indices of national power and readiness. And while positive estimates of these factors do produce optimism, is the probability of war a function of optimism, as the author contends, or of capability and opportunity? Certainly it is difficult to accept his view that anything that produces optimism in such calculations automatically encourages war.

Blainey's discussion of war as a convention between two consenting states presents an intriguing concept. It is useful to be reminded that war is seldom the product of accidental or unilateral action, that even surprise attacks such as Port Arthur or Pearl Harbor are not sudden unilateral initiatives but the product of bilateral actions that were directed toward conflict with considerable understanding and volition on both sides. However, this idea of war as mutual agreement tends toward a relativism that is hard to accept; just because two or more nations agree that there is no alternative to fighting, responsibility for producing such a situation does not necessarily fall equally upon all. Here again the author's analysis seems to suffer from the omission of considerations of policy motives.

Issues such as these are guaranteed to engage the reader's attention and stimulate thought, if not agreement, especially when presented in the graceful and unpretentious style that characterizes this book. In the final analysis, we can agree with Professor Blainey that the crucial question is why war instead of some other means is chosen to measure power or implement policy. That is a question still unanswered but perceptively deliberated in *The Causes of War.*

RICHARD MEGARGEE
Naval War College

Booth, Ken and Wright, Moorhead. *American Thinking About Peace and War.* New York: Barnes & Noble, 1978. 240pp.

In celebration of the American Bicentennial in 1976 the University College of Wales held a conference on "American Thinking About Peace and War: Reflections Two Hundred Years On." This thought-provoking volume is one result of that conference. Each of the 10 contributors was asked to write an essay on American attitudes towards peace and war from the perspective of 200 years of American experience. Wisely avoiding generalizations, they have limited themselves to how some Americans have thought about peace and war.

These essays summarize and illuminate many broad and diverse currents of thought about peace and war in the context of specific times and circumstances over the past two centuries. If there is any one theme it is that Americans have thought long and hard on the difficult, but transcendently important, subject. They have made a notable contribution to intellectual history and in so doing they have provided concepts and ideas that have met with varying degrees of acceptance in the cold, cruel world of international relations.

The contributors are admirably qualified to discourse on their respective topics. They range from such prominent and well-known men as Inis Claude and Anatole Rapoport to such equally qualified but lesser known young scholars as James Piscatori and Catherine Kelleher, who show great promise of significant contributions yet to come. The topics covered range from international law (Piscatori) to American political institutions (Kelleher) to peace movements (Charles Chatfield) and ethical considerations (Kenneth Thompson). Moorhead Wright, one of the editors of this volume, discusses three American war novels. This essay on how individual men have responded to war is a needed foil to the other nine. It reminds us that regardless of what scholars may write or what statesmen may do, wars are fought by individuals on a very personal level. One wishes Wright had expanded this all too short essay.

By far the most stimulating and challenging contribution is Ken Booth's discussion of American strategy. He enumerates and then disposes of a number of myths about American strategic thinking. It is by no means a debunking *tour de force* to show British and European scholars that since 1776 Americans have thought long and hard about peace and war. Rather, he carefully examines and evaluates such myths as "Americans did not think seriously about strategy before World War II" and "American strategy in the last twenty years has been characterized by overthink." Booth points out that explaining American strategy requires an appreciation of the characteristics of American society and an understanding of the American historical experience. His conclusion is fair and well-balanced: "... to the extent an American approach to strategy exists, it has been both very different and very much more complex than it has usually been portrayed."

The contributions are generally readable and well-written. With one exception, they represent a triumph of good editing and literary skill over ponderous academic prose.

The most noticeable lack is an essay on American military institutions and American attitudes towards a military establishment. The inclusion of such an essay would have given this slim volume a better overall balance. Nevertheless, it is a worthwhile collection and it provides necessary and useful background for professional military officers, civilian officials and, particularly, international officers interested in the enormous subject of American views of peace and war.

B. MITCHELL SIMPSON, III

Braestrup, Peter. *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. 1,446pp. in 2 vols. (NOTE: An abridged edition was made available as a Doubleday Anchor paperback in 1978, 606pp.)

Vietnam was, among other things, a journalistic first in the American experience. During no previous war had the press been accorded comparable access to the war and freedom from censorship; on top of that it became our first "war on television." So-called "media coverage" of that war has come in for extensive criticism in military and naval circles; in its more extreme forms that criticism often has assumed the existence of some sort of ideological media conspiracy against any or all of the following: military leadership; U.S. "imperialism"; the war policy of the Johnson administration; and war in general. In this case study of one brief period of that long war—from 21 January through the end of April 1968—Peter Braestrup demolishes the conspiracy theory, but in the process does little to inspire confidence in our major news organizations.

The author's credentials are impressive: combat service with the Marines in Korea, followed by a career in journalism that took him to *Time*, the old *New York Herald Tribune*, a Nieman Fellowship at Harvard, *The New York Times*, and *The Washington Post*. While with the *Times* he covered Algeria (1962-65), Paris (1965), and Southeast Asia (1966-68). In January 1968, just prior to Tet, he joined the *Post* as its Saigon Bureau chief, returning to this country in 1969. Unlike many of the reporters who covered Tet and its aftermath, he had some experience of war and of foreign climes.

Big Story makes a big book, two in fact in the original Westview Press edition. The first volume comprises 15 chapters on such topics as: The Press Corps in Vietnam (who they were, where they came from, experience levels, etc.); Performance, Morale, and Leadership of U.S. Troops (how reported and by whom); Khe Sanh; The Debate at Home; etc. Throughout, the analysis is directed to the war as reported (and *purportedly* explained) by the principal U.S. news organizations: the wire services (AP & UPI), the television networks (CBS, NBC, and ABC), two newspapers (the *Times* and *Post*), and the major weekly news magazines (*Time* and *Newsweek*). The second volume reproduces the data base in 41 appendixes, 23 tables, and indexes to all Vietnam-related coverage from 31 January through 31 March by the organizations listed above.

Many of the appendixes are haunting in themselves as, for example, the transcript of "Meet the Press" for 4 February when Secretary McNamara sought solace, at his wife's suggestion, in T.S. Eliot—"We shall not cease from exploration. And the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started and know the place for the first time." The reader who tries appendix 40 (a step-by-step, person-by-person, decision-by-decision account of the filming and telecasting of the execution of a VC officer by General Loan, chief of the Vietnamese National Police) will probably never again trust *anything* he sees on the evening news. The 1978 paperback edition omits the contents of the original Volume II, but contains virtually all of the original Volume I (and brings the price down from $50 to $8.95, which seems a fair bargain).

In a style that is lively and engaging throughout, Braestrup demonstrates clearly that the reporting of Tet was badly flawed, but ascribes this to many causes, chief among which were institutional habits and procedures of the media as a whole. A partial list would have to include: manpower shortages; the inexperience of those on the scene,

whether by virtue of youth or short tour policies; the incessant demands of news managers at home for "good copy" (destruction was a story; recovery was not); stateside embellishment of basic copy sent from the scene; a predilection for disaster stories ("the conventional journalistic reaction to calamity"); competition (AP vs. UPI, CBS vs. NBC, etc.) to be first in explaining events, even when the overall pattern was clouded and obscure; and finally, a certain degree of resentment stemming from the Administration's "progress campaign" of late 1967, leaving some newsmen feeling they had been used. (Braestrup makes it clear, however, that this sense of "resentment," leading to a degree of "retribution," was not widespread, was present more in New York and Washington than in Vietnam, and was too weak to support any conspiracy theory. Indeed, the reader cannot avoid feeling that the ineptness of the press as a whole in overcoming its so-called "practical considerations" was such that a conspiracy could not have been pulled off even if the press had tried!)

In short, coverage of Tet was shaped largely by habit and convention, ingrained approaches to news reporting that left newsmen ill-equipped to cope with the unusual ambiguities and uncertainties surrounding Tet. Journalism suffered from

> a serious lapse of self-discipline. . . . There was no institutional system within the media for keeping track of what the public had been told, no internal priority on updating initial impressions. . . . The result was that the media tended to leave the shock and confusion of early February, *as then perceived*, fixed as the final impression of Tet, and thus as a framework for news judgment and debate at home. At Tet the press shouted that the patient was dying, then weeks later began to whisper that he somehow seemed to be recovering—whispers apparently not heard amid the clamorous domestic reaction to the initial shouts.

The final chapter should be read by everyone who reads either a newspaper or a news magazine, or who watches the news on television. It even includes an informal score sheet that rates the performance of various news organizations: AP over UPI, the *Times* over the *Post*, *Time* over *Newsweek* (the latter described earlier as seemingly bent on "merchandizing the jitters"). The description of the role played by stateside news managers behind the scenes at rewrite desks, both for the press and television, will be eye-opening for many readers not intimate with the methodologies of modern American news reporting.

In the end one is led to the conclusion that the search after villains in journalism's coverage of Vietnam—rather like the search after villains in *anything* related to Vietnam—is essentially sterile. There is plenty of blame to go around. Far more important is Braestrup's conclusion: "The special circumstances of Tet impacted to a rare degree on modern American journalism's special susceptibilities and limitations. This peculiar conjunction overwhelmed reporters, commentators, and their superiors alike. And it could happen again."

DAVID MacISAAC
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Cooper, Matthew. *The German Army, 1933-1945; Its Political and Military Failure*. New York: Stein and Day, 1978. 598pp.

The alleged purpose of this long, tiresome, and poorly written book is to explain Hitler's control over the German Army and the reasons for its defeat in the Second World War. Unfortunately the explanations presented by the

author are simplistic and unconvincing, most of the evidence he uses to support his arguments (apart from errors) is well known to specialists, and his book does not really deserve to be reviewed at all except for the fact that the author and his publishers claim that it contains new and original theories and explodes some generally accepted myths. These theories and explosions require commentary if not outright refutation.

In his introduction, the author states that he proposes to concentrate on two themes. In presenting his first theme, he argues with curious logic that the German generals "were largely innocent of the blame that has so often been lain at their door, but that, at the same time, they inexcusably surrendered up their military responsibility and, knowingly, allowed an ungifted amateur to gain operational control of the Army, pervert its strategy and lead it to disaster."

What we have here is a warmed over version of the theory that Hitler's faulty military leadership was a major reason (or even *the major reason)* for the ultimate defeat of the German Army. This is true only insofar as Hitler was responsible for the decision to go to war in the first place. We now know that most of the German generals were quite as confident as Hitler that Germany could defeat Russia, and that their joint underestimation of the strength of the Red Army was surely the greatest military error of the war. The controversial questions of Hitler's contribution to the planning of Germany's earlier military victories are ignored or misunderstood.

As his second major theme, the author attempts to refute "the commonly accepted idea of the German Army having been well-equipped and well-trained, and having practised a revolutionary form of warfare known as the Blitzkrieg." The blitzkrieg, he says, was a myth.

Here again, the author's theories are not so novel as he appears to assume. All scholars would now agree that the Nazi dictatorship was an inefficient complex of competing agencies, that the German Army in 1939 was in many respects poorly equipped and poorly trained, and that the concept of a rapid war of movement and encirclement of the enemy forces (i.e., a blitzkrieg) was not a revolutionary conception of Hitler or his generals. What Hitler did possess in 1939 was a *relative* superiority over his foes, especially if he could face them singly and overcome them one by one. He had the nerve and determination to seize the initiative and to take perilous risks with his troops and equipment to surprise and overwhelm the opposition. He was fully aware that he lacked the resources to wage a long war; hence his emphasis on speed and surprise. As we all know, despite the many errors committed by the German leadership, the German armies *did* win a series of lightning campaigns, often with an imaginative coordination of modern weaponry and daring tactics. It is difficult to see, therefore, how the concept of a blitzkrieg can be blithely dismissed as a myth.

Hitler's lack of equipment prevented him from conquering England or from closing the Mediterranean. Most fateful of all, he lacked the resources to conquer Russia. Once the German armies faltered there and the United States entered the war, it is impossible to see how any kind of military leadership could have saved Germany from defeat. Only the invention and employment of a miracle weapon might have done that, and it is one of the more pleasant ironies of history that scientists expelled from Nazi Germany as inferior peoples played a crucial role in the development of such a weapon. Even if the German armies had been faultlessly led and retained their conquests in Russia and North Africa, Germany in the end would have been defeated by the atom bomb.

NORMAN RICH
Brown University

Delbrück, Hans. *History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History, Vol. I Antiquity*, translated by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1975. 604pp.

Walter Renfroe's translation of *Geschichte der Kriegskunst in Rahmen der politischen Geschichte* is a major contribution to the literature of military history in the English language. The students of military affairs who have limited themselves to books in English have been the poorer for not reading such classics in their field. This translation of the first volume of a four-volume work is a major step in bringing a wider readership to one of the most important German studies. One hopes that the remaining volumes will appear shortly.

Hans Delbrück was the leading civilian expert on military affairs in Germany at the turn of the century. Like his contemporaries in the field of naval theory, Mahan and Corbett, Delbrück was clearly aware of the relationship between war and politics. He saw, too, the importance of economics, geographic position, logistics, and technology. But in his analysis of history, he did not seek to find a single, universal theory of strategy. Following Clausewitz, he believed that politics determined strategy in every circumstance and that no single strategy could be correct for every era. In his work, Delbrück concentrated on the distinction, alluded to by Clausewitz, between two methods of conducting warfare. The first, which he called the strategy of annihilation, was the search for the decisive battle. The alternate strategy he called the strategy of exhaustion. By this method, a commander could obtain his objective by means other than a decisive battle: occupation, blockade, or troop movements. Both these strategies, in Delbrück's mind, were equally valid. Their appropriateness depended on the political aims and the military means available.

In exploring these ideas in terms of European history, Delbrück did not wish to write a general history of warfare. "It is not the mission of a history of the art of war to present these events in detail," he wrote, "that would lead to a constantly broadening military history, but only to examine and to establish new forms and discoveries." His history is a selective study which illustrates his understanding of the two alternative strategies.

The first volume is devoted to ancient history. It covers the Persian wars, the Peloponnesian wars, the second Punic war, and the campaigns of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. In his discussion of antiquity, Delbrück regards Caesar as the culmination of ancient military development. In reaching this conclusion, the author was not denigrating Scipio, Hannibal, Miltiades or Alexander. Among all of them, Caesar had at his disposition the most refined means for the conduct of warfare. The Roman art of warfare which Caesar personified was the fruit of a development which had taken centuries to create, and it was a development which lived on in the Roman world long after his death. This was a consummation in military organization, weapons and logistics, but the classical world also showed to Delbrück two workable methods of strategy. Caesar and Alexander represented the strategy of annihilation while the strategy of Pericles stood in contrast as an example of the strategy of exhaustion.

In discussing strategy, Delbrück made it quite clear that the subject could not be separated from the means of warfare. Strategy was not an esoteric matter, but only an aspect of a very practical problem. For this reason, he paid particular attention to the methods of combat, the weapons used, the terrain, and the number and organization of troops involved. In order to achieve some accuracy in this task, Delbrück critically evaluated the ancient texts and

combined stringent, philological examination with a knowledge of more modern military experience. This method earned him a great deal of criticism, both by those who disagreed with his interpretation of the documents, and by those who believed it improper to allow later developments to be used to provide a critical basis for understanding earlier events. Some of the controversy generated may be seen in the footnotes in the translation of this, the third (1920) edition of Delbrück's *History*.

The modern reader may feel that the detailed discussion of numbers, weapons, and terrain is out of proportion to the philosophical points which Delbrück is making, particularly when more than a half century of research will certainly have challenged the accuracy of his facts. Yet his detailed discussion remains essential to the logical process by which he proceeds, and in the absence of any later study of similar scope, it retains its value.

Throughout the study, it is abundantly clear that the author understands warfare as a single unit, not as a series of special studies. For him, tactics, logistics, organization and strategy are all part and parcel of a single problem. For him the conduct of war involved a mental process quite unlike that used in a game of chess. Delbrück believed that warfare is not a game of refined, all-inclusive estimation, but rather it involves the mastery of that which is beyond estimation. In summarizing his views he wrote that the art of command "demands not only the intelligence, but also the entire personality of the man, who even pits himself against chance, counters it with new information, and thereby masters capricious luck and ties it to his chariot."

It is sometimes said that a classic is a book to have on the shelf, but not to read. This is certainly no easy book to read, but it should not be ignored by any serious student of military history.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Endicott, John E. and Stafford, Roy W. Jr., eds. *American Defense Policy*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. 626pp.

The fourth edition of *American Defense Policy*, originally published in 1965, is 70 articles and documents compiled by the Department of Political Science and Philosophy, U.S. Air Force Academy. The editors' stated objective is the reaction of "a book especially applicable to the undergraduate level of defense policy studies" which enables students to "know the issues and understand the processes involved in determining defense policy." Associate Professors Endicott and Stafford point out that no attempt has been made to convince or to indoctrinate. They rather "hope to show the reader that there are no simple answers in the study of defense policy . . . a field dealing in large measure with the unknown—the future—and the intentions of men." Uncertainty notwithstanding, the editors predict that a knowledge of the issues and an understanding of the processes will lead to a better product.

In Chapters one through four the dominant analytical theme is the classic view of national, multinational, and international systems. The subjects include the international environment, the evolution of U.S. strategy, arms control, limited war, and insurgency. The issues here are slanted toward the post-World War II era, particularly the problems of dealing with nuclear technology in order to achieve the realistic objectives of deterrence and defense as well as the more idealistic objectives of arms control and disarmament. In these chapters the student is exposed to real defense problems and policies. These articles are useful as cases to analyze and as fundamental conceptual material. There is Truman on his doctrine, Kennan on containment, Dulles on massive retaliation, McNamara on his "era," Laird on realistic deterrence, Schlesinger on

flexible options, Kissinger on foreign policy as well as the problem of nuclear proliferation, and Halperin on limited war. These chapters identify many post-World War II issues and well illustrate the dynamic and complex nature of national security policymaking.

Chapters five through seven explore the inner workings and hidden mechanisms of the bureaucratic organization. It is suggested that the behavior pattern of the individual nation-state, submersed in the complex whirlpools of international relations, can best be analyzed by looking at the nation as patchwork of bureaucratic organizations, each with its hierarchical arrangement, and propensity for preserving jurisdiction, routines, hardware, action channels, and the personal power of its leading actors. These factors are, in the aggregate, considered to be organizational essence. Whereas the earlier chapters propose national interest as the unit of analysis, these examine organizational and personal interests as an independent variable. Halperin, et al., explain the organization model in detail. Haffa draws on Allison to examine the effects of the need to preserve bureaucratic power. The "wiring diagram" of organizations and their procedures are described and in some cases analyzed by Fabian (PPBS), Roherty (OSD), Bauer and White (the JCS), Halperin (the Presidency), Endicott (NSC), and Aspin (Congress). Various case studies demonstrate the pervasive effect of the organizational perspective on the decisionmaking process. Katzenbach, for example, shows that as late as 1944 the U.S. Cavalry was still organizing and training horse-equipped units for field employment because the Army faith in the horse as a weapon system resulted in a distrust of change. Head describes [the] Air Force resistance to accepting a single purpose, cost-effective attack aircraft because the A-7 did not fit the organizational image of high performance, state of the art, supersonic, multipurpose, tactical weapon systems. Davis proposes that Navy advocates for innovation develop horizontal political alliances and expand these into vertical alliances.

These chapters bring the student down from the "moon view" and encourage him to examine the defense policymaking process with a magnifying glass rather than a telescope.

In the final chapters (eight and nine) the magnifying glass is replaced by a microscope. Here the student examines the nature and dynamics of the military profession in the United States and the relationship of this professional to American society. There is exposure to academic experts in the field of military sociology (Huntington, Janowitz, Moskos) as well as the alternative perspectives of the National War College (Taylor), the Military Academy (Bradford and Murphy), the Air Command and Staff College (Margiotta), the U.S. Air Force Academy (Freney and Wakin), U.S. Air Force Headquarters (Ralf), and the Armed Forces Staff College (Garrison).

These final chapters deal with an analysis of military professional issues ranging from the abstract (the nature of professionalism, ethics, and civil-military relations) to the more concrete (military unions, the all-volunteer force, ROTC, and civilian graduate education for military officers). The military undergraduate will come away with a clear understanding of the complexities surrounding his own future situation.

American Defense Policy presents a variety of frames of reference on which students can build. The book specifies and describes all significant post-World War II defense policy issues. In this respect the compilation is a useful undergraduate teaching tool but its effectiveness can only be evaluated in the context of total academic experience.

The editors are faithful to the current theoretical mode in that their selection and organization of material is

clearly influenced, as well as limited, by Graham Allison's three models of rationality, bureaucracy, and power. But these models do not act independently. They interact in indeterminate and dynamic ways and are influenced by such other models and variables as those which consider the influence of historic precedence, or of particular cultures, or those which examine the significance of philosophic assumptions about the nature of man. In the final analysis, the student must realize that he can only deal with the complexities of defense policy by understanding the *art* of selecting and applying applicable ideas to contingencies and problems that have many variables.

If the student learns only about existing theories or models and accepts these as the basis of a scientific methodology, he may find himself in the position of the historian who discovered that the most important lesson to learn from history is that man usually learns nothing from history. It may be that the most important lesson political science has to teach is that the obsession to find universally applicable methodology may blind us to the fact that our "science" is more properly an art.

STEPHEN B. SLOANE
Commander, U.S. Navy

Goodpaster, Andrew J. and Huntington, Samuel P. *Civil-Military Relations*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. 84pp.

Several new studies of civil-military relations have appeared in the last few years. This slim volume, based on a symposium at the University of Nebraska-Omaha honoring the 25th anniversary of the Bootstrap program, joins the growing body of post-Vietnam literature. The book consists of four selections. Samuel P. Huntington's "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," an update of his seminal study in the fifties, is the heart of the book. It is outstanding; the other three articles are of marginal value.

In *The Soldier and the State* (1957), Huntington counterposed the conflicting world views of American liberal society and the military's "conservative realism." The book, an unabashed defense of the professional military ethic, challenged liberal antimilitary bias. In his concluding chapter, the author noted that traditional liberal antipathy was declining and a more tolerant, respectful view of the military was emerging. The cold war consensus that hostile forces threatened the security of the nation spurred this change. The public and intellectual alike supported the defense establishment.

In the current article, Huntington explains that Vietnam and the "democratic surge" instigated a return to traditional liberal antimilitary bias in the late sixties. Between 1968 and 1972, antimilitary literature proliferated. Intellectuals once more depicted a strong Military Establishment as a threat to peace, justice, liberty, and military institutions and mores as antithetical to American values. The general public, particularly the politically attentive, reflected these same views. Huntington feels that the new wave of antimilitarism showed signs of abating by the midseventies but it remains uncertain whether this is "anything more than a temporary deviation from a more general trend."

The hostile climate of the early seventies imposed constraints upon the Military Establishment. It has less flexibility of response than in the past two decades. The War Powers Act and other recent congressional prohibitions make sustained limited war on the models of the fifties and sixties a legal impossibility. Korea enshrined the concept of limited war; Vietnam ended it. Huntington concludes that the United States will be slower to resort to force in the

future, but when it does, it will be constrained less. The emphasis will be on limiting the duration rather than the means. A future Vietnam is more likely to last 7 weeks than 7 years.

The attitude of society also affects the military profession's self-concept and its relations with society. Speaking to this issue, Huntington sets up an interesting model of congruence and interaction. Observers differ on the degree to which that profession presently defines itself as similar or dissimilar from other institutions (congruence) and the degree it interacts with the rest of society. Huntington discerns a recent trend toward low congruence, or dissimilarity, the military profession tending toward "purely military" functions, defining itself narrowly as the institution involved in "the management of violence." Although the evidence is more conflicting, interaction with society seems to be declining but to a lesser degree. In other words it appears to be turning inward, emphasizing its professional military functions. This is not necessarily bad, Huntington asserts; but it is important that the institution not insulate itself from the rest of society. The Military Establishment must be "different from but not distant from the society it serves."

A word should be said about the other articles. In a somewhat overwritten paper, Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and now Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, discusses the relationship between the Military Establishment's objectives and responsibilities and the role of education. He attests its commitment to education and professional development in which the values of civilian society are inculcated. By bringing individuals from the military and civilian communities together, the educational process fosters understanding and appreciation of each other's goals and perspectives. Thus Goodpaster considers the deterioration of relations between the military and academic communities "incompatible with the needs of a healthy democratic society." The two must work in harmony.

While Goodpaster is concerned with educating the military profession in civilian values, Professor Orville Menard focuses on the other side of the coin, educating the civilian sector in civil-military relations. He stresses that civilian control requires vigilance. He invokes his own research on the politicalization of the French military institution in the late fifties and early sixties as caution. Like Goodpaster and Huntington, he affirms the necessity of integration rather than alienation from society.

Finally, Air Force LTC Gene A. Sherrill, former bootstrapper at the host university, offers a case study of civil-military relations, the 1974 Ethiopian military coup against Emperor Haile Selassie. The paper is only tangential to the rest of the book. A brief secondary summary of Ethiopian history focusing on conditions which made the Emperor vulnerable to restive military forces, it develops little new. Although interesting, its main reason for publication appears to be filling pages in order that Huntington's article could be published in book form.

Huntington's article should be read by everyone interested in contemporary civil-military relations. It is highly commended to the military professional. The rest of the book could be overlooked with little loss.

JOE P. DUNN
Converse College

Hackett, John, et al. *The Third World War: August 1985*. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978. 368pp.

Let it be said straightaway: the West wins the war; not easily, not without losses, and not without certain prior defense preparations and improvements taken between 1978 and 1985 by several governments.

The book is written as popular, narrative history set down "soon after the cessation of hostilities." Readers may argue that none of it will happen but none can deny that any or all of it could happen. In a *tour d'horizon* the governments, policies, attitudes, armies, navies, and air forces of all the action states are found to be much as today. The changes that are evident are, for the most part, changes that most reasonable men may logically accept, particularly those that bear on the relations of nations. More difficult to accept are those changes of attitude and action resulting from the West's increasing awareness that there was a threat and that certain defense preparations were therefore made.

Readers who are familiar with some of the author's, General Sir John Hackett's, other writings will know of his opinions on the weaknesses of NATO and the insufficiency of support given it by its member states and their peoples. They will recognize this book as another call for awareness and preparation but will be pleased to find no emotional exhortation. The author's device of writing "future history" permits him to relate his recommendations and hopes as actions that have been taken. One hopes they will be taken else the conduct and outcome of the war he writes of will be decidedly different.

That war will not be redescribed here. The land battle was mostly on the Central Front (General Hackett once commanded NORTHAG); there were related (and sometime causative) actions in the Middle East, Africa, and on the Chinese border; the only nuclear feature, other than rattling, was the exchange of the destruction of Birmingham and Minsk; space was not a battleground, save for the disablement and destruction of some communications and surveillance satellites; there was resupply from America. Air and maritime aspects are well covered and naval readers will be particularly interested in the discussion and analysis that permit the authors to state:

> When the outcome of the 1985 war as a whole can be assessed, it may be that the downfall of the U.S.S.R. will be attributed, ironically, to Gorshkov, the greatest Russian admiral of all time, whose forceful and successful advocacy of ever-increasing Soviet seapower led the comrades to disaster—when the seas got too rough the Bear drowned.

An interesting conclusion is that at the end of the war the world's two superpowers were the United States and the Japan-China coprosperity sphere.

The 1978 facts, doctrines, and orders of battle of the book are hardly disputable—the authors' and consultants' (Americans will recognize Generals Davison and dePuy and John Erickson) credentials insure that. The book is an excellent, readable, and thorough survey of the world that is and could easily be. If the historical projections prove inaccurate, they are at least conceivable, and even those readers for whom *Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum* is anathema might agree that the foundations of their faith rest more on hope than reason. The most encouraging bit of the book is that the authors "have been encouraged by signs around us that among the peoples of the West the point [that the U.S.S.R. means what it says and knows what it is doing with respect to the capitalist-Communist contest] is beginning to be taken." If General Hackett (no Pollyanna) is encouraged, we all may be.

W.R. PETTYJOHN
Commander, U.S. Navy

Lebra, Joyce C. *Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 206pp.

Shiroyama, Saburo. *War Criminal: The Life and Death of Hirota Koki.* Tokyo, New York and San Francisco: Kodansha International, 1977. 310pp.

Both these books are interesting and well-done historical studies in their own

rights. They are due even more attention because they deal with problems whose aftermaths are part of today's politics in India and Japan.

Professor Lebra of the University of Colorado has been a relentless researcher in the archives of the Imperial Japanese Army; she was at Self-Defense Headquarters that day in 1970 when Yukio Mishima made his gory but futile try at rousing the new Japanese Army to emulation of the deeds of their fathers. From her research Professor Lebra has published a series of articles and books which for the first time give us some idea of the dynamics of the Japanese military model for Asian and anticolonial armies. This study covers eight armies—India, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Sumatra, Indochina, Borneo and the Philippines. It is gratifying to read her conclusion on Japanese attempts in the last named country: the Japanese failed "because of local pressure and pre-war American colonial policy . . . American colonialism had encouraged rather than competed with Philippine nationalism."

In Burma and Indonesia, officers of these Japanese armies became focal points of the postwar independence armies. The officer and staff training they had received, sketchy as it was, had been far superior to any Burma or Indonesia had seen. Given the political role of armies in both these countries, the Japanese model must be counted a significant developmental force.

The Indian Nationalist Army (INA) was the most professional of the Southeast Asian armies and the only one capable of fighting alongside the Japanese in a major campaign. But in the postwar years it was the British Army model that triumphed despite Gandhi, Nehru and Congress Party backing of the INA. The refusal of General Auchinleck to countenance the return of former INA officers to the Indian Army after the Japanese surrender turned on the question of whether these officers had violated their previous oaths to the Indian Army. The Auk insisted on courts-martial at the Red Fort in Delhi and although these were bungled, they served as a rallying point for loyal officers to take politically unpopular opposition to the wholesale reinstatement of these "freedom fighters." Many of those then went into politics (K.P. Menon, for example became Ambassador to China) where they undoubtedly had more influence. But the Indian Army was saved to become what many see today as the one sure cement of Indian unity. But the problem of the INA is not dead. On Army Day in January 1978 the Communist Chief Minister of West Bengal publicly called for a review of the Communist Party's denunciation of the INA (after June 1941 the CPI underwent a miraculous conversion to the view that the British were not fighting a dirty imperialist war). A change in CPI attitude toward the INA even 35 years after the event is no isolated political act. Professor Lebra's book gives us a fine basis for understanding the meaning of the INA and other Japanese trained armies in today's politics in Southeast Asia.

Japanese scholars until now have been reluctant to deal with the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Richard H. Mineart, in the best study of the trial (*Victor's Justice*. Princeton University Press, 1971) wrote: "Apparently they fear that denigration of the trial will lead to a positive re-evaluation of Japan's wartime policies and leadership."

If this is indeed the case, the Hirota biography's reception is astonishing—a sale of 500,000 copies and the award of two major literary prizes.

A revisionist history of the trials could start with no better subject than Hirota. He was a career diplomat, Prime Minister in 1936 and Foreign Minister for less than a year, 1937-1938. The gravamen of the indictment against him seems to have been that as Prime Minister he raised defense budgets,

introduced more nationalistic elements into education and moved toward closer government control of the economy; as Foreign Minister he was in office at the time of the Marco Polo Bridge incident and the rape of Nanking. His trial was hardly a model. Hirota's lawyer, an American Quaker, was effectively banned from the trial by a choleric Australian judge. The court refused to admit any evidence from Ambassador Joseph Grew's diary; Grew had written that he could think of no one he "would have more gladly chosen to head the government with American interests in view" than Hirota. The death verdict was by a 6-5 vote. The American chief prosecutor called the sentence stupid. The Allied Council for Japan (General MacArthur as SCAP tried to avoid involvement in the trial) refused a recommendation from the court for commutation of Hirota's death sentence. Finally, SCAP refused to publish the dissenting justices' opinions; the Netherlands judge had written a telling one which has since been published.

This book seems deliberately low-keyed. Only three of the eleven chapters deal with the trial and little is made of the dignified stoicism displayed by Hirota throughout the trial and imprisonment. As far as the reviewer can infer, this reflects the tone of the original Japanese text.

How then to account for the sale of a half a million copies—large even in a highly literate society such as Japan? Are the Japanese about to take a longer look at the Tokyo trials? Will this look be taken in a mood of resurgent nationalism? In a mood of incipient anti-Americanism? The book suggests a negative answer to all three questions, but the sales figures make one wonder.

J.K. HOLLOWAY, JR.
Naval War College

Liston, Robert A. *Terrorism.* Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 1977. 158pp.

Robert A. Liston is a seasoned free-lance writer who has decided to tackle the question of terrorism. Liston is concerned—indeed "outraged" to use his own words—about terrorism and terrorists, and the product of his outrage against this "crime against humanity" is anything but a dispassionate book. *Terrorism* is a diatribe against terrorism by states, by revolutionaries, and by criminals.

The difficulty with books like this is that they really tell us very little about the problem of terrorism, beyond the "fact" that it is almost always unnecessary when viewed from the perspective of the author. Liston does not understand why such groups as the Fedayeen (here we avoid the more inclusive term "Palestinians" that Liston favors), the Basques and the South Moluccan terrorists cannot peacefully settle their claims through negotiation, majority rule (?), and local autonomy. Were it only so simple. Liston likes the world as it is, how inconvenient that others do not share his view.

The attentive newspaper reader is likely to find little new in this short book. Perhaps the most useful chapter is a nice anecdotal overview of actions that are being taken to combat terrorism. Most disturbing are Liston's prescriptions for defeating terrorism. These include the curtailment of publicity surrounding acts of terrorism, which raises important First Amendment questions in the United States, and worse, Liston's assertion that we "must surrender a portion of our liberty and convenience to achieve greater protection." This latter development would play right into the hands of terrorist groups (e.g., the Red Brigade) who seek precisely such a curtailment of freedoms as a means to foster resentment against the ruling government.

Before terrorism can be eliminated from this world—if such a goal is even

plausible—we must first understand the primary causes. For example, what makes a man or a woman reject nonviolent means and eschew conventional morality, and turn to terrorism? Such questions must be answered; perhaps Liston will calm down a bit and try to do so in a second book on terrorism.

AUGUSTUS R. NORTON
Major, U.S. Army

Louis, William Roger. *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 594pp.

Perhaps the most enduring legacy bequeathed to posterity by the Second World War was the opportunity for nonwhite colonial peoples to secure their independence. In this impressively researched and solidly documented volume, Professor Louis provides a detailed account and a substantive analysis of the thinking, planning, considerations, negotiations, and circumstances that preceded the dismemberment of the British Empire. As the title indicates, the focus is on U.S.-British relations and the future of British possessions and mandates, although related questions of holdings by other nations, both allies and enemies, are dealt with in the overall context.

Trouble over these issues began with the joint statement by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill of 14 August 1941, the highly publicized Atlantic Charter, which affirmed "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live," and expressed the "wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." The provisions of this Charter were included in the U.N. Declaration of 1 January 1942, signed by 26 nations, and on 23 February 1942 President Roosevelt stated that the principle of self-determination was applicable "to the whole world." Yet on 9 September 1941 Churchill told the House of Commons that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to "India, Burma, and other parts of the British Empire," and on 10 November 1942 he asserted, "We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." These diametrically opposed positions taken by the leaders of the Western Allies did not disrupt the joint effort in prosecuting the war against the Axis Powers but they did provide a divisive issue in war aims and postwar settlements and created dissension in branches of the two governments. By untangling and explaining the diverse approaches taken by planners in the United States and Great Britain, the exchanges between representatives of both nations, and the eventual agreement, Louis makes his greatest contribution.

In Washington, the State Department under Secretary Cordell Hull and Under Secretary Sumner Welles worked to implement the ideas of Roosevelt in regard to trusteeship, i.e., the international supervision of colonies with accountability to the United Nations, self-government, and the objective of independence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments strove to carry out the President's concern for security in the Pacific, which required U.S. control of islands for bases and fortifications. Thus the State Department and the military were each pursuing ends that simply were not compatible.

In London a similar but not identical situation prevailed. The Foreign Office was more inclined to a compromise with the American position, while the Colonial Office was adamantly opposed to any tampering with the Empire or Commonwealth system. Australia and New Zealand were additional thorns in

the side of the Colonial Office, for they endorsed the concepts of international supervision of colonies and accountability. Of great moment were the future of islands in the Southwest Pacific and the role the United States would play in providing security. One of the few issues on which all of the British authorities agreed, from Churchill on down, was that the American idea of "trusteeship" was merely a cover for American imperialism. The British statesmen were perfectly willing to allow the United States to take over Japanese islands, mandated or otherwise, but resented interference with portions of the Empire and Commonwealth that, among other things, would allow freer trade and the intrusion of American products. What struck the British as hypocrisy, or a double standard, was American insistence that no U.S. overseas possessions or any part of the Western Hemisphere could be included in the trusteeship system.

The intricate and tortuous course of deliberations among the departments and committees in both nations are analyzed at great length by Louis, and the factors tending toward compromise were revealed by the controversies that took place within each government. Roosevelt began to weaken somewhat before his death, especially on Indochina, but he held steadfast to his concept of trusteeship as a step toward the specified goal of independence. Harry Truman had no such commitment, and he accepted the advice of those who felt that cordial relations with England and France were more important than Roosevelt's belief that perpetuation of the colonial system would exacerbate international rivalry and provoke another war. The issue was resolved at San Francisco when pertinent provisions of the U.N. Charter were formulated and a face-saving formula was devised that completely satisfied few if any of the participants. Britain kept her colonies and mandates with stipulations for self-government and accountability, France retained her possessions, and what amounted to lip service was paid to "independence."

Louis does not indulge in moralizing, but he is not sparing in his judgments of the protagonists or the issues. On the basic conflict, he does fault the United States. "The Americans had raised expectations that they might unfurl an anti-imperial banner," he concludes, but "When it came to the test, the United States sided with the colonial powers." In Britain, the avowedly anti-imperialist Labour Party on gaining power found Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin no more intent on breaking up the Empire and Commonwealth than were their Tory predecessors. Still, there was an acknowledgment in London as in Washington that conditions had changed, although few realized that the proliferation of sovereign states would occur as quickly and as drastically as it did.

This is a book not just to be read but to be chewed and digested. The writing style is clear and straightforward, although there are numerous quotations from speeches and writings of the various officials. Some readers may be distracted by the thorough detail in recounting the discussions in different echelons of the administrative hierarchy as the formulation of policy and the complexities of the decisionmaking process are revealed. The organization makes for some duplication, for Louis opens with a lengthy section on "Introductory and Parallel Themes," which provides something of an overview, then proceeds in a chronological manner through the deliberations in each country and between representatives. Also, except for Korea, little attention is given to the aspirations of the peoples whose fate was being determined with little or no consultation. These caveats, of course, are peripheral to the author's major theme, which illuminates the background of an upheaval that has

significantly altered the world power structure. In sum, this work constitutes a landmark in the writing of diplomatic history.

RAYMOND G. O'CONNOR
University of Miami

Mack, John E. *A Prince of Our Disorder, The Life of T.E. Lawrence.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1976. 561pp.

Patai, Raphael. *The Arab Mind.* New York: Scribner, 1976. 376pp.

Considering the increasing importance that the Arabs with their expanding postoil-embargo wealth likely are to assume, it is disquieting that we in the Western World seemingly have little knowledge about their ancient culture. There seem to be few current general works about the Arabs but there are two rather recent efforts that can provide some meaningful insights.

The first, *A Prince of Our Disorder*, is the product of a practicing psychiatrist and medical school professor. John Mack focuses on the life of a much publicized, but often esoteric, Arabist, T.E. Lawrence, probably more commonly known as Lawrence of Arabia. By examining the multifaceted personality of this unique Englishman, the author skillfully guides the reader through the mysterious mental maze in which the perplexed Lawrence struggled throughout much of his life. From Mack's probe of "El Aurens" (as admiring, if not worshipping, Arabs called Lawrence) we can glean useful insights into Arabic culture.

Lawrence, a driven man, wore many hats in life. He was a tormented bastard. He toiled as a student in Jesus College at Oxford University. Shortly thereafter, he began his intense relationship with the Arabs as an archeologist traveling, often alone, throughout most of the Middle East. He later served as an unofficial diplomat and military leader at the apex of his notoriety in the region where East meets West. During his descent as a public figure, he was a publicity-eschewing recluse who changed his name and served as an enlisted man in the Royal Air Force. Between the extremes of his life, Lawrence was a prolific, if not always profound, writer. His book, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom,* reveals many discerning observations of Arabic culture.

Via some of Lawrence's experiences, Mack leads us through a period in Middle Eastern history that often directly relates to many of the present conflicts in that cradle of civilization. To those interested in learning more about the Arabic psyche, three chapters—"The Background of the Arab Revolt," "Arab Self-Determination and Arab Unity" as well as "Lawrence and Churchill: The Political Settlements in the Middle East"—are particularly helpful.

Mack's book is an excellent appetizer for those who desire more substantive information about the Arabic peoples.

In contrast to looking at the Arabic culture obliquely via Mack's study of Lawrence, the reader of Raphael Patai's *The Arab Mind* will be focusing directly on Arabic consciousness. Patai is a highly regarded anthropologist who has lived in the Middle East and spent a lifetime studying the area and its peoples. He examines the entire gamut of this crossroads civilization. The arts, languages, religions, mores and other Arabic attributes are explored. Not surprisingly, there is much attention to and discussion of the Bedouin and Islamic influences.

For those who are hopeful of a meaningful move toward a sustainable peace in the Middle East, a patient perusal of the section entitled The Psychology of Westernization can be quite worthwhile. Within that section there are two headings, "Egypt—A Case History" and "The Hatred of the West," that are ruefully revealing. This cultural background is essential to an under-

standing of such Arabic political motives and positions as Mr. Sadat's 1977 peace initiatives.

If Patai evinces any failing in his effort, it might be his unmasked admiration for the Arabic culture. However, one should expect any specialist, Arabist or other, to be enthusiastic in a portrayal of the subject of his competence. Overall, the book is very readable and instructive. It clearly is a "must read" candidate for all persons interested in the Arabic peoples and the political plight of the Middle East.

JOHN C. PETERS
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve

Macmillan, Harold. *The Past Masters: Politics and Politicians 1906-1939.* New York: Harper & Row, 1975. 240pp.

Harold Macmillan was Prime Minister of Great Britain from 1957 until 1963. Succeeding Sir Anthony Eden in the wake of the Suez debacle, Macmillan ended conscription, accelerated the dissolution of empire, and brought England to prosperity. In the 1959 general election he carried his Conservative Party to triumph with the candid slogan, "You never had it so good." This book, however, is not about his time as Prime Minister, when political cartoons portrayed him in tights and cape as "Super Mac." Rather, it is about politics and politicians as he observed them from the first years of this century, when he was a schoolboy, to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, when he was an experienced politician and Member of Parliament who had not yet, however, served even as a junior minister.

Harold Macmillan's great-grandfather was a poor Scottish crofter, whose son Daniel came south to London and founded a business which eventually became the great British publishing house of Macmillan. Although he has considerable pride in his humble Scottish ancestry, Harold Macmillan himself grew up in the eminently comfortable and self-confident world of the British upper classes just before the First World War. In this book, written in his old age (he was born in 1894), Macmillan is inevitably nostalgic for those halcyon days of his youth, when the British Empire was at the peak of its power and prestige. Although admitting that he sees his "past masters" through the haze of passing years, he nevertheless rightly observes that these men moved on a larger stage. Since the end of the Second World War Great Britain has lost her leading role in the world balance of power, and we may wonder whether she will ever again produce statesmen equal to the commanding figures Macmillan describes.

The book abounds in astute comments on British political life. Macmillan reflects on the decline of the great aristocratic Whig tradition in the 19th century, and on the decline of the Whigs inheritors, the Liberal Party, in the 20th century. His dedication to the House of Commons and to the civilities of the British political tradition is obvious. He himself started out in the progressive wing of the Conservative Party, and as Prime Minister he proved a master at carrying out change which was more real than apparent. Never an ideologue, he observes that a successful party of the right must always recruit new strength from the center, and even from the left of center.

The book's fascination, however, lies less in Macmillan's general comments than in his sketches of politicians he has known. His assessments of Britain's two great modern war leaders, David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, are of obvious interest to the readers of this journal. His accounts of the failures of those peacetime Prime Ministers of the late 1930s, Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, are perhaps even more pertinent today.

Before Lloyd George, British

political leadership had been the preserve of the privileged, those who were either born to position and riches, or who had achieved academic or professional distinction. Recounting Lloyd George's devastating attacks on hereditary privilege, Macmillan credits him with creating a new type of politician, "the man of the people." Faced with the House of Lords refusal to pass the Liberal Government's 1909 budget, Lloyd George took the offensive against the inherited wealth and power of the peerage. A fully equipped duke, he observed, not only cost as much to keep up as a battleship, but was just as great a terror and lasted longer. An eloquent opponent of the Boer War, Lloyd George as Chancellor of the Exchequer fought vigorously to reduce defense spending right up to 1914. Yet Macmillan describes how in the First World War Lloyd George first created the great Ministry of Munitions and then went on to become the Prime Minister who brought Britain to victory.

In Macmillan's view, Lloyd George proved himself a far better war leader than those British cavalry officers who commanded "the finest body of infantry ever put into the field." Macmillan, of course, was part of that body of infantry, having left Oxford in the golden summer of 1914 just in time to become a subaltern in the Grenadier Guards. Many of his Eton and Oxford contemporaries were killed on the Western Front, and Macmillan just barely survived his wounds on the Somme in 1916. Looking back on that war, Macmillan's admiration for Lloyd George is tempered only by his regret that he never succeeded in imposing his authority on the generals, whose "insatiable appetite for grandiose attacks" produced only minute gains at the price of immense casualties.

Although he considers that Stanley Baldwin was in many respects an admirable peacetime Prime Minister in the 1920s, Macmillan nevertheless concludes that his second administration, from 1935 to 1937, was a disaster for Great Britain. Baldwin's distaste for foreign affairs and his inability to understand defense policy led him to delay the beginning of Britain's rearmament too long, and to conduct it as a "slow motion affair" when he did begin.

Although in his criticism of Stanley Baldwin Macmillan displays a sympathetic insight into his character and temperament, there is no evidence of admiration or affection in his account of Neville Chamberlain's performance as Prime Minister. There is also nothing new in his condemnation. Chamberlain, he explains, believed he had a mission to save world peace, and pursued that mission almost fanatically and in spite of all warnings. Only Hitler's occupation of Prague in March 1939 finally forced even Chamberlain to recognize the bankruptcy of his policy of appeasement. Macmillan does remind us, however, that Chamberlain's policies were generally popular at the time, and that it was Chamberlain's fate "to be at first obsequiously praised and then extravagantly abused."

As for Winston Churchill, Macmillan gives us some personal memories of the great man both in high office in the 1920s and in the political wilderness in the 1930s. Although not disputing that Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer made a colossal error in bringing Britain back to the gold standard, Macmillan points out that the pressure for this move from the Treasury and the Bank of England was overwhelming. "I have often since found," he comments, "that when a line of action is said to be supported 'by all responsible men,' it is nearly always dangerous or foolish." Yet to reject conventional wisdom is not always to be right. Churchill's prestige reached its nadir in the early 1930s when he opposed—unsuccessfully, and in retrospect, foolishly—his party's policy toward India. Once he began his campaign for rearmament after the

1935 general election, however, he began slowly to emerge from his self-imposed political isolation. Yet Churchill was not brought back into office (as First Lord of the Admiralty) until after the outbreak of war in September 1939.

In the years just before the war, Macmillan notes sadly, there were only two giants in the House of Commons, Lloyd George and Churchill, and neither could exert any effective influence upon any party, Liberal, Labour, or Conservative. Lloyd George never saw what was needed, but by the mid-1930s Winston Churchill did. In the light of the missed opportunities and tragic errors of British policy in these years, Macmillan shows us how right Winston Churchill was in calling the Second World War "the unnecessary war."

J. KENNETH McDONALD
George Washington University

Oskenberg, Michel and Oxnam, Robert B. eds. *Dragon and Eagle*. New York: Basic Books, 1978. 384pp.

This collection of 12 essays by prominent American China scholars attempts to explain the basis for future interaction between the two nations by examining the historical background of Sino-American relations. Read individually, the essays are generally informative, if necessarily brief. Together, however, their common schema and subject matter lead to a book which is repetitive and which offers little in the way of fresh ideas.

Oskenberg and Oxnam provide introductions to five of the book's six "parts" (the sixth consists of a single article). The editors have also written three of the essays. The tone is set in the first, introductory, section, where the editors provide the "historical perspective" of Sino-American relations. The components of this interaction—military, economic, political, and cultural—are set forth, to be repeatedly addressed in the following essays.

The section entitled "Mutual Perceptions" contains essays by Warren I. Cohen and Tu Wei-ming. Both articles are well-written, and Cohen makes good use of public opinion polls in discussing American attitudes towards China. The two authors' conclusions are similar and unexceptional: the United States and China have operated and will continue to operate in different cultural and ideological contexts.

The section on "Bilateral Interactions" includes articles by Oskenberg, Lyman P. Van Slyke, Waldo H. Heinrichs, and Stanley B. Lubman. The first of these provides a brief, useful view of the Chinese foreign policymaking apparatus. Van Slyke discusses "Culture, Society, and Technology in Sino-American Relations" but offers no firm, comparative conclusions. Heinrichs attempts to survey the entire history of Sino-American military interactions but is best when discussing the 1950s. He also notes that in 1945 China held only a peripheral position among American foreign interests. Lubman addresses the trade issue and points out the similarity of the present Canton Trade Fair to the 19th-century *co hong* system used by China to control external trade. His attempt to describe China's drive for economic self-sufficiency in the 1950s and 1960s is inconsistent and appears to suffer from poor editing.

The fourth part of *Dragon and Eagle*, "Multilateral Interactions," is the most disappointing section of the book. The reader expects more from the expert Allen S. Whiting than is provided in his "Japan and Sino-American Relations." It would be particularly interesting to know with what reasoning the author concludes that significant Japanese rearmament will not occur. This points up a criticism of the book as a whole: no notes are provided to support the authors' views.

The essay by Steven I. Levine, "The Soviet Factor," is simplistic and subjective. For instance, his view that the

United States bears the responsibility for the onset of the Korean war is a position which can, to a degree, be argued. However, Levine offers no rationale for this position. His "conclusion"—that China will continue to grow militarily, and that "the United States and the Soviet Union would be wise to recognize this emergent reality"—belabors the obvious.

The articles which form "Interactions Around China's Rim" are by Peter Van Ness, Michael H. Hunt, and Alexander Woodside. The last offers a fine view of the role of Southeast Asia in Sino-American relations, although Woodside's advocacy of formal U.S. relations with Cambodia seems unjustified in view of that country's institution of hysteria as a way of life. Van Ness rehashes Taiwan's role in Sino-American relations without offering any new ideas. Hunt's article should be important, addressing the historic and continuing importance of the northeast, the "cockpit of Asia." However, his efforts suffer from staleness—the 11 authors who precede him address many of the same topics—and end in a conclusion which is difficult to justify. Surely, if the United States withdrew her forces from the area and substituted "some less binding agreement for the current South Korean security treaty," as Hunt urges, it would *not* allow "Washington [to] gain the time and flexibility it needs in responding to any Korean crisis."

The final part of the book consists of an article by Jerome A. Cohen, "Sino-American Relations and International Law." It is the finest essay in the book. The author provides a straightforward insight into the two countries' perception of law. He concludes that both nations have a cynical view of international regulation and that international law—which he describes as a relative value—cannot by itself function to improve or even regulate Sino-American relations. It is a well-written and perceptive essay.

The articles in *Dragon and Eagle* are based for the most part on solid scholarly ground—although the essays by Levine and Hunt leave something to be desired in this respect. This is not a work for the reader who is already knowledgeable about Sino-American relations. However, it does provide a comprehensive, if unexceptional, introduction to the subject for the uninitiated student.

BERNARD D. COLE
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Palmer, Dave R. *Summons of the Trumpet.* San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978. 277pp.

Colonel Palmer describes his book as "a broad history—the story of America's military involvement in Vietnam." And that's exactly what it is—a most enjoyable story. No footnotes interrupt the flow of his narrative, making this a highly readable account of 20 frustrating and futile years of military operations.

The book is constrained to an investigation of our military involvement; political, economic, and psychological factors are discussed only as required to provide a backdrop for the military story. However, even though he has explicitly limited his focus, some readers will feel his treatment is still overly condensed. For example, he discusses only six battles/campaigns and even those in very little detail. But this approach serves his purpose well—he communicates the flavor of combat without the usual plethora of tactical specifics that can easily pose a confusing maze for the reader who wasn't there. And he includes these actions as necessary to show the changing faces of the war, not to chronicle specific engagements as more important than others.

Although Palmer neither whitewashes nor condemns, he has his favorites and his "goats." General Westmoreland comes off well; although he is

sometimes shown to be overly optimistic on the conduct and expected outcome of the war, no question is raised about his strategic or tactical decisions. Only Giap rates higher on Palmer's list of effective generals, with references to his execution of the first phase of Tet 68 and the masking of his real intentions prior to initiation of that offensive.

Secretary McNamara is shown as having an understanding of the true complexity and eventual futility of America's involvement but not having ability to do anything about it. The reader without a previously formed opinion of the Secretary is more likely to feel sympathy than disapproval.

President Johnson does not fare as well and if anyone in Palmer's story is meant to be shown as the "heavy," it's Johnson. He is portrayed as reluctant and indecisive, as inflicting a humiliating gesture on the Joint Chiefs of Staff by exacting a pledge from each that he could hold Khe Sanh, as a perplexed president, and as possibly our most reluctant and indecisive wartime commander-in-chief.

One is tempted to chide Palmer for his almost complete absorption with the ground war in Vietnam for, with the exception of 17 pages devoted to the bombing of North Vietnam ("yet another example of a strategic air campaign which miscarried"), there is little mention of the naval and air contribution to our military involvement. And his claim that the rather unique fighting in Dalat during Tet was more representative of the battles of Tet than either Saigon or Hue is open to serious question. It is also surprising to find that the key figures in the few battles he describes just "happen" to be well-known personalities today; e.g., Generals Haig, Starry, Berry and Depuy.

But these are minor complaints about what is a most impressive job of bringing a long and confusing period of America's history into sharp focus. Palmer provides clear support for Westmoreland's description, in 1966, of the conflict in South Vietnam as a protracted war of attrition with no clearly defined objective; and he demonstrates convincingly that the war's final outcome represented a political, not military, defeat for America. He closes with a trumpet summons of his own: "There must be no more Vietnams."

This is a book well worth reading and I particularly recommend it to those who are weary of the Hollywood-in-mind approaches, the half-or-worse truths, and the snide innuendoes of the Caputos, Herberts, Buntings and other pseudohistorians of their ilk. Palmer has painted a three-dimensional panorama of a frustrating military involvement that holds many significant lessons for military and political leaders of the future. One can only hope they will read this book and learn the lessons it contains.

WARREN SPAULDING
Colonel, U.S. Army

Safford, Jeffrey J. *Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy 1913-1921*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1978. 282pp.

This book propounds an ambitious thesis: Woodrow Wilson's was the first modern administration to recognize the merchant marine as an instrument of diplomacy. World War I provided first an opportunity to overcome earlier opposition to government involvement in shipping, then a challenge to wrest maritime supremacy from Great Britain. The author proposes to explain how the Wilson administration used the American merchant fleet "as a powerful bargaining agent in the creation of a liberal and pro-American postwar peace."

He begins by reviewing the conflicts among farmers, industrialists, shippers, and congressional leaders that previously had thwarted efforts to implement a national merchant marine

policy. Two chapters then describe how President Wilson and his Secretary of the Treasury, William G. MacAdoo, used the war crisis to increase the size of the American merchant fleet and to secure congressional authorization for government operation of vessels. The latter one-third of the book presents a series of detailed case studies of merchant marine policy. From them the reader gains insight into the administrative complexities in trying to use global shipping shortages as a "lever" for coercing neutrals into cooperation with the United States. Safford also probes the roots of Wilson's 1918-1919 attempts to exert subtle but firm economic pressure against America's wartime associates so as to effect their cooperation in his efforts to create a League of Nations. The book concludes with an account of the efforts of Senator Wesley Jones of Washington and Rear Adm. William S. Benson, a former CNO turned chairman of the U.S. Shipping Board, to write into the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 provisions that would give American flag carriers a near monopoly on U.S. trade.

Safford exploits a wealth of new archival materials untouched by earlier historians in telling his tale. From them he fashions vivid vignettes of the problems such administrators as William G. MacAdoo, Edward N. Hurley, and William S. Benson faced in designing and implementing merchant marine policies. But the book does not measure up to William A. Williams' dustjacket claim that it presents data "in a comprehensible framework and offers a coherent and persuasive analysis and interpretation." If anything, Safford's analytical framework is too narrow. He does not correlate changes in merchant marine policies with parallel developments in the Wilson administration's naval policies. Indeed the author has not examined General Board and Naval Operations papers that shed considerable light on the interrelationship of naval and merchant marine policies. Nor does he put Washington's fears about a commercial "war after the war" in proper perspective. While genuine, these specters haunted policymakers in Tokyo, Rome, and London as well as those in Washington. The chapters, moreover, are poorly structured, making it difficult for even the specialist to follow the author's narrative.

Safford's central thesis, much in the fashion of those found in Soviet historical studies, is frequently asserted but never quite proven. It may in fact be unprovable. As any historian who has dealt with Woodrow Wilson can attest, the President was a complex man who, despite protestations of determination and consistency, not infrequently expressed his thoughts obliquely and changed his mind. Safford also falls into the trap of labeling as Wilsonian administrators who as often as not harbored thoughts and pushed policies quite inconsistent with the aspirations of their chief. One simply cannot speak of *the* Wilson administration policy when, as Safford's own evidence shows, subordinates disagreed and fought with one another.

Despite these weaknesses, the book should interest the naval professional reader. If he is determined enough, the would-be strategist will find in this volume ample evidence of the difficulties governments face in implementing embargoes and other policies of economic coercion. There are also lessons in leadership to be pondered. Safford is at his best in analyzing the problems that beset the second-level administrator—precisely the type of burden that presidents frequently ask distinguished naval officers to bear. Finally, although it deals with another time and a different set of problems, this book cannot help but enlighten and sharpen the judgments of those concerned about contemporary Soviet-American merchant marine rivalries. It stands as a caution to those who would

too hastily draw conclusions about intent from the outcomes of merchant marine policy.

ROGER DINGMAN
University of Southern California

Sharp, U.S. Grant. *Strategy for Defeat, Vietnam in Retrospect.* San Raphael: Presidio Press, 1978. 324pp.

Strategy For Defeat is Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp's personal account of the war in Southeast Asia during the four years (1964-1968) he directed the Pacific Command as its Commander in Chief. He arrived well-equipped for the job: he had worked both at sea and ashore in the Pacific and had served in Washington as Deputy CNO for Plans and Policy. His most recent assignment had been Commander of the Pacific Fleet. Although he exercised supervision over *all* military actions in South Vietnam, Sharp has limited his discussion to the air war over North Vietnam, the conduct of which "had a tremendous influence on the outcome of this conflict and was an especially revealing example of near flagrant misuse of air power."

Beginning with a brief but comprehensive history of military involvement in Vietnam, Sharp records the natural hesitancy that accompanied initial American policies in Southeast Asia and documents the evolution of the ideological schism that existed between the military (JCS, CINCPAC) and the Administration (President, SECDEF, SECSTATE). This initial difference of perspective became an ever-widening gulf separating the civilian leadership from professional military advice. His chronicle draws heavily from messages he sent to the JCS that repeatedly advised vigorous prosecution of specific targets, strikes against Hanoi, destruction of known supply routes, and the mining of Haiphong Harbor. In general, his advice and counsel were largely ignored and his recommendations were stripped of their effectiveness.

From the time he assumed the leadership of the unified Pacific Command, Sharp strongly opposed the Administration's policy of "gradualism." He insists that airpower, unfettered with target restrictions and pauses, would have concluded the war in short order. While many will challenge this assertion, Sharp emphatically states that airpower was misused by the Administration, that restrictions amounted to fighting the war with one hand tied behind our backs. The contrasting views, I am sure, will define the fulcrum of future debates on the effectiveness of airpower in modern conflicts.

Gradualism was the adopted policy of the Administration, articulated and canonized by Secretary of Defense McNamara. This policy was based in part on the prospects of Soviet or Chinese entanglement and the political sensitivity to growing public concern, both domestic and international. It held that "carefully calculated doses of force could bring about predictable and desirable responses from Hanoi, the threat implicit in minimum but slowly increasing force . . . would, it was held by some, ultimately bring Hanoi to the (negotiating) table on terms favorable to the U.S." Sharp argues that a strategy derived from such a policy was doomed to disaster on the basis of both history and common military sense.

Because of a bureaucratic distinction between the ground war in the south and Rolling Thunder, the air war in the north, Sharp could never reconcile his views with the prevailing civilian attitude that somehow the air war was a lesser included case to which the strategy of gradualism was equally applicable.

Despite the modest expansion of the air war in 1966-1967, it remained medicinal; Sharp contends that the results of these measured doses were hardened resolve, stronger commitment, and increased military strength on the part of

the enemy. In Sharp's view, bombing pauses were used by them for resupply, stockpiling munitions and POL in the streets of "restricted areas," building bridges and extending supply lines with each hour of each extension. Bombing restrictions underscore the crucial failure of the strategy in realizing that the air war in the north was inextricably connected to the ground war in the south. Sharp continually pressed for decisive force to be applied to the north, not only to *influence* but to *decide* the outcome in the south. While his proposed strategy and specific tactics are presented in a convincing fashion, Admiral Sharp tends to discount the possibility that real international pressures of which he was not nor could not be aware would have modified his concept of the proper strategy.

Military men who served during this most unpopular and troubling military action will recognize the frustrations and understandable bitterness of Admiral Sharp. More than anything else, his conclusions are repetitions of the lessons of history: military strategy and tactics cannot be orchestrated by rational concepts and limitations; that once committed, military force must be applied swiftly and with all the assets available; and that the civilian leaders "have no business ignoring or overriding the counsel of experienced military professionals in presuming to direct the day-to-day conduct of military strategy and tactics from their desks in Washington . . . ."

Though I sat out most of the war in the prison camps of Hanoi, I did have a front row center seat during the LINEBACKER II strikes of 1972. This vantage point gave me some perspective of what airpower can do. The ashen faces of the guards, the absence of the usual chatter and laughter of the townspeople and the cessation of patriotic music and political harangues from the street corner loudspeakers were powerful evidence that the North Vietnamese had finally recognized *commitment*. Whether the unleashing of this power many years earlier would have brought about a speedier, more favorable end to the war will be debated in the seminars of war colleges for years. I can only say that after seven years of witnessing all the on and off again, limited, airstrikes, I was back in the United States shortly after our first real show of will.

The last chapter of the book may prove disturbing to those who view Vietnam as some incomprehensible mixture of fate and circumstance in U.S. history that could not possibly be repeated. The author is hopeful that his analysis will stimulate thinking, for he fears that "we are already well on the way to our distressing, if quite human, national tendency to bury yesterday's mistakes under today's obsessions, not stopping even to mark the grave in our rush to do so."

Strategy For Defeat is an important piece in the puzzle of one of this country's most controversial periods. Admiral Sharp's studied assessment of waging war is very much the same as the great strategic thinkers have articulated countless times throughout history: "Once the decision has been made to wage war, that leadership must permit the war to be engaged expeditiously and full bore, not halfway. The marine who steps on a land mine that was not interdicted at the enemy's supply port does not die halfway. And the pilot hit by a surface-to-air missile whose site he was not permitted to bomb does not fall halfway out of the sky or spend seven years as a limited prisoner of war." The book is limited in scope and clearly biased in its military perspective but, when interlocked with all the other pieces of the puzzle, it will help future generations see the picture and never forget the vision of a strategy for defeat.

R. CRAYTON
Captain, U.S. Navy

Stern, Ellen, ed. *The Limits of Military Intervention.* Beverly Hills/London: Sage, 1977. 399pp.

Conventional wisdom holds that America's ability to employ military forces abroad now and in the years ahead is strongly influenced by the "Vietnam legacy." Yet the recent spate of books on Vietnam—although they have added much to our understanding of how American involvement came about—have failed to consider in any systematic way the implications of Vietnam for future foreign and defense policies. For the most part we are offered one of two quite superficial perspectives: the "never again" approach that ignores the possibility that the United States may have important interests and obligations abroad; and the "do it better next time" school that seems to accept uncritically the assumptions that led to American involvement in Vietnam some 30 years ago.

The Limits of Military Intervention, the 12th in a series of studies sponsored by the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, is a collection of 18 essays dealing with the issue of military intervention. The Vietnam experience, the authors suggest, is only one of a number of emerging limitations on the use of military force abroad. Other recent and ongoing developments—changes in the international system, new weapons technologies, the shrinking of America's overseas base systems, the shift to an all-volunteer force, and changes in congressional and public attitudes (partly the consequence of Vietnam)—also serve, individually and collectively, to impose restrictions on the use of military forces abroad. The conclusion, in the words of Ellen Stern, the editor, is that

> The limits on . . . military intervention are real. The clearest and notably obvious conclusion . . . is that they are increasing. But the reality of the constraints does not negate the likelihood of particularized military intervention. Crisis situations will arise where a military answer is deemed proper; but the decision makers will have to operate within a narrow scope and delimited time frame.

The essays in this book are uniformly excellent. The papers by Roger Hamburg, Davis B. Bobrow, and Caesar D. Sereseres are valuable in that they deal with subjects, such as command and control, that have not received a great deal of recent attention. Joseph J. Kruzel's chapter, "Military Alerts and Diplomatic Signals," and Paul R. Schratz' essay, "National Decision Making and Military Intervention," provide particularly useful perspectives on policymaking and crisis management. Service readers concerned with carrying out military operations will find much of interest in the essays by John R. Pickett, Michael MccGwire, and Lewis S. Sorley. Sam C. Sarkesian's chapter, "Professional Problems and Adaptations," and John E. Mueller's essay, "Changes in American Public Attitudes toward International Involvement," offer especially good insights into changing professional and public perspectives on military intervention. Finally, Ellen Stern deserves special praise for keeping a diverse group of authors within a coherent framework of analysis and for her stimulating prologue to the book.

This book is exceptionally useful in helping to define the changing dimensions and limitations on military intervention. It fills an important gap in the literature and deserves the widest possible audience among those concerned with foreign and defense policies.

WILLIAM P. SNYDER
Texas A&M University

Strack, Harry R. *Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1978. 296pp.

Sanctions have not compelled white Rhodesians to end their rule. It has been

the barrel of a guerrilla-held gun, not the effect of a U.N.-sponsored boycott, that has driven white Rhodesians to negotiate with Africans and transform their minority into some kind of a majority regime.

If Strack had published *Sanctions* a few years ago, its message would have been clear: boycotts are impossible to maintain in a world where nations (whether of the West or the East blocs) and individuals trade. The mechanism of the market (which includes barter) has helped sustain Rhodesia. Before the cost of war rose and base metals prices fell in 1976, Rhodesia had in fact flourished behind the artificial barrier of sanctions.

There is a second message: Short of ringing a pariah country with troops or occupying its main air and rail stations, there is almost no way in which sanctions can be sustained over a period of years. If imports and exports cannot be halted in the first weeks or months, prime time is lost.

And a third: The threat of sanctions, if not immediately shown to be real and tough, has little likelihood of mandating the policy results that are desired and anticipated by outsiders. One of Strack's main conclusions from the Rhodesian case must be that sanctions are a blunt and unwieldy instrument. They never frightened white Rhodesians sufficiently to encourage more than strenuous and ingenious evasion.

There have been previous studies of Rhodesia since its declaration of independence in 1965 but none has so thoroughly examined the effect of international sanctions upon the economy of Rhodesia, and upon Rhodesia's policies regarding tourism, sport, international involvement generally, etc. Strack shows in some detail how Rhodesia managed to import and export—how such large, visible, and expensive items as diesel locomotives and jet aircraft were purchased overseas; how cotton became a major export commodity; how, in sum, the effects of sanction were easy to cushion. If the United Nations had managed to sunder all communication facilities, however, the maintenance of international commerce would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. Future boycotters should, Strack implies, quickly end most, if not all, postal and telegraph links between the outside world and the nation being boycotted.

In the case of Rhodesia only a few African states cut vital communication links. Britain tried halfheartedly to make postal ties more costly, and many nations sought to prevent international travel by Rhodesians. But these efforts were easy to circumvent, Rhodesians were adept at making mockery of artificial constraints, and, thanks mostly to Portugal and South Africa, Rhodesia proceeded merrily along its prosperous way despite (and sometimes because of) the effect of U.N. resolutions. Even the freezing of Rhodesian accounts in Britain and the United States proved beneficial to capital-hungry Rhodesia, which froze British assets inside Rhodesia and was relieved of the obligation of paying its international sterling debts.

Strack is exceptionally thorough in reviewing every ramification of sanctions. He devotes a chapter to Rhodesia's legal status, another to the theory of sanctions and its application to Rhodesia, a third to the ways in which Rhodesia avoided sanctions politically and diplomatically, a long chapter to all aspects of the economic effects (without benefit of recent research on the subterfuges used by subsidiaries of British and American oil companies knowingly to sell petroleum products to Rhodesia), and then shorter chapters to the ways in which sanctions destroyed Rhodesia's international sporting role but otherwise had little effect on tourism, transportation links, entertainment, labor migration, etc.

Such adjectives as solid, exhaustive, and well-researched describe *Sanctions*. They do too little justice to the care

with which the book was put together and the objectivity of the author. At the same time, Strack has been comparatively unimaginative, for the most part relying upon official sources, newspaper reports, and interviews with participants. He has hinted at but not investigated the official legerdemain that was necessary to combat sanctions and, with some minor exceptions, the elaborate subterfuges used by Rhodesians to minimize the bite of mandatory sanctions.

ROBERT I. ROTBERG
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Thompson, W. Scott. *Power Projection: A Net Assessment of U.S. and Soviet Capabilities.* New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1978 (Agenda Paper No. 7). 83pp.

Following a preface by Frank R. Barnett of the National Strategy Information Center and a foreword by Adm. E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., U.S. Navy (Ret.), the author devotes the first chapter to his definition of "power projection." Necessary for understanding both the title and the remainder of the book, a very broad definition is given that includes "the overall capability to *develop* an *infrastructure of influence*" as well as "the capacity to *inject appropriate instruments* of influence and force" in distant areas. The focus is on power projection below the strategic nuclear level, although the author readily acknowledges that the credibility and effectiveness of projection at these lower levels are very much dependent on the state of the strategic nuclear balance.

The main theme of the book is that, although the United States still possesses projection capabilities superior to those of the U.S.S.R., a combination of increased Soviet capabilities, weakened Western alliances, Third World instability and lack of American will has established a trend in recent years that favors the interests of the Soviet Union. These factors are discussed in chapters 2 through 5 in an interesting manner, but the level of generality and admitted ambiguity inherent in some of the evidence make clear that the author's assessments are based more on perception than on rigorous empiricism and analysis.

In his treatment of the Third World, Thompson is impressed by Soviet successes in projecting influence and he credits them with understanding the desires of Third World leaders. Yet, he later presents a somewhat contrary view and claims most of these leaders would prefer not to be aligned with either superpower and that the Soviets might well be viewed as new colonialists. Indeed, given that short-term successes in the Third World could become mixed blessings and even be the cause of serious problems for the Soviets in the long run, it would seem that caution is in order on direct U.S. involvement in Third World turmoil. However, Thompson is very critical of the U.S. failure to take action in such places as Angola and assails what he calls the current "So-What School of American Foreign Policy." Of course, asking "So-What?" and then going on to give the answer is far better than automatic and unthinking responses to the many crises which occur. Indeed, it is probable that the question was asked in the case of Angola and that the answer was that costs of involvement were likely to outweigh the benefits to be gained.

The final chapter of the book is devoted to prescriptions for remedying the perceived adverse trend. These include: increased efforts to restore strategic parity; ensure retention of existing bases and basing rights; strengthen and coordinate our alliances; advocate nonalignment for the Third World and educate leaders of those states in the dangers of Soviet colonialism; and, of course, work to rebuild U.S. domestic consensus and will.

Both the problems he discusses and the prescriptions he presents are worthy

of continuing examination and discussion. Although this book provides no conclusive answers, it should serve to stimulate thought on these matters and, one hopes, might spur investigation and analysis of greater depth.

A.T. ISAACSON
Commander, U.S. Navy

RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Ann Hardy, with Kathleen Ashook
Doris Baginski and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Alexander, Lewis M. *Regional Arrangements in Ocean Affairs.* Kingston: University of Rhode Island, 1977. 332pp. (AD-A 041 518) $10.50; microfiche $3.00*

Ocean affairs can be conducted through either geographical, management, or operational marine regions. The general acceptance of the 200-mile economic zone could greatly affect these regional systems. This report examines present regional arrangements, views the various thorny problems confronting them, and then projects possible substitute maritime regional plans, considering how such changes as restrictions in semienclosed and other confined water areas could effect U.S. requirements and concerns.

*For sale by the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Va. 22161.

Bell, J. Bowyer. *A Time of Terror.* New York: Basic Books, 1978. 292pp. $10.95

Bell studies the responses of democratic societies to terrorism during the last decade to analyze what influence terrorism has had upon them. He feels that free societies must develop a more analytical and methodical attitude toward terrorism in order to combat it more effectively.

The End of the Keynesian Era: Essays on the Disintegration of the Keynesian Political Economy. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977. 114pp. $18.00

Maynard Keynes died in 1946. The renowned political-economic theory and system of aggregate demand management and intergovernmental cooperation that he evolved for the 1930s and the World War II period—but which continued to be applied into the 1950s and 1960s—are here introspectively and retrospectively critiqued by 12 authors. The consensus is that in today's unstable economy, with the change in balance between labor and capitalism, Keynes' short-range policies are no longer applicable. One author foresees an era of corporatism succeeding the Keynesian era.

Eren, Nuri. *Turkey, NATO and Europe: a Deteriorating Relationship?* Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1977. 54pp. $4.00

Although Turkey remains committed to the NATO Alliance and to full membership in the European Economic Community, her ties with her

Western allies have been threatened by a series of inter-Alliance conflicts and controversies; at the same time, she has improved relations with the Soviet Union, her Arab and Balkan neighbors, and the Third World. A greater degree of mutual respect, understanding, and accommodation will be required on the part of Turkey, the Alliance, and the EEC if the strategically and economically important "Turkish connection" is to continue.

Farwell, Raymond R. *Farwell's Rules of the Nautical Road.* 5th ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 751pp. $18.95

The substantive changes to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea that went into effect 15 July 1977 provided the impetus for this revision of Farwell's classic text. Mariners sailing in waters governed by different rules will be assisted by the two-column format in Part I, wherein the International Rules and the Inland and Pilot Rules are listed side by side. Part II contains the principles of marine collision law. A lengthy appendix supplements the text.

Firkins, Peter C. *Of Nautilus and Eagles: History of the Royal Australian Navy.* Stanmore, N.S.W.: Cassell Australia, 1975. 269pp. $14.95

Firkins recounts the growth of the Australian Navy from its original ship *Victoria* in 1856 through participation in both World Wars, in the Korean conflict, and in the Vietnam theater until Australian withdrawal in 1972. The author gives specifics of not only regular naval operations and engagements but also of coastwatching and mine disposal activities. There are excellent photographic and linear illustrations and several appendixes listing officers and ships 1859 to 1974.

Fox, Harrison W., Jr. and Hammond, Susan W. *Congressional Staffs: The Invisible Force in American Lawmaking.* New York: Free Press, 1977. 227pp. $12.95

The professional staffs on Capitol Hill are nonelected officials who exert great legislative power. This book is devoted to identifying these staffs, their origins, their tenure, their jobs, their organization, their information sources and research methods, and the relationships among themselves and with the elected legislators whom they assist in formulating policy. The data and analysis are based on questionnaires and/or interviews, involving members of both the Congress and the major professional groups.

Garrett, Richard. *Submarines.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1977. 143pp. $14.95

This well-illustrated, popularly presented volume traces the evolution of the submarine, treating its technical development, providing a detailed account of its employment as a critical tactical naval weapon in World Wars I and II, and noting the effects of such use upon history. The final section is devoted to the current trends in British and U.S. submarine capabilities.

Goodspeed, Donald J. *The German Wars, 1914-1945.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. 561pp. $17.50

The author's views are that both World Wars were in actuality one war and that France instead of Germany was the activator of World War I to further her own aims and fortunes. The First World War, deemed to have been unnecessary, was the real cause of the rise of Nazism and Bolshevism in the

defeated nations, leading to World War II, a "necessary" conflict. Goodspeed deplores the lack of moral discipline occasioned by these wars, resulting in violence and the "death of a civilization" induced by forgetting the "higher values."

Harkavy, Robert E. *Spectre of a Middle Eastern Holocaust.* Denver: University of Denver. Graduate School of International Studies, 1977. 126pp. $3.50

Although the extent of Israel's nuclear capability is a matter of conjecture, the author assumes that the Israelis are developing a sophisticated nuclear weapons program in order to determine how such a capability would affect Israel's political position and to analyze what strategic doctrines she might use.

Lehman, John. *Aircraft Carriers: the Real Choices.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1978. 83pp. $3.00

Formulation of a firm building policy for carriers has eluded the last three administrations, yet Lehman, the former deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, argues that a sound program is not only imperative, but possible. In this short paper, he addresses clearly and authoritatively the seven fundamental elements of this complex issue.

Leonid I. Brezhnev: Pages from His Life. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978. 320pp. $$11.95

Relatively few personal glimpses of Brezhnev appear in this biography written under the auspices of the Academy of Science of the Soviet Union. Excerpts from his speeches are interspersed throughout a text that emphasizes the Soviet view of history and foreign policy.

The Limits of Military Intervention, Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. 399pp. $25.00; paper $8.95

This collection of essays analyzes and identifies the agents contributing to the limitations of military intervention: changing social, political, and economic factors, vacillating public attitudes, new trends in military manpower management, and technological developments and controls as they affect actual present and future military operations. In the epilogue, Morris Janowitz epitomizes the objective of this book: to reinterpret the "classical categories for analyzing military organizations and strategy"; his own concept is the use of stabilization and destabilization as a basis for assessing military functions in the international system.

Llerna, Mario. *The Unsuspected Revolution: the Birth and Rise of Castroism.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978. 324pp. $12.50

As a liberal Christian intellectual in Cuba during the 1950s, the author became deeply involved in Fidel Castro's overthrow of the Batista regime. Two years later, in 1958, he had left Cuba to live in the United States. He tells his views of Castro's early organization, and his disillusionment as he witnessed the growth of a totalitarian government with Marxist foundations rather than restoration of the democracy that had struggled for life in Cuba before the days of Batista.

McConnell, James M. *The Gorshkov Articles, the New Gorshkov Book and Their Relation to Policy.* Professional Paper No. 19. Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1976. 93pp. (AD-A 029 227) paper $5.50; microfiche $3.00*

This analysis of Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov's series of articles, "Navies in War and Peace," and his book, *The Sea Power of the State,* focuses on the content and authoritativeness of Gorshkov's works: his concept of command of the sea; the characteristics and requirements of the naval mission he emphasizes; and the relationship of his writings to official military doctrine and the military-political goals of the Soviet state.

*For sale by the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Va. 22161.

O'Kane, Richard H. *Clear the Bridge! The War Patrols of the U.S.S. Tang.* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977. 480pp. $10.00

The submarine U.S.S. *Tang* served for 9 months in 1944 in the Pacific campaign of World War II. During that time she recorded the second highest number of sinkings of any U.S. submarine, earning two Presidential Unit Citations. However, on her fifth war patrol, the last torpedo to be fired proved faulty and ended by destroying the launching vessel. The author of this intense personal account of *Tang's* amazing career was her commander and one of the nine survivors of the fatal patrol.

Parkinson, C. Northcote. *Britannia Rules: the Classic Age of Naval History, 1793-1815.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977. 199pp. $10.86

The living conditions of navy men, the principles by which they fought, and the personalities of the naval and political leaders of the time form the context for this lively account of significant British naval battles during the Wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.

Ra'anan, Gavriel D. *Yugoslavia after Tito: Scenarios and Implications.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. 206pp. $14.50

Possible crises that could occur in Yugoslavia when Tito passes from power are projected from the perspective of Yugoslavia's political and strategic importance to both the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries.

Rich, Michael E. *Competition in the Acquisition of Major Weapons Systems: Legislative Perspectives.* R-2058-PR. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, November 1976. 70pp. $5.00

Based on an examination of past contract awards, this report studies congressional attitudes toward competition between potential defense contractors. Though price and design rivalry affect the acquisition of modern defense systems, modern procurement practices are affected by a number of political and economic considerations that must be taken into account by military planners and systems acquisitions personnel.

Science and the Future Navy: a Symposium. Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1977. 115pp*

Representatives from the scientific community, the fleet, and industry participated in this symposium held in honor of the 30th anniversary of the Office of Naval Research. These papers, outlining possible future connections

between science and the Navy's mission, present a glimpse of what is to come as they pay tribute to the accomplishments of the past.

*For price information, contact Naval Studies Board, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20418.

Shai, Aron. *Origins of the War in the East: Britain, China and Japan 1937-39.* London: Croom Helm, 1977. 267pp. $18.95

In this study of Britain's China policy during the opening years of the undeclared Sino-Japanese War, the author has used recently available documents of the British Foreign Office and Cabinet, as well as Parliamentary and League of Nations publications. He attempts to distinguish Britain's interests in China, the factors determining her policy, and the nature of her role in this struggle, showing how it was influenced by the need to protect British subjects in the area and by the Communist threat there.

Snider, Lewis W. *Arabesque: Untangling the Patterns of Supply of Conventional Arms to Israel and the Arab States and the Implications for United States Policy on Supply of "Lethal" Weapons to Egypt.* Denver: University of Denver. Graduate School of International Studies, 1977. 151pp. $3.50

The supplier's maintenance of control over the eventual use of weapons once they have been transferred to the recipient is the problem treated in this study that seeks to demonstrate the applicability of quantitative methods of analysis to questions of foreign policy.

Sutter, Robert G. *China-Watch: toward Sino-American Reconciliation.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. 155pp. $10.95

Communication between Peking and Washington from 1959 to 1972 was an indirect process based on careful analysis of official statements and public media output. Through his association with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), the author has had access to detailed files and analytical reports that he uses to study the mutual perceptions and misperceptions that persisted during those years, and the effect they had on developing Sino-American relations.

Thorne, Christopher. *Allies of a Kind.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 772pp. $29.50

This is a wide-reaching study of the British-American alliance, its policies toward the Far East during World War II, and the international consequences of those policies after the war.

Vanezis, P.N. *Cyprus, the Unfinished Agony.* London: Abelard-Schuman, 1977. 141pp. $9.75

The web of ethnic and political confusions and national and international problems obstructing the settlement of the Cyprus question are clarified in this brief work that also offers a program for positive action in the situation. Appendixes provide texts of pertinent documents as well as a chronological review of Cypriot history.

Walters, Vernon A. *Silent Missions.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978. 654pp. $12.95

An insider's view of U.S. policy during the last 30 years, this autobiography recounts the extraordinary career of Lieutenant General Walters who enlisted

as a private in 1941 and retired as a deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency. His ability as a linguist and as an intelligence officer enabled him to serve five presidents in various capacities: interpreter; military attaché to France and Italy; member of NATO standing groups; and participant in the Paris Peace Talks.

Whitlow, Robert H. *U.S. Marines in Vietnam; the Advisory and Combat Assistance Era 1954-1964.* Washington: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1977. 190pp. $6.75*

First in a series of nine monographs tracing Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnamese war, this history has two main objectives: to provide military, scientific, and geographical background information for subsequent volumes; and to describe the evolution of Marine Corps activities in Vietnam during the first decade. The narrative is largely based on unpublished documents, official Marine Corps records, command diaries, and interviews–in those areas where official documentation is scarce or nonexistent.

*For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Washington, D.C. (Stock No. 008-055-00094-7)

CUMULATIVE INDEX

Volume XXXI

(This index includes the articles in volume XXXI. For earlier articles see *Naval War College Review Index: 1948-73*, May-June 1974 and 1975, Spring issue of 1976 and 1977, and Summer 1978 issue.)